THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

COMMUNITY

LABOUR IN THE CHANGING WORLD

THE WEB OF GOVERNMENT

THE ELEMENTS
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

BY

R. M. MACIVER

PROFESSOR, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY



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CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF SOCIETY

I. WHAT SOCIETY MEANS

WHEREVER there is life there is society. For life can raise and continue only in its own presence, in the society of like beings. In the lowest stages of development the society whence new life arises is incredibly brief and slight, a mere moment of conjunction or proximity, but in the higher stages life is always obviously social. It is born and nurtured in society, it finds its degree of fulfilment, its character, its limitation, in society. Society is more than our environment: it is our nature. It is within us as well as around us. Aristotle revealed this truth long ago when he defined man as a 'social animal'. All animals are in their degree social, but the highest is of necessity the most social.

Society means likeness. It exists among like beings, like-bodied and like-minded. Otherwise they could not join to pursue their purposes, they could not in any sense live together. Comradeship, intimacy, association of any kind or degree would be impossible without some understanding of each by the other, and that understanding depends on the likeness which each apprehends in the other. Likeness may exist without creating society. There are serious qualifications of the principle that 'God always brings the like to the like', or that 'birds of a feather flock together', since the limitations of intelligence as well as the psychical (no less than the physical) difficulties of free communication may prevent their recognition. On the other hand, there cannot be society without likeness. Difference is also necessary to society, but difference by itself creates no society, only difference which is felt to be subordinate to likeness, thus affording the ground for reciprocal service towards common ends. Primary likeness and secondary difference create the greatest of all social institutions—the division of labour.

Society means interdependence. The first society, the family life, rests on the biological interdependence of the sexes. Each by itself is incomplete, and seeks fulfilment by aid of the other. As society advances this principle is vastly extended. The area of interdependence grows. The forms of interdependence multiply. In the primitive world the small group, the clan or tribe or village community, is self-contained; it contributes nothing and it owes nothing to the world outside. On the outskirts of that narrow circle lies the hostile, a peril and a possible prey; beyond that the unknown. To-day not only countries but also continents depend upon one another, and when communications are interrupted, as by war, they all suffer together. This growing interdependence is intensive as well as extensive. 'The history of man,' as I have elsewhere expressed it, 'is in one aspect the history of the growth of an organization which diversifies the work of each, making each more dependent on others, in order that by the surrender of self-sufficiency he may receive back a thousandfold in fullness of life.'[1]

Society means co-operation, and therefore also economy. Society is the exact antithesis of war. War means mutual destructiveness of units or groups animated by the sense of opposing interests; society means the mutual constructiveness of units or groups animated by some sense of common interests. The wastefulness of war is likewise in direct antithesis to the economy of society. The nature of this social co-operation and its resultant economy will be more fully considered in the next section, on the division of labour.

Society means likeness, interdependence, co-operation, economy, but in so saying we have not penetrated to the meaning of society. For society is an infinitely interwoven series of relationships, issuing from the wills and purposes of beings who realize their likeness and their interdependence, in a word, their community. It is, therefore, in the first place *a state or quality of mind*, not a mere means or agency for the comfort or convenience of the beings so minded. The social relation of mother and child, for instance,

[1] *Labour in the Changing World*, c. i.

consists in an attitude of mother to child, expressing the nature of both; and in an attitude of child to mother, also expressing the nature of both. This is the social fact, as distinct from the mere biological fact, and a myriad of such social facts constitutes society.

Herein we must find the true nature of society, and having understood it we can pass to consider the attributes which flow from it. Society is then revealed as the extension of individuality, the transcendence of self-enclosedness, the vehicle of personal identity, the means of the continuation of personality through the generations, the nurse of youth, the arena of manhood and womanhood, the organization of the human conquest of nature and the refuge of the human spirit against its unpitying law, the repository of the gathered customs and filtered traditions of men, the summed experience of life, the sphere of a thousand lesser conflicts and unities within the embracing purpose of one community.

II. THE DIVISION OF LABOUR

Of all social institutions the division of labour is the most universal, being co-extensive with society itself. The term *division of labour* obscures the character of the institution, for it is in the first place a form of co-operation. It is more, however, than co-operation. Men may co-operate without division of labour, as when a group of navvies dig a ditch or a group of sailors haul a rope. Division of labour involves the assignment to each unit or group of a specific share of a common task. It may be so ordained by elementary nature, as in the family division of labour between father and mother in the nurture of children. Or at the other end it may be due to a deliberate calculation which assigns men distinct tasks for the sake of foreseen economies. The double advantage of specialization, that it enabled men both to acquire skill, ease, and reliability in their work, and also to select their work in accordance with varying natural aptitude, was the chief *economic* stimulus which led to the extension of this institution. But the division of labour could extend only as the area of effective society extended. It is limited, as Adam

Smith put it, by 'the extent of the market'. Thus it proved from the first an important agent of social evolution, tending always to widen the range of society. The enormous economy of co-operation fought, here as elsewhere, against the waste of exclusiveness.

As the division of labour permeates further, it creates a new type of social cohesion. M. Durkheim, in his clever study, *La Division du Travail Social*, calls this new solidarity 'organic' as distinct from 'mechanical'. While the appropriateness of the terms may be questioned, the idea is important. This new solidarity arises from the recognized dependence of each on each, not simply from the general sentiment of likeness or kinship. Take one member or group of members away from a primitive society, and it makes little difference to the functioning of the whole. The member or group of members does not as a rule need to be replaced in order that the normal life of the community should continue. Take one member or group away from a society in which the division of labour is advanced, and it makes generally a greater difference. Each part is dependent on every other. Nearly every class of workers, as it becomes specialized, becomes necessary to every other. If it dropped out altogether or ceased to function there would be ruinous disruption, and even its partial or temporary withdrawal, as in the case of a strike, may have the most serious consequences for the community. This is the other side of the new 'solidarity'. Under the division of labour each specialized interest organizes itself and learns its power. Where each is necessary to every other each has power over all. This common lever of power makes for a kind of equality. In a very literal sense it pulls down the mighty from their seats and exalts those of low estate. For the mere threat of the withdrawal of service becomes a formidable weapon, and its strength depends, not on the social estimation, but on the immediate social necessity of the threatened service. The need of society is more immediate (which does not of course mean greater) for dustmen than for judges and for dock-labourers than for members of parliament. Here is a

significant challenge to the old bases of authority. It points to a new kind of social order, broader-based than any that has existed in the past. But in the process of obtaining it there arise conflicts which shake society. The new solidarity does not come as an automatic result of the division of labour, but only through the recognition, which must be slowly and painfully achieved, of the readjustments imposed by interdependence.

It has been well pointed out by Marshall[1] that in the industrial sphere it is not *skill* but *work* which is being specialized. Industrial skill is to-day more generalized than it was in the handicraft age. It is no longer the special aptitude acquired by long years of initiation into a particular art that counts, but the general capacity to utilize, control, and develop the common technique of production. The remarkable diversion of workers from other industries into munition-making in modern warfare would have been quite impossible before the age of machinery. In the handicraft days a great barrier separated each art from every other—the art of the smith, say, from the art of the shoemaker. A long and necessary period of apprenticeship stood between. To-day the process of production demands, not an acquired dexterity in the working of a particular material by particular tools, but the common intelligence, whether it be great or small, that can learn and control the operations of a machine. This is one of the factors which have led towards a unification of interest on the part of the 'working classes'.

The division of labour is too apt to be identified with certain of its extremer industrial manifestations and its social significance accordingly misunderstood. The truer view is attained when we reflect that there is division of labour, not only between specialized mechanics in the production of a manufactured good, but also between mechanic and farmer, between those who organize and those who operate, between all these and doctor and teacher and actor and artist and magistrate; in fine, between all who contribute to their

[1] *Principles of Economics*, iv, vi, 2.

society any service that their society requires. So comprehended, it appears that the social benefits of the division of labour are inherent or essential, while its disadvantages are, however great they be, incidental. Much that is set down to the account of the division of labour is more justly attributable to the changing technique of mechanical industry through which, at a particular time, the division of labour is realized. Should we blame the division of labour for the lack of sanitation or the exploitation of childhood associated with the early stages of the factory system? But these evils have been to a very great extent removed while the division of labour has grown. In like manner we should beware of condemning this fundamental institution for the monotony to which the modern factory worker is subject, or again for the greater automatism which certain projects of 'scientific management' have sought to impose. Specialization as such may mean not less but more interest. It is significant that in the professions and in the arts every one prefers to be a specialist. Given the right conditions a man may be 'bounded in a nutshell' and find himself 'king of infinite space'. It may also be significant that to-day the least specialized occupations, those nearest to an earlier age, are the least attractive. Witness the shortage of domestic servants and of farm workers. The career of all others which is least specialized (though slowly moving in that direction), the service of the home, is the fullest of drudgery of them all. It is shunned as a paid occupation, and is assumed by the wife because, and because only, of motives associated with the life of the family.

We have therefore to distinguish between the essential character and service of the division of labour and the conditions imposed at any period by the technique of production. That technique will change and the conditions it imposes—or is suffered, sometimes needlessly, to impose—but the division of labour will not on that account be stayed. The division of labour goes hand in hand with man's conquest of knowledge and of nature. It is an index of civilization. It is the necessary way by which men find release from

the rigour of the command: 'In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread.' It permits that liberation from material necessities, that leisure of the toiler for other and higher pursuits, that emancipation of intelligence and sensibility which broadens the bases of civilization. This will appear more clearly when we come, in the next chapter, to describe the procession of social stages.

III. COMMUNITY, ASSOCIATION, AND INSTITUTION

It is most desirable that every student of social science should learn to attach a definite and single meaning to the primary terms of his vocabulary. Just as the physicist gives precision to such terms as 'atom', 'force', 'momentum', etc., and the biologist to such terms as 'cell', 'life', 'organism', etc., so must the sociologist to the terms which express social characters and relations. It is even more necessary to insist on such precision in our study, because our terms are not themselves technical. They are terms of everyday speech, and so are often employed loosely and interchangeably. We must begin, therefore, by attaching distinct meanings to our essential terms 'society', 'community', 'association', and 'institution'.

'Society' we shall use in the very widest sense, to include every kind and degree of relationship entered into by men—and any other social creatures—with one another. All our other terms will then express particular types or varieties of social fact or situation. Society, when used without qualification, means the whole system of social relationships.

'Community' properly signifies any whole area of social life, such as a village, or town, or country. It is any circle in which a common life is lived, within which people more or less freely relate themselves to one another in the various aspects of life, and thus exhibit common social characteristics. It is inevitable that people who over any length of time enter freely into social relationships should develop social likenesses, should have some common social ideas, common customs, common traditions, and the sense of belonging together. A community may be small or great. A great

community, such as a nation, will enclose a number of small communities, localities, and groups with more intense and more numerous common qualities. Small communities are sometimes semi-isolated in the midst of greater ones, especially in countries to which immigrants flock and where they form, as it were, islands of their own peculiar life. Thus it is seen that community is a matter of degree. What we should particularly bear in mind is that community means *any circle of common life.* Common life is more than organization or relationship. When we use the term 'society' we think more particularly of organization, but when we use the term 'community' we should think of something greater—the life whence organization springs and of which organization is but the means.

The distinction between 'community' and 'association' is apparent if we take one or two examples. We should call a city a community, but not, in our sense, a church or a college or trade union or a local or city council. We should call a country a community, but not a national association of traders or manufacturers. The church or the trade union or the manufacturers' association or any corporate body is an organization existing within some community. It is an organization deliberately formed for the collective pursuit of some interest or set of interests which the members of it share. But such interest or set of interests is always narrower than the whole range of a common life. It is partial, however important it may be. Hence it has to be specially organized. It pursues in a definite way definite purposes which are not comprehensive of all the purposes of its members, still less of all the purposes of the whole community to which they belong. A community, on the other hand, is integral, not partial. It does not exist for the pursuit of special interests. It is not deliberately created. It has no beginning, no hour of birth. It is simply the whole circle of common life, more comprehensive, more spontaneous than any association.

One remarkable feature of more recent social development has been the multiplication of associations within the community. In former times a few types of associations seemed

to suffice: state and church and guild, for example. To-day there are myriads in every developed community. Every single interest or purpose that men share with any other men now prompts to an association. These are of all kinds and degrees of permanence. Some exist to achieve an immediate purpose, say the passing of some piece of legislation, and if and when that purpose is achieved the association ceases to exist. Others stand for permanent purposes of human life, in which class come the family and the state. We shall have occasion later to classify the various types of association, and shall then see more fully the infinite ramifications of associational activity in the modern community.

We have called the family and the state associations. These offer good criteria of the distinction between association and community. In the primitive social world the family—or more strictly the kin-group—was almost comprehensive with community. To-day the family is very distinctly an association. It is not the whole common life of its members, but a specially organized part of it, deliberately established in the first instance by the marriage contract. All associations, unlike community itself, rest on a specific covenant, whether expressed or implied, of its adult members.

So with the state, the most comprehensive of them all and therefore the most easily confounded with community. It is highly important that we should realize that the state is not a community, not a whole common life, but only a particular association for its furtherance. The identification of community and the state has led, alike in theory and in practice, to disastrous conclusions. This false conception, accepted by a long line of political theorists, has lent support to the principle of the unlimited sovereignty of the individual state, such that it owes no express obligation to others, being by nature a completely independent and morally unlimited power. It has justified the exclusiveness of governments by which, under the stimulation of selfish interests, they have denied the common interest which binds people to people, and striven to isolate, only in fact to frustrate and to destroy, the conditions of the welfare of each. Within the state it has

led to tyrannous encroachment over the free life of other associations, to a coercive uniformity in respect of religion, education, language, and opinion, against which the creative spirit in man has had to wage incessant war. The state is an association of fundamental value, because to it belongs the establishment and maintenance of the whole system of enforceable rights and obligations, the basis of order and of liberty. It is an essential association of community, but it is not community. Nor can it fulfil its vast social function aright unless that distinction is realized.

A further distinction may now be made, between 'community' and 'association' on the one hand and 'institution' on the other. To illustrate, we should call monogamy an institution, but the family an association; the party-system an institution, but the state an association; baptism an institution, but the church an association. Institutions are established and recognized forms of relationship between social beings. They may be so established either by particular associations, as in the instances above mentioned, or by the community in general. Established customs or 'folkways' belong to the latter class. Not infrequently an association takes over for special protection some institution which originally was a spontaneous creation of community. This is specially the way of the state. It has, for example, taken over the institution of property, originally a communal institution, and made it a legal institution. Social institutions make a great network of organization, which both serves and controls the life of men in society. There is always a danger of institutions becoming stereotyped, of their coming, by age or habituation, to seem to exist in their own right, or of their growing into an engine of power quietly manipulated by a dominant few or many, and thus exercising a social control divorced from the principle of social service. Every progressive community needs therefore continuously to examine its institutions so that they shall the better serve the changing needs of the age.

IV. SOCIOLOGY, THE SCIENCE OF SOCIETY

There is a group of sciences which study particular aspects of social life. Of these politics is perhaps the most ancient, while economics is the youngest and most aggressive. Others are jurisprudence, penology, comparative ethics, and perhaps eugenics. None of these sciences studies society as a whole. They are not concerned with its whole structure, with the character or evolution of the whole interdependent mass of its functions and relationships. They select for study the working of particular social motives, such as the economic, particular associations such as the state, particular institutions such as law. They thus leave room for, in fact they invite, a more comprehensive science. This is the science now named sociology.

The name is a very modern one. It was coined by Auguste Comte, who was the first thinker of the modern world clearly to set out the fact that all the aspects of social life are bound in a unity and to show that this unity has an evolutionary character. But the comprehensive study of society is much older than its name and its re-establishment by Comte. It was the object of Plato's masterpiece, *The Republic*, really an analysis of the city community in all its aspects. It was pursued confusedly in many treatises on 'politics', before the distinction between state and community was apprehended. Later it appeared under the guise of the 'philosophy of history', which was little more than the pre-scientific study of social evolution. It was the great service of Comte that he removed these confusions, and put forward a distinct method for the scientific study of society.

There are some who still deny the right of sociology to be named a science, but this is itself an unscientific attitude. For the reign of law does not stop at the borders of society. Society is a living whole, every part bound to every other. It has laws peculiar to itself, appropriate to its character as a unity of consciously related beings. It reveals a process of evolution, with stages as clearly marked as, though even more complex than, those of plant or animal or the earth

itself. All manner of false ideas, which Comte described as 'theological' and 'metaphysical', have stood in the way of this study. We naturally think of ourselves in society as free agents, but we misinterpret this idea of freedom if we imagine that our past does not change our present, that our character and experience do not determine our actions, or that our environment does not reflect itself in our thoughts and in our destinies. We are all bound up in law, the law of our own nature—which is but another name for our freedom—and the law of the outer world, which we call necessity. It has been said that a shudder ran through men when they first read in the pages of Buckle, one of the followers of Comte, that the rise and fall in the price of wheat was directly correlated with the marriage-rate, and that the number of suicides, illegitimate births, and lost parcels was relatively constant. What the ordinary man accepts—customs, institutions, social divisions, and other phenomena—as simply manifestations of an inscrutable human nature, the social scientist pursues further back, seeking their origin and their principle, believing that human nature too has its laws, and that it is always both reacting to and reshaping its environment, social and physical.

The task of social science is to find guiding threads of principle through the infinite variety of processes and activities which make up social life. It has to avoid the danger of becoming a mere summary or smattering of the particular social sciences. It studies man as social being. This is its special field, not man in relation to property or anything else that is external to him, but man in relation to his fellows. It studies the particular ways and usages that express these relationships, and beyond that it unfolds the nature of community, the greater common life that is the matrix of the particular associations, family, state, economic corporation, trade union, church, club, and all the rest.

V. THE METHOD OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Social science has hitherto suffered greatly from the attempt to make it conform to methods derived from the

older and more abstract sciences. It has led us, for one thing, to look for impossible results, and to be disappointed at not getting them. We inquire, for example, after the manner of physical sciences, which of two related social phenomena is cause and which effect. It usually turns out, in the social sphere, that both are cause and both are effect. Does the kind of education account for the standard of intelligence in a community? True, but does not the standard of intelligence account for the standard of education? Was slavery in the ancient world due in part to the lack of technical development? Doubtless, but was not the lack of technical development due in part to the institution of slavery? Was the severity of the criminal code a hundred years ago due to the amount of crime? May it not be replied that the amount of crime was also due to the severity of the criminal code? Are low wages a cause of poverty? Yes, but is not poverty a cause of low wages? Intemperance is a source of destitution, but destitution is also a source of intemperance. Such examples could be multiplied indefinitely. One can reverse, with some degree of truth, almost any statement of social causation. Social causation is nearly always reciprocal. Unless we realize this fact we will be asking wrong questions and finding wrong answers—though questions of a type that might be legitimately asked in other scientific spheres where another kind of causation prevails.

Let us then illustrate the true nature of social law. Suppose we take some social phenomena in which we are interested, say the declining birth-rate. The problem is to bring it into relation to a complex of interactive factors of more or less importance. To understand it we have to see how it is bound up with changes in education, in the standard of comfort, in the applications of hygiene and medical science; how again it is connected with the development of city life, with the breaking down of old class distinctions and the development of democratic institutions, with the decay of militarism, with the legal and social emancipation of women, with the decline in religious beliefs. At whatever

point we start in a social investigation we discover a complex of interdependent factors somehow bound up in that all-too-little-understood process which we call social evolution. The uninitiated is ready to ask, What is the cause of the decline of the birth-rate? expecting an answer as simple as might be given to the question, What is the cause of an earthquake? In social science phenomena are not nearly so isolable as in the mathematical and physical sciences. Not only because of their own peculiar nature but also because of the way they interact, they must be studied on a different plan.

It is a common view that science begins and ends with measurement. Whether or not this is true of physical science, it is certainly not true of social science. Even in the physical sphere the mind that discovers measure is really seeking something more. It seeks to understand, not merely to compute. Light and colour mean more to the mind than vibrations and wave-lengths, and that more always eludes measurement. Heat is not to be understood as the dance of atoms. It is something we feel. Music is more than combinations of sound waves, nor will all the computation in the world bring the knowledge of harmony. Or take our knowledge of time itself. The real time we live through refuses to be broken up into a succession of mathematical points. We are apt to think we know what time is because we can measure it, but no sooner do we reflect upon it than that illusion goes.

So it appears that the range of the measurable is not the range of the knowable. There are things we can measure, like time, but yet our minds do not grasp their meaning. There are things we cannot measure, like happiness or pain, and yet their meaning is perfectly clear to us. Perhaps, after all, we can measure only the external, the unknown, and can know only the internal, the conscious state, the incommensurate. In which case science, if it is limited to the measurable, is limited to the unknown, perhaps even to the unknowable. It is then a means to power, not to understanding. It is our weapon to conquer and control nature, not to comprehend her. It is only quantity we can measure,

but it is only quality we can experience. Science then counts the throbs of nature, but does not feel them. They are to her as the beats of a vast mechanism, fulfilling eternally eternal laws. But the question, Why?—the only question that matters, the first question of childhood, the last of age—that she cannot answer.

All this follows if science is confined to measurement. But it would be too paradoxical to conclude that science, the express term for all that is clear and illuminate, is concerned only with the unknown. But here our object is only to vindicate the claim of social science. In the study of society we have to do with the relationships of conscious beings, with the motives and purposes that determine these, with the ways of living and acting which depend upon them. None of these things can be measured. There is a very common confusion of the commensurate and the incommensurate in social science. We can add the wealth of a group or a nation and get some kind of total. We can add its man-power and get a total. But we cannot make a sum of its health or its habits or its culture. A thousand weak purposes cannot be rolled into one strong purpose as a thousand weak units of force are joined into one strong force. We cannot add wisdom as we can add wealth. A thousand mediocrities do not sum up into one genius. Likewise of joy and sorrow. The suffering of a thousand is not more intense than that of a single heart, for it is a thousand who suffer it. The woe of a stricken people is a myriad circles of woe which its members feel only as individuals—save in so far as their sympathy for their kind adds to each a further suffering. In times of general misfortune this is a legitimate consolation, for it can come only to those who abjure the mass-idea of mankind, who know that one heart can suffer whatever there is of suffering and enjoy whatever there is of joy.

The root distinction here is that between means and ends. Social science is concerned with the relation of means to ends, as it is actually worked out in the structure of society. Power and wealth are means, not ends; they are the means

to some kind of satisfaction or fulfilment, and have no significance apart from that. Only means are cumulative, nor can we measure the degree of fulfilment in terms of the amassing of the means through which it is sought. The divorce of means from ends, the engrossment in projects of power or wealth, as if these were significant in themselves, the assumption that the measure of the means is also the measure of the ends, this has been a most dangerous delusion in many an age, our own not least.

There has been a tendency to deny the name of science to those studies which do not admit of exactitude, but if they add to our understanding their exclusion would only narrow the universality and the work of science. The search for the significant, that after all is the wider task of science. In its house are many mansions. Each science has its appropriate method which need not be that of any other science. The study of social states is as significant as the study of physiological or of physical states, but it is different and requires a different method. Ideas do not associate or cohere like atoms or like cells. The growth of society is a synthesis vastly unlike the growth of a plant. The thoughts and emotions of men are forces that amazingly change the world, but they cannot be measured by any dynamometer. We do not deny that some aspects and conditions of society are subject to measurement. We can establish rates that measure population changes, changes in various expressions of public opinion, the frequency of occurrence of certain social phenomena and so forth. But beyond these indices, and to give them meaning, we must study ways of living, the manners and mores of the people, the relation between men and institutions, the impact on social behaviour of many changing conditions, the relation between the leaders and the led, the changing social myths of the times, and the whole intricate network of associational activity. We must seek to see these things as *meaningful* changes, to be discovered by patient exploration. We cannot understand them by any mechanical process of adding and substracting. We may assess, but we cannot *measure*, their social significance,

In the scale of the sciences, from our present viewpoint, mathematics stands at one end and social science at the other. The former deals with the most abstract, the latter with the most concrete, of subjects; the one with the ultimate forms of mere existence, the other with the ultimate of realities. Quantitative relations hold of social as of all other facts, but they are quite inadequate to reveal the nature of the former. The social scientist needs, for example, statistics, not for their own sake, but because they serve as indices to facts of another order altogether. Thus what are called vital statistics give us most necessary and valuable indications of changes taking place within society, changes not merely in health conditions, but changes in mode of life and thought, changes in the character of the family, in the whole system of ideals and traditions that animate society. To get the figures is, or should be, easy; to interpret them is the much more arduous task of the social scientist.

It follows from what has been said that we must not look on society as if it were a kind of great mind or 'soul', or, again, an enlarged organism. This would make social science merely a sort of psychology or biology. The science has been much impeded by the attempt to follow out these methods. Herbert Spencer, for example, elaborately applied the idea of organism to society, and in consequence most of his sociology is obsolete. Social beings do form a unity, a unity which can be studied and analysed, but a unity unlike any other, neither a whole of aggregated parts nor yet some greater body or soul in whose life they live—for it is only they, the parts, that live. The social structure is one, but the life is many-centred, not unified like the structure. Here we touch the great fact which marks off social science from all others—the fact of immanent purpose in the members of society making a new form of explanation necessary. In the physical sciences the idea of immanent purpose is out of place, here it is essential. The law of purpose works through the laws of the physical and the organic, not abrogating these, not deflecting them one iota from their course, but nevertheless using and applying them. In the

social explanation of industry, of transportation, of agriculture, this overruling purpose, and not the laws of mechanics or biology of which it makes use, is what matters. A world war is not explained as a social phenomenon by the principles of chemistry and engineering. During the First World War some journalist wrote an article on the 'Curse of Petrol', pointing out that without petrol whole nations could never have been massed for war, and its range of destruction would have been narrowed. One might as well have written of the 'Curse of Gravitation'. It was but one of the innumerable instruments and conditions of human purpose. Similarly at the present time many men regard the epoch-making discovery of the control of atomic fission as a deadly evil. It is indeed a deadly danger, but only because men themselves may use it for wholesale destruction. In itself it is but one of the many great potentialities for good or evil that the genius of man has learned to control. All other law is but the environment of social law. The latter lies beyond the range of measurement, though it measures all else. It has its own sphere and its own method, and only confusion ensues from the long-prevalent attempt to assign it to the sphere and method of other sciences.

CHAPTER II

THE STAGES OF SOCIETY

I. CLASSIFICATION

IN this chapter our object is to distinguish, by description of their characteristic features, various types of human society as they have emerged in the greater history of the race, written and unwritten. In a later chapter we shall try to discover some thread of evolutionary law running through this vast process. We shall seek for a clue to social history, in the hope that it may enable us to link stage to stage in the unfolding of society. But for the present we are concerned with description, not with law. It is thus a preparatory chapter. We are all familiar with the expression, the 'ages of mankind'. We must try to attach definite conceptions to these, our interest being focused on the nature of their social structure.

These ages are usually named in terms of some simple feature whose changing character makes a change of civilization. We take, for example, the names of various materials which seem to typify the economic life of different periods, and so we distinguish the Stone Age, the Bronze Age, the Iron Age, perhaps also the Steel Age and the Coal Age. In this sense we may now be entering the Atomic Age which, according to our social wisdom or folly, will either raise civilization to a new level or else destroy us altogether. Or again we take the successive occupations which give character to the whole social organization. Thus we may roughly distinguish the hunting stage, the pastoral stage, the agricultural stage, the industrial stage. Or again we may take the various ways in which sex and kinship are instituted and controlled within the social structure, and so distinguish the primitive endogamous society, such as we find among Bushmen or Veddahs, where the small group marries freely within itself; the exogamous society, as we find it, for

instance, among totemistic peoples, no man of one totem being permitted to marry a woman of the same totem; matronymic societies, in which the husband is affiliated to his wife's clan and their children take name and place within it; patronymic societies, both polygamous and monogamous, in which descent is traced through the male line and the family takes on a more definite and limited form.

But these distinctions, though most of them can be exemplified by existent peoples, imply a succession of social stages leading back beyond history, and abound in difficulties which cannot here be considered.

Other forms of classification, such as that which distinguishes between 'nature-peoples' and 'culture-peoples', or again the well-known system of Comte, according to which mankind passes through three stages named respectively 'theological', 'metaphysical', and 'positive', have only an indirect reference to the social structure, and are more suggestive than conclusive. We must content ourselves here with a brief survey of the historical forms of social organization among those peoples which have achieved a dominant place in the civilization of the world.

II. THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY

If the whole record of the world were opened to our eyes we could never say at any point, Here and thus did society begin. We could by no searching find the origin of society, for it lies hidden in the origin of life. The first form of society is the family, but not the family as we know it in our higher human civilization. The first society is the family, but never the mere family. It is rather a small circle of sociality controlled and perpetuated by the sense of kin. The family in some sense, the group founded on the recognition of more or less permanent sex-relationships, must have been the first form of social orders. By the very nature of things the family in the narrower sense cannot exist in isolation, cannot be a self-contained society. Endogamy has limits. Each family is a nucleus within the kin-group, and each new pairing weaves new family relationships within it.

History and literature afford us glimpses of that very early stage where family and society were almost one. There is the famous story of the Cyclopes, of which the *Odyssey* (ix, 112–5) tells us: 'Each rules over his children and wives, and they pay no heed to one another.' Aristotle quotes this passage in his *Politics* (i, 2) and adds: 'For they lived dispersedly, as was the way in ancient times.' Nor was this the mere imagination of a poet. There remain in the world to-day among such wretched peoples as the Ceylon Veddahs quite close approximations to the 'Cyclopean' life. This is the nearest approach to that 'state of nature' of which the political theorists used to speak, and in that condition the life of man is well represented by the words of Hobbes, 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'.

How, out of this primitive condition, by what processes of integration into clan and tribe and people, correspondent to what discoveries in the ways of food-getting and tool-making and what developments of authority and of custom, the next stages of society emerged we cannot here inquire. We must pass to the great step with which history proper may perhaps be said to begin, the settling of the tribe into the village community.

The village community is a stage which a very large portion of mankind must have reached or passed on the way to civilization. It is not, as Maine thought, a peculiarly 'Aryan' institution, being found in many parts of the earth, among Fijis and Basutos no less than among Hindus and Europeans. It is the settlement of human swarms in permanent habitations on a definite area of land, which, being owned in common, is partitioned out for cultivation. To each family a homestead, to the community the common soil—that is the general principle of the village community. We can still trace the process by which the wandering tribe passed into the village community. Sometimes a tribe settles into a number of separate villages, held together by the common authority of tribal chief or priest. Sometimes a group remains partly nomad while partly settled in village life. This may occur, for example, where the group depends

in part on agriculture, in part on herds of sheep or cattle. An interesting survival of this condition, occurring in the little isolated Hebridean isle of Heisgeir, is described as follows:

'It consists of ten tenants, or more properly twelve, because two of the ten have two shares each instead of one: these I shall call the villagers. The dwelling-houses of the village are made of wattling, plastered over on both sides with boulder clay and whitewashed with lime. There are as officers of the community the maor [*sic*], the constable, and the herdsman. The maor is appointed by the lord's factor, and acts for the lord as a kind of sub-factor. The constable is elected by the villagers in a most primitive and interesting manner. The people meet together at a gathering called Nabac (neighbourliness), or if presided over by the maor, it is called mod, moot—the official title of the assembly thus following the official mode of meeting. The place of meeting is locally known as Cnoc na Comhairle, the Council Hill, or Clach na Comhairle, the Council Stone. The constable having been elected, he takes off his shoes and stockings, uncovers his head, and bowing reverently low, promises in presence of heaven and earth, of God and of men, that he will be faithful to his trust. At Hallowtide the villagers meet and decide upon the piece of ground within their mark which is to be broken up for arable cultivation, a different piece being selected every three years, and the old ground put under grazing as before. This land is called Scat, Clar, or Leob.

'The allotment of the land is the next process. The constable takes a rod and divides the scat into equal divisions. At the boundary of each division he cuts a mark in the ground, which is called by the curious name of Torc, and resembles the broad arrow of the Ordnance Department. A man, probably the herdsman, is then sent out from the meeting, and each of six men then put a lot into a bonnet. The man sent out is recalled and the bonnet is handed to him. From this the man takes the lots and places them one after one on a line on the ground, the order in which they

thus stand being the order in which the owners of the lots stand to one another in the shares, each man knowing his own mark. The two tenants who have double shares retain their two shares each; the four other tenants subdivide their divisions with four other men, whom they thus represent at the division. These subdivisions are called Imirean or Iomairean, rigs or ridges, and each two tenants again cast lots for the subdivided rigs. A piece of ground is then set apart for their herdsman, which is the outside rig bordering on the grazing, and further pieces of ground are set out for the poor.

'Having finished their tillage, the people go early in June to the hill grazing with their flocks. The different families bring their herds together and drive them away: the man carrying burdens of sticks, etc., to repair their summer shealings, the women carrying bedding, meal, dairy and cooking utensils. Barefooted, bareheaded, comely boys and girls flit hither and thither keeping their herds together.'[1]

So obvious, so inevitable, a form of human society as the village community of necessity appears in many variations. The essential characters may be summed up as follows:

(1) The unit of society has grown more definite. It is the family in the homestead, the family delimited from the kin by the walls of that more exclusive centre, the home. The possession of a homestead is now the source of rights, of the right to an allotment of the common soil, to protection and a place in the life of the community, to a share in its religious ceremonies. Thus in the Hindu village community the homestead and the hearth-fire as its focus are sacred, and in the village community of early Britain the utmost social significance was attached to 'hearth and home'. The laws of Canute made house-breaking, the violation of the home, an inexpiable offence. The hearth was an altar around which religious ceremonies were performed; the hearth-fire sometimes represented, as in the worship of Vesta, as an undying flame, played its part in the ritual of the final mysteries, birth, marriage, and death.

[1] Gomme, *The Village Community*, c. vi, pp. 144–5.

(2) Politically, the heads of households formed the village council. The village community is in idea self-contained, self-sufficing, self-governing. The village council of elders maintains the law, chiefly customary law, of the community. The village community, as Maine pointed out in the case of the Indian type, is 'more than a brotherhood of relatives, and more than an association of partners'. It is a politically ordered society with all the necessary apparatus for the conduct and administration of government. In Russia the idea and the fact of the self-governing community have lingered on to the present day—the 'mir' was officially abolished only in 1861. Authority, law, custom, and religion of a wider range have in the surviving types of village community obliterated the sharp lines of the earlier exclusive polity. The challenge of invasion, the sweep of conquest, the growth of trade, brought larger political unities within which the village community was made in part subject to the authority of an overlord. But it clung tenaciously to its autonomy. Thus, as was pointed out by Maine, in Indian village communities local usage is even more insisted on than the sacred law.

(3) The economic structure of the village community reveals by contrast with our own the main characters of economic evolution. Take, for example, a typical village of twelfth-century England. It is isolated by the waste from any neighbouring village. Its dwellings are huts of wattles and daub—bare, comfortless dwellings for the most part, low built, save where church and manor house tower in comparative eminence. The surrounding unenclosed fields are parcelled out in curious uneconomic oblong strips, divided by narrow balks, bearing witness to an earlier communism and to a still prevailing rule of custom. The meadow and the waste are common. There are no shops. The many things we buy ready-made to-day, even in small villages, were then either provided within the household or were not available at all. The division of labour is rudimentary. Only a few specific trades or crafts are represented, perhaps those of miller, cobbler, smith, and herd. Nearly all work, save

that of agriculture, is carried on in the home. Exchange is rudimentary, and is largely barter. There is neither credit nor capital as we understand these terms. In other words, there is no wealth freely transferable, through a credit and banking system, from one channel of productive employment to another.

Communal ownership has, in the type of village we are describing, become subordinated to the feudal or manorial principle, presently to be discussed. To carry the description further would therefore be to endanger the general conception of the village community with which we are here concerned. We should keep before our minds the picture of a self-contained group or cluster of homesteads, essentially agricultural, living a life of narrow and poor self-sufficiency. Try to imagine also the face of a country in which the characteristic type of organization is that of the village community, a territorial expanse dotted with small islands of society. The advantage of autonomy is lost through the prevailing scarcity and the general hardness of life, through the pressure of tradition and custom in so narrow a circle, through the general ignorance and lack of spiritual stimulation prevalent in the enclosed community. On the other hand, there are all the disadvantages of semi-isolation. Since each community is practically isolated from the rest, there is little or no exchange of surpluses or of specific products. If one village had an over-abundant harvest, there was no system by which it could supply the needs of another suffering from loss of crops. There was little division of labour. There was no regular market, only here and there a seasonal fair for adjacent villages. The only imports were commodities like salt, tar (for the treatment of sheep against scab), iron and perhaps other metals. Isolation always means loss and waste, and co-operation always means economy. The smaller the area of self-sufficiency, the poorer is that self-sufficiency. It is a cardinal fact of social evolution, as we shall see later, that the narrowness of the self-sufficiency of a community measures the narrowness of its whole standard of life.

Here, as always in the history of society, the way of advance is prepared by the breaking-down of exclusiveness. This came partly from the growth of cities, whence lines of trade and of culture radiated over the country, piercing the enclosures of village life; and partly from the general integration of the country as a national unity, under the control of the intrusive state. Generally these two movements, as in England, advanced together, but in one very remarkable case the city community developed out of relation to the nation. This instance marks a stage in social evolution and must next be described.

III. THE CITY COMMUNITY

The town was at first simply an enlarged village, retaining many characters of the village community, but modified or developed through the economic, political, and social necessities of a wider life. Certain situations are calculated to attract population, such as a ford, a harbour, a junction of trade routes, a position fortified by nature. Political and economic considerations naturally combine. A fortified place tends to be the resort of traders, while a centre of trade tends to be fortified, and to become a centre of government. Thus at the point where economic and political advantage met, the greater town, the city, arose out of the village.

It was in ancient Greece that the city took on most signally the character of city community. To understand this development we must remember that Greece is a sea-girt, much-indented Mediterranean territory, divided by narrow ranges into almost isolated valleys. This enabled the Greeks to develop a wonderful series of autonomous city communities, each the focus of an intense localized civilization, each jealous of its independence. Nearly every mountain-mass shut off one autonomous city from another: Thebes from Athens, Athens from Corinth, Corinth from Argos, Argos from Sparta, and so on. Thus each city maintained a perilous autonomy against its neighbours. Thus, aided by good fortune and the bungling strategy of its imperial invaders, who sought to pierce the narrow passes, it was for

long saved from foreign domination. The Greek cities which dotted the coast of Asia Minor suffered a different fate. They fell under the suzerainty of Persia and so never developed that intense local individuality which marked the city community.

Again, Greece is sea-girt, with a very long coast-line for its size. It is everywhere accessible by sea. The sea, unlike the mountain, unites as well as divides. The sea, though leaving Greece the independence of her cities, enabled her to enjoy the civilizing advantages of commerce, the knowledge of other lands and peoples, the adventure of seafaring, the quickening of life resulting from free intercommunication with other civilizations.

Again, Greece enjoys a Mediterranean climate. At its best it was never very fertile, in spite of its vines, olives, and wheat. But the climate encouraged the open-air life. The Greek citizen lived out of doors. His city was a kind of exaggerated club. His interest centred less on the life of the home than in the life of the assembly, and the market place, and the open-air theatre. It was in out-of-door activities that the Greek excelled: out-of-door arts like sculpture, out-of-door literature like the Greek drama, out-of-door sport such as running and wrestling. The climate dissuaded from sedentary toils. These were thought illiberal, unworthy of free citizens. 'The so-called menial occupations,' said Xenophon, 'are despised, and it is quite right that cities should rate them low. For they murder the bodies of those who work at them and spend their time upon them, by compelling them to stay indoors and sometimes even to spend all day by the fire.' This attitude was confirmed by the fact that the Greek city community rested economically on a basis of slavery.

Kinship meant less than citizenship. The blood-bond, the great principle of all primitive community, was modified and in part superseded by the civic bond. In this respect the Greek of the developed city community, such as the Athenian of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., stands in significant contrast to the Homeric Greek. The latter,

nearer to the stage of the village community, still found much of the charm of life within the household, as the intimate descriptions of the poet reveal. The former found his society in the city rather than in the home. The Greek city was a social union. Its forum, theatre, gymnasia, and temples engrossed the life of the free citizen. That was the civic life. The city should not be so large that all the citizens could not share a common life. 'You cannot have a city,' said Aristotle, 'composed of ten men nor yet of a hundred thousand.' 'Who,' he asked, 'could be the herald of such a multitude?'

Under these conditions the Greek city communities, and, above all, the city community of Athens, passed through a most remarkable period of cultural development. Encompassed by a barbaric world the human spirit awoke, within that narrow circle, to an emancipation and creativeness and understanding that has never been paralleled. The small city of Athens gave to the world in the space of a few generations the most splendid gifts of the mind. In poetry, prose, drama, oratory, philosophy, painting, architecture, sculpture, and music there was revealed literally a new order of human values. The sense of form as expressed through art and literature, the sense of beauty as manifested in the proportions and motions of the body no less than in the creations of the mind, reached a refinement unknown before. A new ideal, the search for a new perfection, was born. 'Art combined with restraint, and knowledge pursued without effeminacy,' made Athens not only as Pericles is reported to have said, 'a school for Hellas', but also an inspiration for all succeeding civilizations.

In the great funeral oration from which quotation has just been made Pericles put forward another claim which the test of time has not sustained. He claimed for Athens that it had solved the ultimate political problem, the reconciliation of freedom and order, of spontaneity and discipline. This the city community never in reality achieved. The Greek city community passed through many stages of political evolution, from the period of so-called tyranny to that of direct

democracy. But within and without there was almost continuous strife. 'In old Greece,' said Freeman, 'the amount of hatred between city and city seems to depend almost mathematically on their distance from one another.' Cities at each other's doors, moved by the strength of local patriotisms and antagonisms, by constantly recurring differences over frontiers, by commercial and other jealousies, were engaged in the fiercest and most destructive hostility. A great common peril, such as the invasion of Xerxes, might unite the warring cities for a time, but even before the danger was passed the unity was lost. Ambitious cities like Athens and Sparta established a precarious suzerainty over others, and the clash of their mutual rivalries, as in the Peloponnesian war, wore out their strength and left them defenceless before new invaders. Within most cities there was unmitigated civil strife. The feud of oligarchs and democrats was never reconciled. The spirit of compromise was absent, and the freedom which each city so fiercely vindicated went down in the strife of factions.

There are other aspects of the Greek city communities which explain the stage of socialization they attained, and qualify the estimate which the splendour of their cultural achievements might suggest. In many respects their control of nature was primitive as compared with our own, and in particular they were very backward in medical and sanitary science, so as to be without protection against malaria and recurring pestilence. To some this failure of itself seems adequate to explain the downfall of their civilization. Furthermore, the economic basis was unsound. Slavery gave the Greek community the leisure without which her culture could not have developed, but the cost was heavy. Greek slavery was not for the most part of that cruel exploitative nature which we associate with the plantation system, but it had demoralizing consequences. It added a new instability to communities already torn by dissensions. It brought a contempt for the mechanical arts which prevented their advance. It warped the idea that the basis of right lies in the nature of humanity, not in the peculiar virtues

of any people. Even to Aristotle the slave was a 'living tool'.

Lastly, the position of women and of the family in the Greek community was retrograde. The life of the family was eclipsed by the life of the city. Marriage was not associated with a civil ceremony. The city did not concern itself with the registration of births, with the care and education of young children, with the education of girls at all. The position of women seemed to change for the worse as the city community developed. It was in the cities which possessed most of the character of the village community, and particularly in Sparta, which was to the end only a cluster of villages, that women retained most dignity and freedom. Herodotus, the historian of earlier Greece, has many tales to tell of the devotion and service of women; whereas Thucydides, the historian of the city community, only twice mentions, and then most casually, a woman in his record. Pericles, in his most famous speech, summed up the popular view when he said that the greatest glory a woman could have was to be heard of neither for good nor for evil. Xenophon speaks of the newly married wife as a kind of wild animal who has first to be tamed before she can carry on a conversation with her lord. The effects of this degradation of women are manifest in the history of the city community. The family lost its significance and social strength. One consequence was that the Greek married as a rule late in life, and this must have played some part in that depopulation which overtook the once populous cities of Greece.

Great, then, as was the realization of social life in the Greek city community it was also in many respects limited and imperfect. It was, and could be, only a stage in the evolution of society.

All true communities rest on willing allegiance. How to extend this beyond the inadequate circle of the city community was the problem set alike for Greece and for Rome. Greece failed. All her attempts at federation, from the

Amphictyonic League onwards, were abortive or else degenerated into alliances which, like the alliances of modern Europe, only made her wars the more disastrous. The most likely experiment in federation, that of the Achæan League, came too late to save a distracted and depopulated land from the invader. Rome, beginning her world-career also as a city community, followed a different plan. Unlike Athens, she gave her citizenship to the world she conquered, and thereby strengthened it and saved her conquests. But the gift of the citizenship of Rome was no real solution for the peoples far from her gates. It meant, after all, dominion, the inertia of empire instead of the active co-operation of citizens. Wonderful as was the work of Rome, it did not establish the greater community, for community is more than public order, and social life is more than pacification. As forms of society the barbarian empires and the empire of Rome differed only in degree. A new principle had to be revealed before the next great stage of community, that of country or nation community, was reached. Therefore we must in this brief survey pass over the record of Rome and seek in the growth and dissolution of feudalism the origin of the greater community of to-day.

IV. THE FEUDAL COMMUNITY

The processes which bring to birth new forms of society work long in darkness before the result is revealed to our eyes. A period of vast confusion followed the downfall of the Roman Empire, and it was long before the creative impulse towards a new order took clear shape in the 'Holy Roman Empire', proclaimed by Charlemagne in the year 800 after Christ. In this new order of society there were found Teutonic and Roman elements, the polity of Rome and the polity of the barbarian. The attribute 'holy' points also to another element. A new religion had conquered the world, though, as always happens to the conqueror, it had itself become changed by conquest. So now a new system of order spread over Europe—the distinctive order of the feudal age. On the one hand a universal claim, or rather the two universal

claims of church and of empire, gave common character to the new civilization. On the other hand the institution known as feudalism established various grades of authority, suffering a loose array of feudal kingdoms, principalities, duchies, and minor powers to exercise all degrees of overlordship and autonomy. The ideal of social order, the union of the universal claim with the particular, of justice with liberty, was outlined rather than embodied. The middle age was the age of ideals, but ideals imposed as it were by weak hands upon a reluctant material so that they never fulfilled their promise of reality.

In the feudal structure the elemental fact is landownership. 'I become your man, as touching the fief I hold from you'—so runs the oath of homage—'and will be faithful to you in matters of life and limb, and of earthly honour against all men.' The idea of subservience, loyalty, duty, honour is dominant, but it depends on this extrinsic fact, that one man holds land from another who thereby is his 'superior'. Property in land is the ultimate criterion of rights. As Sidgwick points out, this is a reversal of the original principle of the Teutonic village community, where the land was assigned to those who possessed rights as heads of families. In the feudal system the idea of citizenship as such disappears. Political and social rights could be exchanged, transferred, bought, and sold as though they were pieces of property. A personal relation took the place of the true civic relation, and this personal relation was not based on personality but on possession.

The feudal system is therefore a hierarchy. It is a graduated system leading up to the sovereign as supreme territorial lord. The lower ranks in the hierarchy hold their fiefs on condition of service to the higher. But the greatest dividing line is that between the noble, the landowner, and the ignoble, the land-cultivator. There are ranks below as well as above that line; above the grades of duke, baron, knight; below, the grades of freeman, villein, serf. Such is the rude outline of a never clearly formulated system which passed through many stages of development and decay.

The feudal system is also a military system. The chief service that the noble owes to his sovereign and the vassal to his superior is military service. But every man is bound particularly to his immediate superior, and there is no direct relation between the individual and the supreme authority. There is no unity in the feudal state. Sovereignty is land-ownership, and the lord of a manor rules in his degree like the lord of a kingdom in his. Authority is distributed in a most impolitic way. Hence the anomalous rights of private jurisdiction, private war, private taxation, private coinage, and so forth. All manner of cumbersome restrictions, tolls and dues, and personal services and fines marked the range of each. So politically disjointed an order could never have been maintained were it not for the non-political bonds of common culture and common religion, above all, the claims of an authoritative religion seated at the ancient centre of civilization. When the claims of church and state came into determinate conflict the dissolution of feudalism was at hand.

Within the feudal system there were always elements opposed to its principle and ready to break away. This was specially true of the cities. Feudalism belonged by nature to the country; it could not live in the city. As towns grew they sought to throw off the feudal overlordship. In some feudalized regions, such as Northern France, the towns, growing wealthy by industry and trade, and gaining strength by the formation of economic and political corporations, struggled fiercely for the independence of the city community, and gained a considerable degree of autonomy. The Lombard cities rose successively against the feudal nobles, excluded them from all public functions, and even, for a time, expelled them from their gates. Citizenship and the caste system of territorial overlordship could not dwell together. The contacts and activities of trade and commerce developed a spirit antagonistic to feudal restrictions. The guilds of merchants, and later of craftsmen, which arose in the towns, played a particular part in the undermining of the feudal structure, by fostering new forms of political and economic power and influence not dependent on the ownership of

land. The first mention of a merchant guild in England occurs about the end of the eleventh century, but they appear in great numbers during the twelfth, figuring in the charters of liberties which the towns were then obtaining from king or feudal or ecclesiastical superior. These over-lords were surrendering feudal privileges and prerogatives in return for funds, an exchange which then as later facilitated the process from feudalism to democracy. In the catalogue of liberties contained in a town charter is always included the right to a 'guild merchant'.

The guild delivered its members from most of the tolls and customs and personal molestations characteristic of feudalism. It became a body of free citizens whose interest lay in the extension of trade, in the widening of economic and social relationships. It is true that in time the merchant guild grew exclusive and oligarchical, and that new organizations, the craft guilds and finally the national government, had to fight against their encroachments and break up their power. But meantime the merchant guilds did much to weave those threads of relationship which changed the country from an aggregation of semi-isolated communities into the network of a national economy.

The new anti-feudal civilization bred in the towns gradually shed its influence over rural life. Under feudalism the cultivator of the soil lost whatever effectual liberty he had possessed. He became the 'man' of his lord, bound by exacting personal services, bound to work in the demesne and to pay burdensome dues and fines. There were various stages of subservience from mere serfdom wherein the worker was "tied to the soil", through villeinage and other forms of servile tenure, up to the relative independence of the freeholder. But in feudalism proper the whole class of land-cultivators was a subject class, graded like all feudal classes, but nowhere enjoying the liberties or the powers of citizens. The difference between the class of 'freemen', and the class of serfs, was, after all, one of degree. In the oath of fealty the lord is called 'master', an appellation inconsistent with freedom or with citizenship. The cultivator fell

into a degrading personal dependence, even when he retained the name of freeman. How the change took place we cannot here consider, how servitude and villeinage disappeared, how the spirit of independence that never died within the cities stirred those wretched habitations of wattle and daub which, huddled near the village church, stood at a respectful distance from the manor house. The result is well summed up in these words:

'This change from service to free labour, begun some two centuries before, and virtually completed in, the reign of Elizabeth, is a high landmark in the development both of economic and political society. It is a long step towards modern industrialism on the one hand and the modern all-inclusive state on the other. By snapping the organization of society in the basis of tenure, and thus making room for the more elastic relationships of the wage-contract, it prepared the way for new methods of production and for the growth of new centres of economic power. The refusal of the courts to allow that the lord of a manor had, *qua* lord, a theoretical right to dispose of the persons and chattels of his unfree tenants, meant the final triumph of the common law in regions with which for four centuries after the Norman Conquest it had not dared to interfere. Henceforward, while the German peasant is driven afield to gather snails and wild strawberries for his lord, is plundered and harried and tortured without hope of redress, his English brother is a member of a society in which there is, nominally at least, one law for all men. His liberty may be more in shadow than in substance, yet the shadow is itself an earnest of greater things. To us who know the misery to many of the poorer classes in the sixteenth century the boast that 'if any slaves or bondmen come here from other realms, so soon as they set foot on land they become so free of condition as their masters'—may read like a bitter mockery. But it is something that the boast should be made, and when England is confronted with the greatest moral issue of the modern world, that boast will stand her in good stead. She owes some acknowledgment to the nameless serfs who fled from

farm and homestead, till villeinage, in spite of the law, bled gradually to death.'[1]

Other cleavages arose, other conflicts, other oppressions and dominations, often no less burdensome than the old, but the breakdown of feudalism ushered in an age which restored the idea of political equality, which prepared a new form of community for its vehicle, which widened the bounds of science and the dominion of man over nature so that the whole earth became at last a potential community and the peril of a new exclusiveness was sufficiently illumined by new catastrophe.

V. THE NATION COMMUNITY

We have hitherto spoken as if each stage of social organization, the tribe, the village community, the city community, the feudal community, had one characteristic form which it retained until new forms broke it down and constructed another in its place, or as if such communal types were, in fact, stepping-stones in the course of social evolution. As we approach our own time and society we see that this conception, helpful at the first, is inadequate to the fact. The nation community as we know it to-day has itself no fixity. Ere its idea is realized it is already in process of becoming different. Community is never a complete form, like a species of animal or plant. It is a life that perpetually baffles the analytic mind, which would arrest it at any stage, and say, This is the type, the complete form, the true character, the norm or standard of society. It is a life that is always unmaking and remaking its institutions, that never knows any maturity, any fulfilment, any resting-place of adaptation, that lives always by change, by creation. All we can do is to select what seem certain significant moments and the formative forces in an endless transition.

The nation community, like every other, is an ideal. It is an ideal which has determined and is still very effective in determining the conduct of men. It is the ideal of a

[1] Tawney, *The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century*, c. i. pp. 43-4.

community held together, and apart from others, by the sense of nationhood, the consciousness of being a people, sharing on a common soil certain rather subtle characters and qualities which require for their expression a single political government. It depends on no one definite attribute, such as race or language, or religion or custom or tradition. It has its roots in history, but history alone does not explain it. It is the active sense of belonging together, extended beyond that which inspired the tribe or the city by the great agencies of intercommunication, social, cultural, and economic, which have widened the thoughts of men.

The idea of the nation community is of quite recent growth. Politically, the first step was the unification of authority in the absolute state, the territorial sovereign state that all over Europe took the place, sooner or later, of the petty, ineffective, unintegrated authorities which divided jurisdiction under feudalism. There arose instead a number of powerful centralized independent monarchies in which was established the principle of the indivisibility of sovereign power. There arose, in other words, the country state which in due course became the condition of the nation community. After innumerable vicissitudes and conflicts the principle of absolutism became supreme in Western Europe, as we find it in Spain under Philip II, in England under Henry VIII, in Germany, much later, under the Hohenzollerns. Various influences worked in this direction: the ferment in religious thought which weakened the claims of Rome, the new study of Roman law, the development of commerce, the conscious revolt against the economic oppression of a privileged class of nobles. Men found in one supreme loyalty a refuge against the distractions of conflicting allegiances, against the insecurities and exactions and restrictions of a disordered hierarchy. It was the age of the divine right of kings.

Within the territorial states thus established there went on a most remarkable process of social development. The social structure of the feudal age was gradually undermined. Its principle, which made landownership the symbol and the

source of prestige and power, was weakened by the new importance of capital. By capital is here meant that whole apparatus of wealth production which is itself the product of land and labour. In a primitive economy there is practically no capital in this sense, save the simple tools, the spinning wheel and the loom, the potter's wheel and the cobbler's last, the fisherman's boat and nets, owned by the actual producer. Until the modern age capital was quite unimportant as compared with land. In the closing period of the Middle Ages there were significant beginnings of the greater trade and the greater finance. Banking houses such as that of the Bardi arose. The political power of finance was strikingly illustrated by the position of the Fuggers, especially in their relation to Charles V. Commerce as it extended its range called for more capital and in turn yielded new capital, but it was only when industry became national, above all when it became mechanical, that capital assumed pre-eminence. Under these new conditions capital in the hands of the fortunate and the shrewd multiplied itself in an extraordinary manner, and became a source of power before which the ancient prerogatives of landlordism melted away. Capital was made or acquired while land was inherited. Thus was broken down the rigid class system of feudalism, and a new class system constructed, more unstable and less clearly graded than the old. Under the feudal system a man's class was predetermined by his birth, under the capitalistic system (in spite of inheritance and the modern security of investment), the turn of fortune's wheel, the fluctuations of boom and depression, the rapid change in technical process, as well as the economic sagacity or otherwise of the individual, contrive to produce instability and constant change within the class-structure.

The process in question is sometimes described as a levelling of classes. It is so only in part. There has been a certain levelling, in so far as social and economic opportunity, now vastly widened, provides to larger numbers easy access to a common culture—and culture is essentially common, universal. This is symbolized in the facts that to-day

all classes dress alike, follow, save for the necessities imposed by work, the same fashions, enjoy, so far as different economic conditions will permit, the same kinds of amusement, and do not in general expect or receive from one another those signs of salutations which in other days expressed inferior or superior status. These external facts show that the sense of class no longer holds as a principle of stability, as an accepted part of the order of things. But the *fact* of class, the objective difference in power and opportunity, remains, and being no longer supported by the spirit of class, the subjective adaptation to the fact, it creates new and quite intense cleavage. In the Middle Ages the distinctions of class were maintained by the sanctions of religion, political authority, and social prestige, and confirmed by gross differences of education and culture. To-day these sanctions have lost their hold, and class distinction is determined primarily by economic situation, the form of occupation, and the standard of wealth. It depends in fact upon the relation to capital, this new power which itself, more than any other, has overthrown feudalism. Capital is both the good and the evil genius of our civilization. It creates a surplus of enjoyable wealth which more and more raises the mass of men above the mere level of subsistence and makes possible for an ever greater number a degree of leisure in which to pursue other interests than that of 'keeping body and soul together'. At the same time it has driven a wedge between those who own the means of production and those who use them, between those who hire and those who are hired, between those who live by investment and those who live by labour. Of all the differences which have arisen in our complex society this is the profoundest, the most disconcerting, and the most likely to stimulate new social change.

The capitalistic economy extended its range, gradually supplanting, in the East as well as in the West, the feudal and the tribal economies that had hitherto prevailed. At the same time there were important processes of change at work in the capitalistic countries, so that they introduced a series of political controls over the operation of capitalism and through

social legislation provided new safeguards against the effects of capitalistic exploitation. In other words, from being sheerly capitalistic they became socio-capitalistic. Indeed, an increasing body of opinion came to favour a wholly socialistic economy, and during the First World War, through the Bolshevik Revolution, a state based on wholly collectivist principles was set up, a violent experiment the results of which—many of them entirely unanticipated—still await the judgment of time.

As the present order has developed it has evoked a marvellous variety of new associations which differ markedly from the few characteristic associations of the Middle Ages. We have spoken of the guilds, merchant and craft. These were, characteristically, hierarchical, graded, comprehensive, exclusive, authoritative. The craft guild included masters, journeymen, and apprentices, but its authority lay with the first of these classes. It sought political and social as well as economic ends. Modern associations are more single-minded, more uniform. Each unites the adherents of a single common interest, occupational, economic, cultural. These often form in turn great federations representative of one broader interest. And here the line of cleavage appears again, in the opposing front of the associations which represent capital and those which represent labour. As we shall see later, these federations have modified the place and power of the state and created a new problem of social order.

The present age is one in which technical discovery has changed in many ways the everyday conditions of life and work. Men respond in unforeseen ways to the environment they make, and we can now perceive how the 'age of machinery' has stimulated new reactions of thought. It has been suggestively pointed out by Veblen that the discipline of subjection to impersonal forces, the necessity imposed by the control of power-driven machinery, regular, unerring, inexorable in its operation, has weakened in the worker the sense of submission to any power or authority which by contrast appears arbitrary or capricious. This is but one of

the many ways in which the new conditions of work have aroused new social emotions and attitudes. There can be no doubt, for example, that the specialization of work and the aggregation of numbers under the factory system have greatly changed the mind and temperament of the worker.

No technical change has more profoundly affected the character of our society than that which has taken place in respect of the means of communication. This development is twofold: on the one hand the increased facility of transportation, first through the improvement of roads and river-beds, then through the construction of canals, then through the utilization of the steam locomotive and the internal combustion engine, the latter being finally applied to the aeroplane; on the other hand the increased range of the written or spoken word, as a result of the invention of the printing-press, the telegraph, the telephone, the wireless. No summary such as this can do justice to the importance of these facilitations of social intercourse. In particular, they have made the nation community an established fact by strengthening and upholding the sense of common nationality. They have brought the people of a whole country-state into immediate touch with one another and with the course of events and opinions. The newspaper especially has both expressed and inspired the common voice, becoming a most formidable instrument of social control. And these new forces have broken down isolations, and evoked a more continuous and formative sense of unity and common interest. They have worked towards the fulfilment, through nationality, of the nature of the country-state, but they have also passed that limit and amid new confusions prepared the way for still more extensive community.

The nature of these changes will be considered more fully in the succeeding chapters. What we have sought to do in the present chapter is merely to indicate the incessant process of the life of society. We must at the outset beware of identifying process with progress, leaving the relation of the two as a question for later discussion. We should also bear in

mind that, as the extension of community beyond the village and the city did not abolish the village or the city, so the extension of community beyond the nation does not at all destroy nationality.

CHAPTER III

SOCIETY AND ENVIRONMENT

I. ENVIRONMENT AND LIFE

ONE of the first things the student of society must understand is the intimate way in which social life depends on the nature of the environments within which it falls. The very word 'environment' tends to obscure this relationship. It suggests what is merely external, that which encircles, houses, supports, man and society, the mere setting of his life, the background of his actions, the scenes amid which the great human drama is played. But environment is more than that. It interpenetrates life everywhere. It directs or diverts, stimulates or depresses, man's energies. It moulds his speech, it subtly changes his frame. Nay, more, it lives within him. It is recorded in his brain and his muscles. It works in his blood. It is utterly inseparable from life, the warp, as it were, across which the woof is threaded that makes the 'living garment' of society. All social forms, all customs and manners and institutions, record the environment wherein they arose.

Nor should we think of environment as single and unchanging. It is infinitely mutable. The earth is one, but it is a house of as many mansions as there are forms of life. All living beings both select and modify environment. The bacteria which live in a drop of water have selected and are changing their environment as they move and grow and feed and die. In an incomparably more complex way does every group of human beings select and make its habitation on the earth. Adaptation is incessant. It is twofold: the accommodation of the life to the environment and the accommodation of the environment to the life. We shall see, as we proceed, that the latter aspect grows more prominent as mankind advances in civilization.

From the social standpoint we ought to distinguish certain general aspects of environment: the surface of the earth, marked nearly everywhere by the traces of man's creative purpose, the sea, the 'unharvested deep', which man turns into his greatest highway but which he can in no wise change, the climate and the seasons, against whose extremes, though he cannot control them, he devises various forms of protection. There is the economic environment, including that whole apparatus of economic goods, houses and roads, ploughlands and orchards, domestic animals, machines, stores of manufactured articles, all the comforts and conveniences which man has made to deliver him out of 'the state of nature'. There is the social environment, the customs, traditions, laws, modes of thought and forms of knowledge and belief which form man's social inheritance. These are not so much distinct environments as aspects of this one great fact, that life is everywhere and in everything, according to its kind, according to its individuality, expressed and maintained by means of a whole inter-woven array of environing forces of which it is in part master, to which it is in great part subject.

The first people which awoke to clear consciousness of this fact were the Greeks, and their literature contains many expressions of this fundamental sociological thought, that man in society is engaged first of all in adapting nature, by means of its own powers, to his own ends. This is, for example, the moral of the old-world legend of Prometheus, who 'stole fire from heaven' and gave the arts to men. Prometheus is man the inventor, fearfully and daringly—impiously as it seemed to the conservative element of his mind—asserting himself as not only a part of but also as a power over nature, setting forth consciously on his endless untravelled road.

> Eyesight they had, yet nothing saw aright:
> Ears and yet heard not, but like forms in dreams,
> For ages lived a life confused, nor bricks
> Nor woodwork had to build them sunny homes,
> But dwelt beneath the ground, as do the tribes
> Diminutive of ants, in sunless caves.

First I trained beasts to draw beneath the yoke,
The collar to endure, the rider bear,
And thus relieve man of his heaviest toils . . .
Nor before me did any launch the barque
With its white wings to rove the ocean wave.
Greatest of all was this, when they fell sick
Man had no help, no medicine edible,
Potion or ointment, but for lack of cure
Wasted away or perished, till my skill
Taught them to mix the juice of sovran herbs![1]

It is the picture of man daring to subdue his former gods, the powers of nature which he began by worshipping, taking risks and enduring pains of which the lower ranks of subject creatures have no inkling, but destined, according to the legend, to final triumph.

II. THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Until quite recent times there were no scientific studies of the relation between physical and social conditions. Original writers like Montesquieu in the eighteenth and Buckle in the nineteenth century had made suggestive over-bold generalizations. The doctrine of Darwin, with its emphasis on adaptation, gave a new impetus to this as to so many other studies. It prepared the way for such a brilliant and yet solid contribution as Ratzel's *Human Geography* (*Anthropo-geographie*), which has been the inspiration of a number of more recent works. Another school of thinkers, represented by Demolins and his colleagues of the French review, *La Science Sociale*, have furthered this subject by a series of regional surveys, intensive meticulous studies of the social characteristics of selected geographical districts, particularly within France. This latter method, though not leading to the broader (if less safe) inductions of Ratzel and his school, is admirably adapted to provide the data on which scientific conclusions must rest.

Here we must be content to indicate the direction, method, and general results of the study of the relation between social development and the physical environment. It is clear, for

[1] Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, (Goldwin Smith's translation).

instance, that the movement and growth of population depend on favourable physical conditions. The first dense populations appeared in certain fertile plains and valleys of the East, where great rivers assured both an ample food supply and an easy means of communication. The Euphrates, the Ganges, the Nile, the Yangtze-kiang, nurtured the earlier civilizations as certainly as they fertilized the soil. The river is the first great highway which made possible the moving of the peoples. Along it came the contacts of commerce and migration and invasion, according to their kind stimulating or crushing social developments. The civilization of Europe would have been very different had there been no Danube or Rhine to carry down the migrations of barbarian peoples and later to determine the limits and the struggles of expanding nationalities. Most of the great cities of the world are situated on streams, and particularly on their tidal reaches, as London, Hamburg, Calcutta, Rangoon, Canton, Hong-Kong, Buenos Ayres, New York, Philadelphia, Montreal, and many others. In the opening up of new lands it is the rivers which form the great avenues of penetration, as is seen in the history of the Hudson, the Mississippi, and the St. Lawrence.

No less obviously does the sea-coast determine the course of civilization. 'Barrier and threshold, these are the rôles which the coasts have always played in history.' The seaboard forms the limit of the ruder instinctive movements of population. But it provides the great opportunity for adventurous intelligent peoples, made adventurous perhaps by the penury of their inland soil. Thus was bred the civilization of Phœnicia and of Greece, whose seafaring arts Rome added to her own genius for land expansion. Thus arose the power of Spain, of Holland, and of England, in a great new series of colonizations made possible not only by historical circumstances but also by improvements in the technique of navigation. To-day, with the vast development of international trade, access to the sea is for every people a matter of vital importance.

One of the oldest sociological observations is that of the

contrast between the inhabitants of the mountains, of the plains, and of the sea-coast. Even in the small confines of ancient Attica there was a time when political factions were named in terms of these geographical distinctions. The strange religious drama to which the prophets of the Old Testament bear vehement witness is represented as a conflict between the more luxurious civilization of the Canaanites, dwellers of the cities of the plains and the ascetic conservative moralism of the Israelites, bred in the pastoral mountain regions of Palestine. Undoubtedly men respond differently to every difference in environment, but it is very hard to single out the direct effect of geographical conditions, bound up as they are with so many others. We may, to develop the case just cited, think of the peoples of the mountain as by nature hardy, poor, conservative, frugal, religious, suspicious, honest. But we must not forget how the adventurous progressive members of these peoples tend to migrate to more fertile regions, nor how the larger populations of the plains, as in China and India, exhibit frugality, industry, poverty, conservatism, and so forth. In the last resort it is hard to say that mountain, plain, and sea-coast have any direct constant influence rather than the direct influence of any conditions which further or promote intercommunication or isolation.

More obvious, at any rate, is the influence of the varying natural resources of different geographical regions on social life. The situation which makes a group predominantly farmers or hunters or herdsmen or fishermen or miners quite clearly affects their customs, morals, and institutions. It affects their outlook on life, their religion, their marriage-institutions, their forms of government. It determines how men shall spend their working hours, and nothing has more influence on their ideas and motives than the way in which with ease or with travail, indoors or in the open, in the field or the forest or on the sea, they earn their livelihood.

Climate and the seasons exercise a powerful influence on the habits and activities of men. Here too it is easy to point out certain broad effects. It seems clear that extremes of heat

or of cold have a deterrent effect on social development. White men seem to change in the tropics, they grow inert, irascible, indulgent, and this approximation to the prevailing character of the native races strongly suggests the common influence of climate. Extreme cold has also a depressing effect. It seems clear that a certain moderate temperature is best calculated to evoke human activity, physical and intellectual. This is confirmed by a variety of experiments which suggest that a mean temperature ranging between 38° and 60° Fahrenheit induces the best work.[1] Of course various other factors, such as the degree of humidity, the alterations of temperature within the range, the rainfall, have to be taken into account. Suggestive studies have been made which show a correlation between seasonal changes and the frequency of crimes and of suicides. Crimes against the person, as also suicides, occur more frequently in summer, crimes against property in winter.

We must be careful, however, in drawing conclusions from such studies. We must distinguish between direct and indirect influences. Take for example the case of the marriage-rate. It is higher in general (as are also birth-rate and death-rate) in tropical regions than in the temperate zone. But it would be unwise to conclude that climate is directly responsible. There are differences of racial character to be considered, of economic development, of culture and education, of religious beliefs, and so on. All of these in turn are doubtless in some way affected by climatic conditions, but it would be going too far to say that climate was *the* explanation. The environment of men is many-sided, and even if we could understand that whole complex of conditions we should still have only half-answered our question. For environment after all is the passive factor, that to which the living being reacts, after his kind. Under similar conditions of physical environment we find the most remarkable contrasts of customs, institutions, temperaments, displayed by different groups, as a study of such a work as Westermarck's *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* suffices

[1] Huntington, *Civilization and Climate*, c. viii.

to show. Environment does not actively mould the character of men, it merely affords or withholds opportunity for the development of this or that potentiality; and the potentiality itself varies infinitely. This potentiality is the secret of life, and we can never read it whole from the fragmentary revelations of it through each environment.

Man is the most plastic of animals, the most adaptable to conditions of heat and cold, of mountain and sea-coast, of plain and forest. This adaptability is the sign and the result of superior intelligence. It is due to the conscious control of outer nature to those purposes which constitute the nature of humanity. For the same reason civilization means, in part, that the differences of physical conditions become less imperative in defining social conditions. The distribution of agricultural resources is less determinative, as civilization progresses, of the distribution of population. In the pre-industrial age the most populous part of England was that of the greatest fertility of soil, the south-eastern and south-western region between Somerset and Surrey. Now it lies in Lancashire and Yorkshire, less fertile but rich in mineral resources and industrial opportunities. Rhode Island is much more populous to-day than the fertile plains of Illinois. Cities of magnitude arise, like Johannesburg, in barren regions which could not possibly maintain them. Natural routes of migration and trade matter less than of old, as men have learnt to build railways through mountains and over swamps, and now at length to use the unbounded highway of the air. Climatic conditions matter less, in so far as men gain control over the natural disadvantages of certain climates. A good example is the way in which, through the application of science, the Panama Canal zone has been delivered from malaria. Even the extremes of heat and of cold grow less deterrent as the arts of warming and to some degree of cooling dwelling-places improve. All these furnish illustrations of a more general principle which we shall consider further on.

III. THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

The economic environment is an aspect of the social environment, but an aspect which has a peculiar and easily discernible significance. In his secular task of making nature serve his purposes man has built up an elaborate economic structure, an order of everyday life for the satisfying of his needs through production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of wealth. It consists not merely of the means of production and the products which flow from them, but of complex and changeful institutions which determine the relative shares of peoples and classes and families and individuals, which ordain leisure or incessant toil, which distribute power, which bind together the ends of the earth. It is an environment in the sense that it is an inheritance, partly material, partly institutional, from the past, an order within and upon which present society works.

It is not in place here to describe that order, which belongs properly to the science of economics. Our task is to suggest how it controls and reflects the whole life of society. We have already, in the very attempt to define society, had recourse to the conception of the 'division of labour'. This conception has a peculiar significance in the economic order. For it is an eternal principle that the economic order rests upon co-operative but diversified activity. As men become more intelligent in adapting means to ends, they pursue more and more, not from social instinct now, but from the conscious perception of a clear gain, this method of co-operation. Each smaller centre of exclusive production and exchange, the family, the village, the city, the nation, has under this influence been transformed into the unit of a complex economic civilization which inevitably widens until it encompasses the world. The Indian coolie picks tea-leaves for the millhand of Lancashire and the Lancashire millhand spins cotton for the coolie, not because they belong to a common empire, but because they are meshed in a common economic order. There is no more fundamental fact for the understanding of society than this, that men must work in

diversified interdependence if they are to reap the fruits of economic victory. All the bitter divisions which arise in the pursuit of economic advantage are finally conditioned by this fact.

This interdependence is the result of the division of labour, the specialization of functions by groups and areas. Specialization, however, often threatens the interdependence it creates. Every specialized group becomes an organized interest group, seeking its own advantage to the detriment of the whole. It often acquires the power to 'hold up' the rest of the economy in order to gain its own ends. The pressure of special interests can thus undo the common interest. Where all are interdependent each becomes dependent, to an extent unknown before, on the co-operation of all the rest.

It is only when an order changes or passes that men appreciate its significance. The life and character of society has always been responsive to the economic environment, but the closeness of that relationship was understood first only in our own age when a peculiarly rapid change in the method of production, the so-called Industrial Revolution, was followed by a remarkable transformation in law and government, in the structure of classes, in the distribution of population, in customs and institutions, in modes of thought and belief. No one can trace the story of this latest era in history without being struck by the fact that while men were seeking merely to satisfy more fully through new devices of invention and organization their economic wants, while they were developing machines and utilizing powers, while they were exploiting new countries for raw material for the machines and searching markets to dispose of the surplus products, they were all the time unconsciously breaking down an old, and building up a new, order of society. It is no wonder that the forthright mind of Marx should have concluded that the economic environment is the primary determinant of all social change. This is his famous materialistic interpretation of history. More strictly, he concluded that 'it is always the immediate relation of the owners

of the conditions of production to the immediate producers . . . in which we find the innermost secret, the hidden foundations of the whole social structure' (Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III). To his mind all the great associations within which human life falls, the family, the state, the church, and all the great forms of human culture, art, literature, science, take their shape and character from economic fact. But this represents the opposite reaction, from the neglect of economic forces to the assertion of their social omnipotence. It unduly simplifies the causal relationship of the complex factors of society. This we realize when we remember that, after all, economic goods are not an ultimate end of men's endeavour. Men do not produce or exchange for the sake of the satisfaction of so doing, but for the sake of satisfactions which these processes serve. On the other hand, men do seek health or happiness or knowledge or art or religion for the direct satisfaction these involve. In this sense these interests are prior to the economic interest, and must be regarded, however they depend upon it, as modifying and directing the economic order.

Bearing this qualification in mind we may proceed to illustrate the profound effect on social life of changes in the economic environment, themselves not due to any anticipation of such social consequences. One of the most striking outward characters of the industrial age is the growth of city life. In old times, the overwhelming majority of the people were engaged in agriculture. Here and there a city arose as a centre of trade or a seat of government, but it stood apart from the everyday life of the larger population. Even at the beginning of the nineteenth century the most urbanized countries of Europe, then England and the Netherlands, had only 21·3 and 29·5 respectively of their population in cities of over 10,000 inhabitants. To-day, in all industrialized countries, the situation is reversed. The urban population has expanded continuously over the rural population. This change is essentially a result of economic development. New facilities of communication make it convenient for people to live together in larger aggregations.

Technical advance makes it possible for an ever-smaller percentage to satisfy the agricultural needs of the whole population, particularly as these needs, being primary, do not expand in the same degree as the needs which industry serves. Consequently the city grows at the expense of the country, and as it does, the whole character of society undergoes a change.

For country life is markedly different from city life. It is not necessary to insist on the difference of temperament which life in the country evokes as compared with life in the city. Let us consider merely the differences in social structure which correspond. In the country, though no longer to the same degree as in the pre-railway, pre-newspaper age, the chance of nearness mainly determines social relationship. The city has made contiguity count for less. People know nothing of their next-door neighbours or of the other inhabitants of the same apartment house. (This is less true of the districts of the very poor, where the neighbourhood engages in doorstep conversations, and where, in general, privacy is less protected, but the contrast with the country remains sufficiently obvious.) We might sum up the difference in the statement that in the country people depend more on undifferentiated community, whereas in the city they depend more on deliberate associations determined by specific interests, such as those of work or recreation or religion or some form of culture. Consequently in the city the pressure of opinion is less strong, the rule of custom less binding. In the village everybody knows, and is concerned with, the affairs of every one. In the city there is a distinct liberation from customary regulation and censure. Greater physical nearness goes along with a new indifference and remoteness of spirit. In the city there is more opportunity for selection in the formation of social contacts. People with particular interests can more easily find congenial company with others of like interests. The city specializes its inhabitants. And so as urban life develops we find an extraordinary increase in the number and importance of specific associations, a characteristic of modern society to which we shall return.

The old community spirit at the same time is weakened. Here and there experiments are tried with the idea of restoring within the city this community spirit, but these experiments, such as the 'city unit' and 'community centre' plans being tried out in certain American cities, cannot be regarded, whatever their value, as a means of restoring the old order.

There are advantages and disadvantages in the new order. The city heightens suggestibility, alike for good and for evil. It quickens social movements. The city weakens custom and strengthens fashion. All the influences of imitation are active, particularly in respect of the outward distinctions of dress and manners and living standards. At the same time the liberation from public opinion gives encouragement to new ideas and undermines old sanctions. In the city are combined certain advantages of the wilderness along with the facilities of civilization. But the loss of social control and support has serious consequences for the unstable, the weak, and the unfortunate. Old assurances pass away. The sense of nature and the sense of religion are less compelling. The city may substitute in the ordinary man shallowness for stolidity, and in the superior man the love of power for the love of contemplation. It is hard to balance the loss and the gain, and every new opportunity is bought at the price of an old security.

The new urban life changes in another way the character of society. There is inevitably a great extension of collective activity. A multitude of things which under other conditions each household provided for itself, the water supply, lighting, disposal of refuse, protection, recreation, and so forth, inevitably pass under collective administration. In addition, new forms of collective activity become more urgent, as for example the control and prevention of disease. The city increases the danger of infection, and this stimulates the quest and discovery of new safeguards, involving a general social advance. The problem of aggregation, if intelligently faced, leads to progressive solutions of which the country also reaps the benefit.

Another change of great moment must here be mentioned. The city environment has a profound influence on the life of women. It has been said that practically all the employments of modern industry represent forms of work which in the primitive community fell to the lot of women. If social life had remained predominantly country life, women would still be drudges within the household, engaged in various tasks of production which now are carried on outside its walls. Women have in part followed their work as it migrated from the home to the workshop and factory. This itself has spelt, in spite of certain disadvantages, a form of emancipation, an entry into the wider life. Furthermore, the democratization of life in the city has notably altered the outlook and the habits of women, in general the more custom-ridden sex. Women could never become citizens in the wider sense, until the modern city brought the appropriate environment.

In general, much that otherwise seems confused in the social movements of our age is explained when we relate them to changes in the economic order. Probably never in all history has a great transition taken place so rapidly as that which in a century and a half of industrialism has been witnessed in the living and working conditions of an ever-larger proportion of the population. It is rightly called a revolution, and it has had one common consequence of revolution, unsettlement. Adaptation to changing environment, even if we ourselves are responsible for the change, is a long and subtle process. To this new environment of industrial urban life men and women are still far from being adjusted. Physiologically we have only begun to relate the new conditions to our needs so as to avoid physical strain, fatigue, nervous exhaustion, accident, and unnecessary disease. Psychologically we have been seeking, half unconsciously, for new ways of realizing old and essential desires, amid much wandering and unrest and excitation. This leads to the condition of 'balked disposition' which has been so well described by Mr. Graham Wallas in *The Great Society*. The new environment alters the conditions under which

even the most essential dispositions, such as those of sex, companionship, recreation, ownership, must find satisfaction. In the present degree of civilization, where we still remain so uneducated in the primary understanding of our own natures, so engrossed in the pursuit of immediate gains, and so unconscious of social reactions, these dispositions tend to be perverted or starved or over-stimulated. Through it all we are nevertheless seeking a fuller adaptation to fuller needs. 'This,' as Mr. Wallas expresses it, 'is the master-task of civilized mankind. They will fail in it again and again, partly from lack of inventive power, partly from sheer ignorance of the less obvious facts of their material surroundings and mental structure. But it is hardly possible for anyone to endure life who does not believe that they will succeed in providing a harmony between themselves and their environment far deeper and wider than anything which we can see to-day.'

IV. THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Society creates for itself, as the oyster its shell, an inner environment of customs, traditions, institutions, within which it lives. These are properly to be regarded as an environment, not a part of the community. Community is a form of life, the incessant activity of relationship between social beings who love and strive, co-operate and compete, pursue place and power, serve and are served, and in a thousand ways affect the destinies of one another. This life of society is determined not only by the present nature of these beings but also by a great order of usages, customs, traditions, manners, an extremely complex and comprehensive legacy from past generations. This order (of which the economic order forms a part) is what we mean by the social environment. Usually it is not felt as a mere environment at all, so closely is it inwoven into the motives and activities of social beings. But times of transition or of revolution reveal clearly its environmental character.

In such times certain parts of the social environment are felt by many to be alien or oppressive or ill-adapted to their

awakened needs. Then they speak, like the French revolutionaries, of a 'return to nature', which means the abandonment of the social structure altogether. Or they distinguish, like the Greek sophists, between 'nature' and 'convention', denying the claims of the latter in vindication of the supremacy of the former. Or, like the Marxists, they attribute the existing order to the power and cunning of the few, the 'master-class', instead of to the cumulative operation of half-unconscious communal responses and reactions to past and present needs. Such conceptions, though they bring out the environmental and changeable quality of the social structure, pass to the other extreme by denying the intimacy and the continuity and the service which also characterize it.

Every important aspect of social life, sex-relationship, ownership, comradeship, the exchange of services and goods, is ordered, supported, and controlled by an elaborate system of rules or usages, slowly accreted and in general slowly modified by generation after generation out of the immemorial past. We may classify these usages as *traditions*, the broad, age-old modes of thought or action expressive of the historic spirit or ideal of the group to which they belong; *customs*, the accepted ways in accordance with which the members of a group perform familiar acts, eat and drink, dress and play, and generally 'behave themselves'; *ceremonies* and *rites*, being formal and often symbolic routines publicly performed to signalize or commemorate some significant event, the term *rite* implying more particularly that a certain solemnity or religious sanction attaches to the occasion; and *laws*, or general regulations enacted and enforced by some constituted authority. To illustrate, we might say that in England it is a *tradition* to give asylum to political refugees, or that in a particular family it is a *tradition* for the eldest son to join the navy. We speak again of the *custom* of handshaking, the *ceremony* of marriage, the *rite* of burial. All these cohere into a continuum, as it were, of observances which give its specific character to each community, forming the cement of tribe or nation or civilization.

A distinction should be carefully drawn between *customs* (mores) and *morals*, though the two terms had the same original significance. A custom may be 'more honoured in the breach than the observance', it may be definitely condemned, even though followed, by the conscience of the community, somewhat as a habit may be deplored by the individual who yields to it. The divergence between customs and morals can occur only at a few points, and we may say that in general the customs of a community reveal its morals. But the distinction is real and important; if we fail to make it we can scarcely understand the process of social evolution, for the schism between customs and morals occurs at every crucial point in that process.

Another distinction which should here be made is that between *customs* and *institutions*. These terms, like so many in the vocabulary of social science, are loosely used in the common speech. But *institution* implies a definite social recognition and establishment which need not belong to a custom. 'Our whole lives are threaded by unfelt, unrecognized customs, of which we can make ourselves aware only by an effort of reflection. These latter can scarcely be called institutions. They are but the raw material of institutions, and common will is for ever taking customs as they emerge into common consciousness, and instituting them. So it has been from the beginning. Even monogamy was a custom before it became an institution. The traditional lawgivers of the peoples, such as Ammur-abi, Moses, and Lycurgus, were men convinced of the importance of fixing customs as institutions.'[1] Institutions are the forms of order and activity consciously created by an association or community, so as to further and perpetuate some accepted principle or common interest.

These definitions and distinctions may give us an initial idea of the elaborate texture of the social environment. It is an inner environment, in the sense that it exists essentially within the consciousness of social beings, a form of relationship apprehended, accepted, and passed on by these from

[1] *Community*, 2nd edition, pp. 154–5.

generation to generation. Thus, for example, Mohammedanism is part of the social environment of a large part of the Near East. We know that millions and millions yet unborn will practise that faith and system, not simply because their predispositions would otherwise express themselves in that particular shape, though doubtless there must be some degree of consonance between it and their natures, but because they will have been nurtured upon it. The children of one social milieu, if transplanted to another, easily respond to the new environment, by virtue of the very same instincts and tendencies which would have made them inheritors of the old. The English child brought up among native Indians takes on the social colour of the new habitat. The study of the way in which the human mind thus responds to, and in turn creates, the social environment is often termed *social psychology*. It has in the past tended to rely overmuch on the simple formulation of some vague non-rational principle, such as 'imitation' or 'suggestion' or 'herd-instinct' or 'gregariousness', whereas all the qualities of the human mind, however named, love, fear, curiosity, affection, self-esteem, and the rest, are inextricably involved in the construction by all, and the assimilation by each, of the social environment. Man is a 'social animal' not in virtue of any one faculty but by reason of his whole nature. His every source of activity and enjoyment, alike when he earns his daily bread, when he worships his gods, when he pursues the secrets of the universe, involves and is stimulated by the appropriate contact of his fellow-men. This wider view is becoming reflected in later works on social psychology. It found apt expression in the intimately descriptive writings of Graham Wallas, and it has been greatly developed through the more recent investigations of social scientists of various schools.[1]

The social environment has another aspect. Every gain

[1] For Graham Wallas see *Human Nature and Politics* and *The Great Society*. Among recent studies the following particularly deserve attention: Gardner Murphy, *Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure;* H. Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements;* and N. Sherif and H. Cantril, *The Psychology of Ego-Involvements.*

made by humanity, every achievement of technique or of understanding, is a potential gain for all, because it becomes recorded or otherwise incorporated within the social environment. Thus human culture often seems to us to be further advanced than is really the case, because we imagine that those who share the marvellously complex system of a civilization have themselves as a whole produced it, though the great majority have as little comprehension of its meaning as the passengers of an ocean liner have of the mechanism which makes their voyage possible. It is the business of education to make actual these potential gains, and therefore as civilization grows the work of education becomes perhaps the most significant function of society. As biology discovers the profound importance of heredity, so does sociology discover the profound importance of environment. As biology insists on birth and breeding, so does sociology on education. For it sees how environment reaches the inmost penetralia of life, how what we call progress is held for us more as an acquisition than as a birthright, how circumstance makes the socially vital difference between health and disease, happiness and misery, virtue and vice. Most 'social workers' are immensely impressed with the influence of environment on life, and learn to attribute to environment many distinctions that generally are set down to heredity. We are learning, for example, that many illnesses and diseases, such as diabetes, formerly presumed to be induced by organic disturbances stem most frequently from the socio-psychological stresses, the worries and frustrations and fears to which people are subjected.[1] Even in the germ cell there is environment, and its influence may be most profound in these earliest stages which are beyond our power of direct observation. Environment is the means, the vehicle, of life; it alone grants or denies actuality to each of the seemingly infinite potentialities of life.

[1] See e.g. Flanders Dunbar, *Mind and Body*.

CHAPTER IV

INTERESTS AND ASSOCIATIONS

I. INTEREST AND WILL

JUST as the statue expresses the will of the sculptor or the house that of the architect, so does the social order express the will of social beings. It is their work. Not therefore, let us observe, the fulfilment of their *desire*, or even of their *design*. The sculptor may ardently desire to rival the work of Pheidias, but his power over his material may not be adequate. Society, working under fitful direction with a more reluctant and infinitely varied material, working distributively with a myriad partial conflicting plans, builds an order which, complex and wonderful as it is, falls far short of fulfilling the desire of its members. The social order is its work, but only in part, if at all, its ideal. Strictly speaking, in the study of the social order we are not concerned with the mere desires of men and women, but only with their *interests*. By *interest* we mean any aim or object which stimulates activity towards its attainment. We have many desires which have no fruition, which we suppress as being foolish or untimely or dangerous or evil, or which are overborne by more imperative desires, or which are recognized to be unattainable and therefore stimulate no quest. An interest involves, therefore, some consciousness, however vague, of a satisfaction to be attained and some resultant activity towards its attainment. It is more than *need*, for need may be blind or, even if clearly felt and its object known, may be controlled or thwarted by the will, as for example sexual need may be under the influence of religion. An interest is any object of the will. It is in that sense objective, something sought or pursued, such as nourishment or warmth or power or distinction or knowledge or companionship. It is the correlative of will, as object is of subject. It is interest, so understood,

which explains the origin and growth and evolution of society.

For the interests of social beings weave their relations to one another. Society exists because of common interests. Some interests are by their very nature common, such as the interest in the welfare of family or city or nation. Each such unity rests on a common will, pursuing a common interest. Other interests are attained more easily when they are pursued in common, a lesson which men slowly learn as they gain in social wisdom. Men begin, for example, by competing, and learn that it pays better to combine. They begin by fighting, and learn that in order not to defeat their mutual interests they must unite. It is in this way that society grows wider and more coherent, for, as we have seen, society is just co-operation. Two neighbouring tribes destroy one another to gain possession of a few acres of land. Two powerful firms outbid one another to gain possession of a market, and often the result is that the profits they alike pursue evade them both. Then they form an agreement, and find that not only do they share the profits they lost by warfare but also gain new ones as well. The interest in the new combination is a common interest, even though it is stimulated by a private or separate interest which underlies it—the interest in personal gain. To secure the private interest they have to establish a common interest. The common interest is secondary in this case, but it tends to grow more prominent as men become attached to the new association they have formed, and come to prize its reputation and tradition as something with which their own lives are bound. Thus every interest of men has a mixed or complex character. Patriotism, the interest in the welfare of one's country, may be the 'last refuge of a scoundrel', or it may be the pure devotion of a disinterested spirit. Nearly always it represents some degree of both private and common interest. Even those whose lives are occupied wholly with the service of others may be sustained by a sense of the reputation that it brings. The martyr for his faith is upheld by the thrilling sense that his God approves. The man who 'saves his country'

may be seeking 'glory' as well as the good of his country. Private interest (which is by no means the same as selfishness) and common interest are inextricably interwoven. But what concerns us here is that the common order of society is increasingly, as the intelligence of man grows, supported and widened by the operation of both. The gains which can be attained through conflict or through isolation are realized to be far fewer and narrower and more precarious than those which can be attained through association. Thus the socializing forces grow and strengthen community.

To understand the structure and development of society we must examine the nature of the interests which men seek in common, and the way in which they seek them. Every community represents a complex of common interests, which the common will upholds and sanctions as a whole. It is in this way that the nation forms a coherent unity. Every social class again represents a particular complex of common interests which, being partial, may at some points conflict with the interests of another class. So we distinguish, for example, the leisured class, the professional class, the working class, the agricultural class, and so on. Or we speak of upper, middle, and lower classes, in terms of social status. Or we draw the line between bourgeois and proletariat, in terms of their respective relationship to capital. In the feudal society out of which our own has evolved classes were much more marked than they are now, the chief criterion being the relation to the land. In some Eastern societies classes are still more marked, becoming castes, in which case there is a rigid line, usually birth-determined, between the groups so named. Every society has some kind of class system, but the nearer it approaches to caste the narrower becomes the common interest of the community: and in fact such communities could not endure at all were it not for the spell of religion. Again, each locality represents a group of common interests, because of common occupations, common territorial advantages, common 'public utilities' and amenities, common traditions, and that subtler common quality of mind which seems to characterize those

who together occupy for any length of time any particular place. It is on the basis of the common interest of locality that the representative system of modern democracy grew up, but with the improvement of communications the significance of this type (and indeed of all types) of territorial interest has waned. In its place another form of common interest has become paramount, the more specific common interest which brings together, over a wider area, those who do the same kind of work or otherwise occupy a similar economic position, who practise the same profession or group of professions, who profess the same religion, who pursue the same art or science or recreation. These specific interests create associations after their kind, and one of the most remarkable features of modern society is the multiplicity and influence of such associations. On this account we must now examine more closely the relation between interests and associations.

II. THE KINDS OF ASSOCIATION

Like always draws to like, provided they become conscious of their likeness. Watch a group of people thrown by chance together for any length of time, say at a 'hydropathic' or on an ocean steamer, and very soon you see groups separate out. Sets more or less exclusive inevitably form, the 'sportsmen', the fashionable, the quietly respectable, the noisy vulgar, the consciously wealthy, the 'intellectuals' (when there are any), and so on. Under the conditions in question, natural congenialities and incompatibilities are free to work, unchecked by the ordinary engrossments of life. A similar phenomenon occurs within society in general, as the means of communication makes distance a less serious obstacle to the recognition of specific likenesses. But now the more permanent interests have greater weight, and they lead to the establishment of associations as distinct from mere unorganized groups. The place of these new associations in the modern structure of society we shall consider in the next chapter. Here we shall attempt to classify them in accordance with the interests for which they stand. Every association

represents some particular interest, or else some particular way of pursuing a group of interests. A manufacturers' association exemplifies the former while the state is the great exemplar of the latter type.

If we begin with the organic nature of man, a first group of essential interests consists in the satisfaction of his physical needs and appetites. These we may roughly divide into two main classes—those which centre round the fact of sex, and those which are, on the other hand, more exclusively individual, such as the interests in food, drink, health, shelter, warmth, clothing, and physical activity and recreation. The interests dependent on sex have of course a social character and bearing which makes it desirable to distinguish them from the latter. They include not only those interests which are concerned with sexual relationship in the narrower sense, but also those which find their fulfilment in the life of the family and the kin-group. The great association resting on sex is the family, and as it is the most elemental of all associations, it is natural that ideas properly belonging to it should be adopted to express the unity of other associations. Fatherhood, for example, symbolizes the relation of the head of the church to its members, and brotherhood is widened to signify the relation to one another of the members of countless lodges, 'friendly societies', trade unions, and other bodies, while in primitive society the sense of the putative blood-bond, as still to some degree among the more primitive members of civilized peoples, is the chief psychological support of community as a whole. As for the non-sexual group of organic interests, they are served by a multitude of associations concerned with industry, agriculture, commerce, medicine, and hygiene.

We pass next to a group of interests which we may distinguish as psychical. By this we mean that they belong to the psychical or mental nature of men as distinct from the merely organic processes which fulfil the life of the body. It is to be understood, of course, that this classification is made merely for convenience, without implying any duality of mind and body. Every interest, whether we call it organic

or psychical, is an interest of the will, and reveals in its operation the most intimate quality of the mind. This is obviously true, for example, of the sex interest. Every organic interest is capable of great refinement and complexity, just because there is no cleavage of mind and body. The distinction we make is purely for working purposes, and its justification from this standpoint will appear as we proceed.

There is a sense, clearly, in which we can call the interest in food organic and the interest in science or in music psychical. If we start from the common analysis of mental processes into the aspects of knowing, feeling, and willing, we have an easy though rough method of classifying the psychical interests. Thus there are interests in which the cognitive or intellectual aspect is dominant, such as the interest in science and in philosophy, in history and generally in education. These give birth to appropriate associations, to which belong schools and universities, 'learned societies', historical clubs, debating societies, and all kinds of associations formed for the purpose of study, research, or discovery. Again, there are interests in which the feeling or emotional aspect is dominant. This class would include, for example, all religious interests, and also, on the whole, the group of artistic, literary, and dramatic interests. These give birth to the church, the theatre, the musical club, the choir, the reading circle, and various associations of art and letters. It is sometimes hard to say to which of the two classes just referred to, the intellectual or the emotional, an interest or an association more properly belongs, as, for example, literary associations. The line of division is not a rigid one, and we must remember that though one aspect may predominate, all three are involved in every kind of mental activity. The intellectual and emotional interests are closely allied in the great class of cultural interests. Lastly, there is a class of interest in which the aspect of willing is supreme, interest of power or place or distinction or prestige. These do not as a rule give birth to specific associations, though we may perhaps assign to them certain societies for

nationalistic propaganda and certain exclusive clubs, but on the other hand they are active in determining classes. And they reveal themselves within all associations, and notably within the class to which we come next, the associations of the political and of the economic order.

We have assumed so far a simple correspondence between interests and associations. Where men share a common interest they associate for its furtherance. But every one has a great variety of interests which he must satisfy in order to live within society, and each has to depend on the rest for the means of satisfying the great majority of these. A social system has to be devised by which each, contributing his quota of goods and services to the general stock, receives in turn the means of drawing, according to some standard of exchange, on the goods and services contributed by others. This is the economic order, and nearly all the associations we have mentioned have an economic as well as a specific interest. Whatever men do, they do as a rule not merely for the sake of doing it but also for a living. In fact, their work has very often only the derivative interest of the economic return, and this divorce of work and desire may be intensified as the division of labour increases. The happier few both find a direct interest in their work and gain thereby the means of providing for their other interests. The economic interest is derivative, since it is not pursued for its own sake. Men do not build cotton mills or manufacture steel rails for the joy of doing so, as an architect might build a cathedral or a craftsman a beautiful chair; they do not become bankers or brokers for the sake of banking or broking, as they might become scientists or artists or educators or administrators for the interest of these things. The economic interest is always the interest in a means by which more fundamental interests are satisfied. It is a universal interest because no other interest can be secured without some economic aid. Some associations may be regarded as standing specially for the economic interest, such as buying and selling companies, financial amalgamations, and again associations for bargaining and economic warfare, such as trade unions and

employers' associations. But nearly all associations must in some way add the economic interest to the specific interest which they represent. Partly belonging to the economic order but extending well beyond it is the great group of occupational interests which in recent times has created such a remarkable network of organization, the various associations of tradesmen, craftsmen, manufacturers, farmers, professional workers, teachers, civil servants, and other occupational groups, with all their amalgamations and federations.

Equally universal and equally derivative is the political interest. An authoritative system of government, sanctioned rules in accordance with which men can confidently conduct enterprises and enter into contracts, an established order of enforceable rights and obligations, so as to provide protection and essential liberty—this is a necessary condition of the pursuit of other interests. As is the case with the economic order, the political order is therefore a means through which all other interests are secured. The great political association is, of course, the state, which on account of its peculiar significance has often been confused with community itself, a confusion we shall examine in the next chapter. We should always remember that the state is properly one among other associations. It is an association, not because it stands for a specific interest but because it is a specific organization for securing, by specific means, the general interests of the community. Besides the state there are other associations belonging to the political order, as having a political interest for their main or subsidiary concern. Nearly every powerful association seeks to influence the state, and some, such as party organizations and alliances for the promotion of legislation along particular lines, exist solely on that account.

There remains a group of interests which are social in a narrower sense of the term. There is a kind of selective gregariousness which enables groups of like-minded people to maintain a sense of coherence and identity in the midst of the greater heterogeneous community. People who belong to a particular 'set' or social coterie form clubs to foster the

types which they represent and perhaps to maintain its exclusiveness. People who belong to an immigrant group in an alien country form societies for mutual aid and comradeship, such as the Jewish societies everywhere and the Italian and Slavic organizations in American cities. Or the stimulus may be chiefly the need of social intercourse and good fellowship, such as inspires many a little circle where people meet to dine and talk, and play. This is also an important motive in the formation of masonic lodges and other brotherhoods. On the other hand the social interest is made use of in order to attract and retain members within associations having a more specific object, such as churches, trade unions, and political organizations. In the case of 'friendly societies', the social interest is supported and sometimes supplanted by the interest in mutual insurance, and in the latter case the society would belong properly to the economic order. But philanthropic associations of all kinds, depending on the social sense of sympathy, may be placed in the present class.

In the table which follows, the correspondence between interests and associations is summarily shown. It should be noted that the association set over against any particular interest may not limit itself to the pursuit of that interest. The church, for example, represents the religious interest, but often has important activities belonging to the social order just described. Interest mingles with interest in very complex ways, and all that a table can present is a conspectus of essential correspondences.

INTERESTS	ASSOCIATIONS
1. Ultimate interests, or those which are not in general pursued merely for the sake of interests beyond themselves:	
A. General interests, or those which depend on general like-mindedness.	Social clubs, lodges, societies for mutual aid, philanthropic associations.
B. Specific interests	
(i) Interests which reveal primarily the physical nature:	

INTERESTS	ASSOCIATIONS
(*a*) Sexual.	The family. Marriage and kinship associations.
(*b*) Non-sexual, interests in food, drink, clothing, shelter, and the conditions of bodily health and activity.	Agriculture, industrial, and commercial associations. Hygienical, medical and surgical associations.
(ii) Interests which reveal primarily the psychical nature:	
(*a*) Scientific, educational, and philosophic interests.	Schools, colleges, and universities; study groups, associations for the promotion of science and philosophy.
(*b*) Artistic and religious interests.	The church: missionary associations, societies for the promotion of religious life and thought. The theatre. Associations for the promotion of art, music, and literature.
(*c*) Interests in power and prestige.	Nationalistic and imperialistic associations. (The state as 'Machtstaat'.) Exclusive clubs maintaining standards of fashion or the sense of distinction or power.
2. Derivative interests, or those which are in general pursued mainly for the sake of interests beyond themselves:	
(i) Economic interests.	Banks, trust companies, trusts, trading companies, co-operative associations, etc. Trade unions and employers' associations. Occupational associations of all kinds. Many other associations listed under 1 *B*.

INTERESTS	ASSOCIATIONS
(ii) Political interests.	The state. The empire (in the modern sense of a union or congeries of states).
(*a*) Communal interests.	The subdivisions of the state, the municipality, the county, etc.
(*b*) Group interests.	Political parties.
(*c*) Specific interests.	Associations for the promotion or maintenance of some particular form of legislation, e.g. the single tax association, the proportional representation league, tariff associations.

In surveying this classification of interests and associations it should not be forgotten that interests may grow or wane in social urgency and that they combine and separate in endless ways. The nature of the associations they form therefore varies according to the character and evolution of society. In the Middle Ages religious associations engrossed men's minds to an unusual degree. To-day occupational associations have gained a range and prevalence unknown even in the heyday of the guilds. In some more advanced society of the future the associations of cultural activities may be the distinctive feature of social organization. Nearly every social period has some dominant association, in the sense that one type of association characterizes the age, gives colour and tone to other associations, and by sympathy draws other interests in its train. The nineteenth century saw the great rise of economic associations, in the form of industrial corporations, public utility companies, combines, holding companies, financial syndicates, cartels, and so forth. In the twentieth, while in some countries these vast organizations are still dominant, the socializing activities of the state have to a considerable extent usurped their place; while in one country, Soviet Russia, and within its zone of influence the distinctive economic association has been abolished

altogether or reduced to a mere auxiliary of government. Here again we have a reminder that the list of associations just given represents merely the lines of classification of some Western countries at the present point of their social development, though the interests to which they correspond are the eternal sources of all associations.

III. INTRINSIC INTERESTS

There is yet another distinction between interests which we must consider, as it possesses great social significance. It is that between intrinsic and extrinsic interests. If we turn to our classification in the preceding section we may note a certain character which marks off what we have called the 'interests in power and prestige' from all the rest, and particularly from those we have named as 'culture-interests'. The former lack the objective character of the rest. We have defined interest as the object of the will, but in respect of these, the will is, as it were, its own object. That is why there are practically no associations which exist specifically for their pursuit. The sense of distinction, for example, is not satisfied by the possession of any absolute good, but by superiority of possession. The satisfaction lies not in the having, but in the having more; not in good birth, but in better birth; not in power but in supremacy; not in wealth, but in greater wealth. This is the characteristic of a whole group of interests. They rest upon comparison. They are fulfilled only by the establishment of a relation of inequality between a man and his fellows. Their satisfaction demands that he shall be ahead of the rest. For this reason they may be called extrinsic interests, and distinguished from those interests whose fulfilment depends not on comparison but upon the direct enjoyment of a good directly sought. Thus we all seek warmth and food and bodily comfort as things which by themselves—not merely because we have more than others—satisfy our needs. The explorer sets out on a difficult or dangerous quest because it appeals to his sense of adventure. The inventor takes a direct delight in the problems and intricacies of mechanism. The scientist is

engrossed in the order and causality which nature reveals to his search. The artist is inspired in his work by an idea of beauty, in form, proportion, colour, harmony, which makes a direct appeal to his creative interests.

These two types of interests are inextricably mingled in all human activity. Up to a certain point the extrinsic supports the intrinsic. Ambition spurs the explorer, the inventor, the scientist and the artist, as well as the money-maker and the politician. It is the 'last infirmity of noble minds' as well as the ruling passion of the ignoble. It stimulates the devotion of men to the service of family and city and country. The prospect of fame leads them to undertake the most arduous tasks. The satisfaction of the sense of power induces them to surmount the most formidable obstacles. In one form—the passion for social approval and the dread of social disapproval—extrinsic interest is the most powerful support of the accepted order of morality. And beyond that it merges into the inspiration of religion itself, and the prospect of that final recommendation, 'Well done, good and faithful servant.'

On the other hand the extrinsic becomes the great enemy of the intrinsic. It tends to pervert all higher ideals, and, above all, the ideas of the common welfare. The extrinsic is always the relative. The common good is envisaged, under the obsession of the extrinsic, as consisting in mere advantage. The good of one's country is sought through the struggle to obtain a superiority over other countries, notwithstanding the absolute loss. It is found in mere expansion, in magnitude, in those external features which admit of easy comparison. It is found in the things which matter least, in the area of the earth's surface which a country covers, in the multitude of its possessions, the amount of its wealth, the number of the millions who owe it loyalty. Patriotism becomes a spirit of contention, breeding barren strife and foolish hatred. It becomes a spirit of emulation and pride which loses sight of the real welfare of the country. Here, for instance, is a test which suggests how much of extrinsicality and impurity there remains in the spirit of patriotism.

Suppose some new process of production or form of industrial power were to be discovered which would greatly enhance the general prosperity of all countries, but which would remove the relative economic advantage over others which our own country possesses, what would the reaction of the true patriot be? He would rejoice because of the absolute gain, but the extrinsically motived patriot would rather grieve because of the loss of relative advantage. And one cannot but doubt whether in many minds the latter would not outweigh the former.

The social inferiority of the extrinsic interest is here revealed. The extrinsic motive is shallow as compared with the intrinsic. It is restless and envious and cannot from its very nature attain an enduring satisfaction. It is not concerned with the nature or quality of well-being, but only with a position with a relativity, which, like the rainbow's end, moves away as we approach it. It feels loss where others gain, and finds a gain in their loss. The deeper satisfactions are destroyed wherever the extrinsic interest dominates, the satisfaction in quality, in workmanship, in the fineness of things, the appreciation of form and beauty as objects worth while in themselves, the sense of fruition in the exercise of one's nature. A whole cluster of anti-social emotions accompany it, envy for the things which others possess, pride in the possessions which others lack, jealousy which disputes possession, and fear, and shame. It is concerned with acquiring rather than with enjoying, with seeming rather than with being. Under its urgency men gain forcefulness and lose personality, they accumulate goods and lose experience, they find wealth and never find themselves, they travel always and swiftly but to no destination.

The conditions of modern economic life seem to have unduly stimulated extrinsic interests. The competitive struggle sharpens the sense of the more and the less. The revolution in technique, the exploitation of new lands, the domination of old ones, gave unwonted opportunity to the acquisitive instincts. From the unregulated development of these our society is suffering, not merely in economic

disharmonies which only the development of a more co-operative system can remove, but above all in the neglect of intrinsic interests. The faculty of 'getting on' is exalted and the faculty of appreciation, the power to understand and to enjoy, is weakened. Hence an important aspect of social education consists in the restoration of the balance between extrinsic and intrinsic interests and in the emphasis on the superior worth of the intrinsic. The true relation between the two has been summed up for all time in the contrast between the fripperies of the much-possessing Solomon and the steadfast beauty that the flower of the field weaves silently for its garment.

CHAPTER V

THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY

I. THE STATE, THE OTHER ASSOCIATIONS, AND THE INDIVIDUAL

WE have now to follow up the distinctions already drawn between the various essential types of social fact, community, association, and institution, and to show how these build up the structure of society. Here as always we start with community. Community creates all other social facts. It is their matrix, their seed-ground. It is the ultimate source of whatever unity may be found in the diversity and opposition of the numerous partial structures we named associations. This truth has generally been completely obscured in the social theories of the past, because the difference between a community and an association was not realized. Most of all this has been due to the misunderstanding of the nature of the state, which has in fact as well as in theory claimed falsely and dangerously to be identical with community. We shall therefore first explain how and why the state is an association, belonging to the same genus as the church, the family, or the corporation.

We saw that an association is an organized way of pursuing some interest or interests. Now, all interests can be in some part and degree better attained by the definite organization of those who share them. It is a method of bringing those who share the interest together, avoiding the waste of isolated efforts, utilizing the economies of the division of labour, stimulating by fellowship and counsel the sense of the common end, thereby giving it definition and fuller attainment. But the interest is always wider than the association. There is much religion outside the churches, there is much education, which does not fall within the activity of schools and colleges. Associations are merely foci for the pursuit of interests which remain partly unorganized and free within

the communal life. For this reason we should regard associations as *organs of community* no less than as organizations within it. This is true, as we shall see, in spite of the fact that associations conflict and counter one another, sometimes even threatening to rend community asunder.

How do associations advance the interests for which they stand? We answer that it is by establishing, developing, and supporting with the common will the appropriate institutions. All developed associations have in the first place a common council, a shareholders' meeting, annual congress, or similar institution, in the case of the state taking the form of a 'general election', by which the members of it determine its general policy, or at least appoint the executive, directorate, government, or however else the organ is named which translates that policy into action. This body in turn acts through officials and servants of the association. In respect of this framework of institutions the state is just like any other association. Its organization by way of electorate, government, and officials implies equally some definite purpose or set of purposes, distinguished out of the purposes of community, which it exists to fulfil. The state is nothing more than an association, and if it claims pre-eminence or supremacy over other associations it must be on account of the peculiar character or importance of the interests which it serves.

But when we begin to compare the social significance of associations in terms of the different interests for which they stand we can at best argue only for some degree of preeminence of one association over others. The old conception of the uniqueness or of the all-comprehensiveness of the state, as put forward, for example, in Dr. Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State*, becomes at once untenable. Moreover, in abandoning this conception we are but conforming to the facts of social and political evolution. Men refuse, in fact, to entrust the whole range of their lives to any one association or to suffer it to dictate the policy of other associations which stand for interests they cherish. This first appeared clearly in the conflict of church and state.

In a very late stage of that conflict the principle at issue was clearly expressed as follows: 'It should never be forgotten that, in things ecclesiastical, the highest power of our Church is amenable to no higher power on earth for its decisions. It can exclude; it can deprive; it can depose at pleasure. . . . There is not one thing which the state can do to our independent and indestructible Church but strip her of her temporalities. *Nec tamen consumebatur*—she would remain a Church notwithstanding, as strong as ever in the props of her own moral and inherent greatness.'[1] In so far as a solution has been found, it has simply been through the mutual recognition by these two great associations that each has a field, however roughly defined, on which the other should not trespass. In the case of church and state this decision, though it took many centuries of stupid conflict to obtain it, was comparatively easy on principle, for the church has in a sense a super-social mission, and being essentially concerned with a relationship not directly between man and man but between man and whatever spiritual principle he believes to be revealed in the universe, it could claim a separate jurisdiction without cutting across the main body of political activities. But the problem is more complicated when the position of the state is challenged, as to-day, by associations belonging to the economic order. Economic activity has been, save for a quite short period of *laissez-faire* policy, one of the great preoccupations of the modern state. The *laissez-faire* philosophy was in fact a disguised form of the theory of the limited or associational state, but it was put forward in the name of individual liberty and not on account of the claims of other collectivities such as trade unions or capitalistic organizations. To-day these other associations are claiming and exercising economic functions which bring them into direct conflict with the older prerogatives of the state. When the railroad brotherhoods of America compel Congress, by the mere threat of a strike, to pass an eight-hour day Act which certainly it does not wish to pass, when the Welsh miners extort a minimum wage

[1] Quoted Laski, *Problem of Sovereignty*, q.v.

law from an unwilling government, when French transport workers refuse to unload supplies that serve a political programme to which they are opposed or when Italian workers call a general strike on political grounds, most obviously there is a conflict of associational powers. And although technically the state has the ultimate right of coercion in practice it may under such circumstances be too hazardous for it to invoke the requisite power to enforce its decrees. No less obviously, there is no power in the state association which can, in the face of great hostile associations, ensure obedience to its decrees.

Such facts as these make it clear that the state is not in any sense omnipotent. During the nineteenth century the capitalistic organizations of Western democracies largely controlled their respective states. Towards its close and still more in the twentieth century the power of organized labour became a force limiting and threatening this control. At the same time there was developing a trend towards greater collectivism. The capitalistic states of the nineteenth century were becoming socio-capitalistic, nationalizing certain key industries and establishing a greater degree of regulation over others, assuming also important functions over prices, the volume of credit, monopolistic tendencies, and international exchange. War-time conditions and their aftermath led to a great extension of such activities. The era of *laissez-faire* philosophies was over. The crises following the First World War, overthrowing old monarchies and dynasties, brought into being a number of totalitarian states under dictatorial rule. These states, whether the dictatorship was of the right or of the left, reasserted the old claim that the state was all-inclusive and that all other associations are or must be merely its agents.

The only way, however, by which the state can vindicate this claim shows how essentially false the claim actually is. For to maintain it the state must suppress the free life of the community, and by means of violence, terror, and monopolized propaganda must prevent the normal processes of society from finding expression. The state, for example,

does not take the place of the church. It merely destroys its public existence. In similar fashion the totalitarian state suppresses the creative forces of art, literature, philosophy, and science. In short, as so much modern experience has again shown, the state can never be a substitute for free associations, especially in the great areas of human culture.

One obvious conclusion follows. It is that the life of the community is endangered when government extends its functions beyond a certain range. We are not referring to the fact that this over-extension of the coercive power of government seeps initiative and fosters bureaucracy in its more cramping forms. We are concerned rather with the profound damage it inflicts on all the manifestations of the cultural life of man. When government becomes the arbiter of the arts, of the faiths, of the philosophies, of the morals, and of the attitudes of the people it cuts the heart out of all these activities, the activities by and for which men live. For it co-ordinates and regiments the primary loyalties that can flourish only when they are free.

Hence it is a first principle of every democratic creed, and a first requirement for any charter of elementary human rights, that government must be limited in the following ways:

(1) It must respect, and refrain from coercing, the opinions and the faiths of the members of the state, save only where these opinions and faiths demand that other men be denied the same rights to free expression that they claim for themselves.

(2) It must not extend its control over the practical concerns of men, especially their economic activities, in such a way or to such a degree that by doing so it directly or indirectly endangers the primary rights set forth above.[1]

Let us inquire then as to the characters which distinguish the state from other associations. It is these that have led to the false inference that the state is either omnipotent

[1] On this subject see the author's *The Web of Government*, cc. xi, xiii.

within or else identical with community, but they may serve as guides to the discovery of the functions which may properly belong to the state.

In the first place the state has a universality which no other association claims. It alone has territorial boundaries of such a kind that all who live within them are protected by, and subject to, its laws. All the inhabitants of a country are in this sense members of the state, and in our developing democracies the great majority of adults are now citizens, entitled to participate in the election of the 'government' from among themselves. No particular qualification of citizenship, other than birth or residence, is usually required. Every one must be a member of one, and no one can remain a member of more than one, state,[1] the case of federal states being of course only an apparent exception. These facts imply that there is a fundamental system of 'law and order' which the state upholds, a primary system of social rights and obligations which does not in principle depend upon, or stand for, special interests, but rests on the common nature and universal needs of man in society, a system also which makes possible, co-ordinates, protects, and therefore at some points regulates the associations which stand for specific interests. To build and develop this system is thus an incalculably important function undertaken by the state. Men can indeed live like the Veddahs and some groups of Eskimos without any state to give form and sanction to their social relationships, and there is an 'anarchist' philosophy which denies its necessity even for civilized peoples. But certainly the complex life of our day depends essentially on the state, and the 'life of nature' is only a dream, a rather foolish dream, of the past. Without the state, the life we desire no less than the life we have already attained would be for ever impossible. Let us not forget, however, that this statement is at least as true in respect of other associations.

[1] Note that a person can be a member of one state in the sense above indicated but a citizen of another, as in the case of recent immigrants or even travellers. To become a citizen an alien must be 'naturalized', and certain requirements other than residence are made. There are other technical exceptions, e.g. in the case of an ambassador.

Without the family, what kind of existence would we lead? Without economic associations, what would become of our comfort, our leisure, and even our daily bread? And down our history, even to the present day, have there not been men who at the heaviest price have chosen, when the two conflicted, allegiance to their church as a higher value than allegiance to their state?

A second character of the state is its unique investment with the coercive force of the community. Except in times of revolution, the state alone is accorded the right of compelling obedience, the *ultima ratio* of imprisonment, exile, or death. Other associations can deny their privileges to recalcitrant members or subject them to a fine or similar penalty as a condition of retaining their membership. But the state alone, with respect to adult members of society, can, and habitually does, exercise the sanction of force. It is not enough that it should deny, to those who disobey, the advantages of its membership. They cannot escape by resigning from the state. They cannot become 'outlaws' within community. Any other association they can abandon at will—unless the state prevents it, as is the case normally in respect of the marriage-association—but they cannot abandon the state nor repudiate by any act of will the obligations which it imposes. Other associations, such as those of law and medicine, can under conditions disqualify a member from exercising the profession over which they have cognizance, but only because the state confers this power upon them. This again seems to imply that the state stands for a necessary and universal system of order without which society would fall apart, and which the community as a whole values so much that it would prevent its violation with all the means at its disposal. But there are certain considerations which show that its investment with coercive force does not place the state in a category quite apart from other associations. Force has held an exaggerated place in political theory not because of the use of it we have been referring to, but because of the barbarous institution of war, and should that institution ever become, as is at least possible,

obsolete, the interpretation of the state in terms of force would pass away. Even now it is recognized by political thinkers that not force but common will is the basis of the state just as it is the basis of every other association. Even the totalitarian state must win the allegiance of a large body of its citizens, and it exerts its hypnotic and unlimited propagandism to that end. The conformity of the great majority of the members of the state does not and can not depend on enforcement or the threat of enforcement, but on acceptance of the purpose of the state, on loyalty, on the habit of obedience, or on the fear of social disapprobation. The last-mentioned motive, together with its correlative, the love of social favour, is a coercive force of great moment, and it resides, not in the state, but in the community and the various nearer associations, family and club and church and business circle, to which men belong. Its power is very great in time of war, for then it leads multitudes to face terrors as great as any which the state could possibly wield. Again, recent developments have shown that economic associations possess non-physical powers of coercion against which the force of the state may beat in vain. The power of organized capital can silently sway governments. Organized labour, through the strike, can by mere passivity offer the most effective opposition to its decrees. It may be answered that the state can forbid the strike as it forbids in some countries that other weapon of passivity, the boycott. But the experience of its efforts in this direction shows the limits of its power. In Australia, New Zealand, and Canada it has proved itself unable to enforce these prohibitions. In the last-named instance the state has never once ventured to enforce, in spite of numerous breaches of the law, the penalty attached to an act which merely prescribed that no strike or lock-out should take place until after a board of arbitration (when either side appealed for one) had recommended a settlement.

Finally, not only are there other powers which can nullify the coercive force of the state, but there are spheres where such force is by its very nature futile. Force can command

only the external, the formal. It cannot enjoin a spirit, a belief, or a form of culture. When it seeks to, it only destroys. Where the value of an act depends on the spirit in which it is done or on the spontaneity of the doer, as is the case with those activities which men most prize, there force is vain, and the state has no pre-eminence.

We have not therefore found in the state any character which gives it unqualified supremacy within community. The state has a unique function, but so has the family, so has the church, so have the economic associations. We have therefore to inquire just what function belongs to the state corresponding to its distinctive characters. If we look back at our table of common interests we observe that every ultimate interest, every object which men set before themselves as worth while attaining for itself, is already the province of some association other than the state. What then remains for the state? What common interests can it pursue which directly and vitally concern all men, for this is implied by the special character of the state, and which are not the preserve of specific associations? If not any of the ultimate interests, it must be some condition of them all. Thus we find that, in fact, every state is concerned with *justice*. Justice Plato long ago defined as 'the minding of one's own business' so that others can do the same, and this is a universal interest. In furtherance of it the state formulates a code, or rather a series of codes. We may roughly distinguish two essential codes: the criminal code, defining and prohibiting offences which in their very nature are anti-social, such as arson, rape, or murder; and the civil code which regulates the making and keeping of contractual rights and obligations so as to ensure fair dealing, according to the conscience of the time, between man and man. These codes are interpreted and applied by the judiciary and executed by the 'officers of justice'. The former code is obviously concerned with direct personal relationships, but no less obviously, to my mind, the latter must include the regulation of associational and institutional relationships in so far as this is necessitated by the idea of fairness or justice among men. Associations

are more powerful than individuals to pass the bounds of justice, and what but the state can restrain them? If the law of the state prohibits fraudulent dealing by individuals, why should it not prohibit, let us say, 'unfair competition' by associations? This means that the state has a certain function of co-ordination among the other associations, assigning to each its bounds, saying in the name of justice, 'Thus far and no further.'

One of the most essential attributes of justice, as we understand it to-day, is equality of opportunity for all men. The unequal distribution of power, dependent in democracies largely on the unequal distribution of wealth, leads at once to inequality of opportunity. If any association is to undertake the general task of mitigating inequalities of opportunity it must be, in virtue of the special powers assigned to it, the state. This gives the state a very important economic function. The historical necessity which led to the abandonment of economic *laissez-faire* and the enactment of legislation intended to protect workers against excessive hours, insanitary conditions, under-subsistence wages, overstrain, and industrial poisoning, seems far from being exhausted. It now leads the state, from the other end, to such special taxation as is involved in progressive income taxes and inheritance duties and again to the regulation of monopolies and combinations. The former of these activities may be regarded, though undertaken primarily for the sake of revenue, as an attempt towards a more equitable distribution of wealth, the latter as establishing, in another way, some degree of economic equality of opportunity. Both may be justified as providing the general conditions of social justice, though how far the state should go in these directions will depend on our conception of a just order of society. But it is quite certain that multitudes are dwarfed and thwarted by the pressure of economic conditions which condemn them to ugly, mean lives, ill-nourished, ill-equipped alike for work and for enjoyment, exposed to hazard, privation, and endless harassment, while others, questionably blessed with easy superfluity and unearned power, divert to unproductive

ends the resources and energies of the community. It is not possible that the state alone should effect a fairer and happier equilibrium, but it might well be—surely in fact it must be—the agency through which is finally expressed whatever form of readjustment an awakening social sense and the pressure of economic organizations have made practicable.

Again, the great development of industrial and professional organizations, each pursuing the specific interest of a group of producers, has given point to the guildsmen's theory that the state should stand for the general interest of the consumer as distinct from the particular interest of the producer. For all are consumers of the mass of commodities and services, just as all are members of the state, whereas a limited group is associated in the production of any economic good. The broad, diffused interest falls to the care of the state.

This principle also justifies the state in the provision of those communal services which experience shows to be adequately provided only when entrusted to this general organ of community. There is much debate as to what these services are. Some still hanker after *laissez-faire*, others would carry 'nationalization' to the limit. Nearly every one would agree that education should be provided for all by the state. It also seems clear that the essential agencies of intercommunication and transport, post, telegraph, wireless, telephone, and railroad, should be either owned or controlled by the state. As the land is the basis of the whole life of the community, the source of all its wealth, and the most exclusive and inexpansible of all properties, its control should be the peculiar care of the one really territorial association, the state. The fundamental conditions of physical, mental, and moral health must surely lie within its scope. For here some element of compulsion enters in which requires the power of the state. Individuals cannot be allowed to spread infectious diseases or to propagate insanity or syphilis or otherwise deliberately to imperil the health and life of their fellows.

Thus provided with a great organization for control and for co-ordination, the state is in a position to bring aid and support to other associations in the fulfilment of their interests. It can endow research, develop the resources of the country, act as a great protective agency against the otherwise disastrous economic hazards of unemployment, accident, and ill health, stimulate and endow the associations devoted to the higher or cultural interests. The taxing power of the state gives it facilities for these services which other associations lack. On the other hand there is need for great caution here. Where two or more associations within community are divided on some cultural issue the state cannot without harm take the side of one of these, say of one church among others. For the same reason it must beware of attempting to interfere with the spontaneity and self-direction which is the essential condition of the successful associational pursuit of knowledge or literature or religion or art or higher education or the co-operative enterprise of the professions and industries. Here, apart from certain general regulations already indicated, the hand of the state becomes heavy and repressive. The life of associations develops from within. The particularity of other associations gives them a flexibility, an intimacy, an initiative which the state can never attain. Consider, for example, the association at the other extreme from the state, the most intimate association of the family. The state may regulate the marriage-contract as a universal condition of social welfare, and may insist on such primary obligations as are necessary to protect the children of the family who are also the citizens of the future, but the inner life of the family is utterly withdrawn from its competence.

One function which the state has hitherto exercised, and exercised very badly, the control of international relationships, we shall leave for consideration in a further section. This function has in the past been primarily associated with the force or 'might' of the estate. We wish here to insist that the place of force in the state has been grossly exaggerated and to point out, in a review of the essential characters of

the state, that it is disastrous to regard it, whether from the standpoint of internal or external relations, as an iron framework within which the great communities we call countries are enclosed.

We have not tried to define accurately the limits of the state. These must vary with the evolution of the other associations and with the standards of thought and living engendered in the community. It should be noted that as the other associations grow more specific and complete the state in turn approximates to them in character, also taking on a more specific and limited character. As, for example, the associations of the industrial order become more integrated they naturally take over tasks of regulation which at first fell to the charge of the state. When and if the new guilds are established towards which industry may perhaps be tending, they would naturally perform more effectively the regulation which is now partly covered by Factory and Workshop Acts, Minimum Wage Acts, and so forth, just as certain professions wherein the cleavage of labour and capital does not exist, particularly law and medicine, are in essentials self-regulating. The tendency then would be for the state to become more of a co-ordinating and less of a directive agency.

The acute author of *Social Theory*, Mr. Cole, would deny to the state the function of co-ordination and hand it over ultimately to a 'joint council' representative of the various essential associations. We cannot here enter into any question which leads far away from the present social order. The difference may be in the end a matter of name, but it seems that the function of co-ordination is a necessary one and that it can scarcely be exercised by any association which has not the universality and the kind of authority characteristic of the state. What may well happen, however, is some development of the method of representation which will assure more capable political government. This will be easier as the functions of the state become more defined, and there are already indications that the no longer significant system of representation by small localities is passing

away and a virtual representation of organized interests taking its place. Political representation may in the future be on the basis of associations just as in the past it was on the basis of classes. For persons cannot represent the personality of others, but they can and do, openly or disguisedly, stand for interests.

Other writers, such as Mr. Laski in his *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, go so far as to deny either the possibility or the necessity of co-ordination, and envisage community as the ground of a number of great associations whose conflicting loyalties admit of no appeal to any final tribunal. This seems to the present writer only a half-truth. When associations find their true place and function, the kind of conflict which stands in the way of social order and co-ordination will scarcely occur. This is clear in the case of the conflict on which much of the argument for 'pluralism' is based, the conflict of church and state. Each of these associations has historically refused to know its bounds. The church has claimed to wield the 'temporal sword'. The state has claimed to regulate matters of doctrine and church government. When each has learned its place the conflict of loyalties, such as that which led, for example, to the 'disruption' of the Scottish church, disappears. Take again the conflicts which arise between the state and the associations of labour. These are due to cleavage within the sphere of economic associations and to the identification of the state with one of the contending parties. They are due, so to speak, to a civil war within the economic order. If, as there is reason to suppose, the conflict of labour and capital must yield to a more co-operative economic system, then the dangerous but at present inevitable alliance of the state with one or other of the great contestants will pass, and the state itself will have a more limited, but clearer and less invidious, function. It is only because there is cleavage within other associations that we can speak, rather inaccurately, of a conflict between the state and one of these. For all men are members of the state. There will, of course, always be a conflict of policies *within* the state, as within any other

association, but it will become more difficult to speak of a conflict *between* the state and any of the other essential organs of community.

The key to the understanding as well as to the solution of these problems is to be found in the conception that the great associations, corresponding to the great interests of men, are *organs of community*. It is the community that creates the state, the church, the family, the school, the industry. It is community that assigns the limits of them all. It is community, the common sense and common will of men who live together, which gives to the state its powers of co-ordination, and sets limits also to these. This conception alters our whole outlook. We may grant the state the great function of co-ordination because it too is under a mandate. It does not stand in its own right. It is maintained to fulfil certain functions, and the will that maintains it is a more fundamental reality than itself. It is there, in the unbounded life of community, that we must look for and, if anywhere, find the unity and harmony of social life.

And in seeking that unity we must always remember that the final value, the only value in and for itself, the ultimate social unit, is the person, that associations have no validity save as they further the development, the good living, and the ideals of persons, that no association nor yet all of them together can include or achieve the fullness of personality, and that the priority of community over its associations is because it at least encloses, even if it cannot be properly said to comprehend, the whole of the lives of men.

II. THE INTEGRATION OF LOCALITIES AND REGIONS

We must now come to closer grips with the problem of co-ordination. We have been discussing the relation to one another of associations; we shall next discuss the relation of communities and of the fragments of communities we call localities. We saw that in an earlier stage of social development these localities were nearly self-contained communities. They lost their autonomy in the growth of the country community, and then the problem arose as to their due place

and function in the greater structure. Various alternatives were opened up. The locality might become, in respect of social organization, merely an administrative unity to register and execute the decisions of a central authority. This is the extreme of *centralization*, never completely attained but suggested, for example, in the political structure of France. Or, again, the locality may retain in large measure the control of local affairs, subject to the sanction or the veto of the central authority. This is the principle of *decentralization*, or *devolution*, to which we find an approach in the English system. Where in respect of certain defined functions the locality or the part community is not subject to any superior government while in respect of other defined functions of a more universal nature authority is centralized, we have the system of *federalism*. In such a system the undefined functions may belong by institution to the component parts, as in Australia or the United States, or they may belong to the whole as a unit, as in Canada. The former is more strictly the federal type. But these definitions give only an abstract idea of the composite character of existent systems. It is not easy or indeed possible to make a sharp cleavage between the powers of the parts and the powers of the whole. It is always, however named, a matter of degree, and the essential question is not what specific functions, but how much initiative in the exercise of almost all functions should belong to the smaller and how much to the larger body. This fact is well illustrated by the history of federations. They begin usually as independent societies, which for the sake of a common order or from some necessity of peace and defence agree to assign certain functions of co-ordination to a central authority. But in practice, as in the United States, the unity becomes a closer one, and various influences conspire to modify the complete autonomy, in respect of their defined functions, assigned to the component parts, in this instance once sovereign states.

Let us consider again the case of political representation. It was natural that as the system of representation grew the

unit should become the locality. There was a time when localities as such could be represented, where the country was built up of localities, each still retaining not only its local feeling but also its local complex of interests. But as the country became integrated, as the idea of the nation developed, as specific interests crossed the bounds of locality and so broke up its homogeneity, representation by locality became less effective. The representative of a locality no longer, as a rule, represented any kind of unity, often he represented nothing at all. The representative nominally stood for a locality, but he was first the member of a party. The party is concerned with national policy but again its national policy may be determined by the interests of particular groups. In any event the locality is no longer, where there are any serious divisions of policy between political parties, the primary concern of the representative. In countries where the multiple party system prevails, members are represented more directly. Members are elected more directly—no longer through a cumbrous disguise—because they represent the general interest of capital or some specific form of it such as manufacture, because they represent the agricultural interest, because they stand for such an interest of the consumer as free trade, because they are associated with the interest of labour or some specific form of it, because they uphold the Roman Catholic Church, and so forth. But this system in turn accentuates the divisions of interest within the community.

In the case of associations other than the state, because they pursue more limited and more definite interests, the same principle appears in a clearer form. Trade unions, manufacturers' associations, professional organizations, co-operative societies, churches, masonic brotherhoods, party organizations, friendly societies, and so on, are organized on the basis of local units, but these units are only nuclei of an interest which transcends locality and is at most merely modified by local conditions. The locality is, for the purpose of the association as a whole, nothing more than a recruiting and organizing agency. The interest itself is not local but

national or perhaps universal, a *human* interest subjected to certain conditions of place.

As the process advances by which associations pass local bounds and become national or international bodies they at the same time acquire a clarified conception of the interests which they severally pursue. The locally bound association was mixed up in all sorts of irrelevant interests apart from the particular interest which was its *raison d'être*. The original town guilds, for example, were concerned with moral, religious, political, as well as economic, issues. Like all locally bound associations they tended to regulate the life, the customs, and the ideals of their members. Their standards of honesty and of honour did not bear solely on the methods of manufacture or trade. They instituted a series of observances which made them part of a system of education, of moral and religious discipline, of philanthropy, of civic administration as well as of good fellowship. The semi-isolated church was likewise inclusive and intrusive. The self-contained manor was a framework which on the basis of land ownership controlled every social relationship. Naturally these inclusive semi-communal associations clashed with one another, and no real co-ordination was possible until each learned, in the wider life of the nation, to limit itself to its special interest. The limitation is never complete, for human interests are too closely bound together to allow of a clear-cut severance. But there is a great contrast between the older discursive types of association and the modern. The present-day associations of labour and of capital, for instance, are concerned with political activities, but essentially as a means to economic ends. Even so, they sometimes have a separate organization for political purposes. Witness the distinction between the political organization of labour in England—the Labour Party, and the economic—the Trade Union Congress. It is clear that in the degree that associations learn to distinguish their respective interests from all others they can pursue them much more effectively and 'disinterestedly'. This is as true of the state as of any other association. So long as, for instance, it discriminated

against those of its members who belonged to other religious bodies, say the Roman Catholic or the 'Nonconformist' churches, than that with which it confusedly identified itself, it made irrelevant distinctions which profoundly disturbed its policies. It was a house divided against itself.

But what of the locality as the interests which once centred within it now take a wider range and find their centre outside? It is denuded of a certain vitality it formally possessed. Men require in the first place a near centre for their loyalties, otherwise these become thin and abstract, and the sense of community, as apart from that of particular and isolable objects of associated endeavour, wanes. It was necessary that the inclusiveness of the small community should go. Inclusiveness meant narrowness, rigidity, repression of individuality, a pent-in and custom-ridden life. But it also meant a certain quality of emotional warmth, the spirit of clannishness, of affectionate attachment within the circle of one's fellows. The strong bickerings and internal feuds of the kin group were but those family quarrels which sometimes break out most violently where intimacy is greatest. In the widened associations and the widened community to which they belong personal relationships tend to be replaced by formal or contractual relationships. The great community of the nation is not alone sufficient to evoke and give expression to the primary social sense of 'belonging together', of neighbourliness. Its centre is too far off, its meaning is too vague; too easily does it become a symbol of empty greatness and the mere sense of power. It does not command, in the affairs of every day, the ready thought of its presence and the devotion of service. In fact, the wider community, the nation and still more the civilization, can become for most men a reality only if it is understood as the extension of the near community in which they actually live.

The lack of this binding social sense, without which social responsibility cannot thrive, is most obviously felt in the great city, where, as we have seen, the older personal relationships of the family and the group are reduced to the minimum. Even by itself the city that numbers its population

by the million is far too large to be an effective social unit. Its organization becomes an impersonal machinery in which the mass of its citizens takes little interest, or only a financial one as being a source of taxation, thus too often leaving its government at the mercy of the 'politician', or the 'boss'. The communal organization of the overgrown city offers the hardest of all problems of co-ordination. In the country there are convenient divisions into districts which may again develop, under a better system of social education, a community spirit, and there are suitable nuclei, in the form of the smaller towns, to serve as 'community centres'. (This is harder where the country district falls within the sphere of influence of a large city, a sphere which grows greater with the improvement of communications and especially with the increasing use of the automobile.) But in the city, with its indiscriminate juxtaposition of massed homes, it is difficult to find effective centres for the evocation of the community spirit. The city ward is not as a rule sufficiently homogeneous nor sufficiently demarcated to arouse in its members the sense that they belong together. Certain attempts have been made to integrate city wards into effective communities, as units of the greater city, but on the whole the experiments have been unenduring or abortive.

The associational side of social life has in fact developed somewhat at the cost of the communal. It is but an illustration of the partial retreats that occur in most advances of the social line. The great extension of associational range and activity represents a real advance, and the way to regain the communal spirit cannot be by giving this up. What is required is to find the proper place and stimulus of the community spirit in this world of great associations. Let us remember that in the first place the community has no specific function like the association, but is instead the focus of the emotion or sentiment of sociability, so that men feel at home within society. In so far as it is built up of units at all, it is built up of homes or families rather than of the wide associations. Its interest is general. It consists in a sense of the welfare of the whole and a conviction that we belong

integrally and vitally to that whole. The clue to its restoration is found in the rediscovery of the nearer and subtler points of contact and resemblance among men, such as special qualities of speech or expression (often cheaply dismissed as being 'provincial'), particular habits and customs springing from the climatic, economic, and other distinguishing characters of a region, and so on. The meticulous geographical surveys of the school of Le Play and Demolins reveal the tenacious character of these regional differences. They can be employed to great advantage in the restoration of community life. The community of the nation under the sway of the aggressive, centralized, and too independent state has tended to submerge them, but as the state learns its own place in the interdependence of a whole civilization they will in turn be able to assert their proper claims.

This is the demand of 'regionalism', which has become vocal most notably in over-centralized France. The 'region' was once the home of a distinctive spirit. A regional 'patriotism' marked—does still in some degree mark—the Aberdonian, the Yorkshireman, the man of Wessex, the man of Devon, and so forth. It is now saved from its old narrowness by the extension of communications and by the permeation of the great associations. Thus refined it can be far more greatly utilized. The obvious method is to entrust to the region as great a measure as possible of control in the direction of associational activity, thus fostering the sense of its unity. In education, for example, it seems a good thing that the county should constitute an effective administrative unit. The same is true of many other functions of the state. It may be that for different purposes different units are appropriate. The economic unit may not coincide with the educational unit. Nor is it necessary that these should coincide. We must not look for a clear-cut system of regional areas. What is necessary is that people should learn to attach themselves to some regional centre whose circumference fades into the circle of a wider community. Then they will establish or renew those more purely communal institutions and cherish those customs which reveal

the spirit of neighbourliness, the purified spirit of the tribe—one might instance such institutions as the Welsh eisteddfod or the Celtic 'mods' and Highland gatherings or the Cumberland games. For many purposes the region represented by the widened electoral district under a system of 'proportional representation' would suffice, and this constitutes an important argument for that system.

It should be observed finally that this process of 'devolution' does not lessen but in fact increases the appropriate functions of the central organization and particularly of the state. Just as in the bodily organism the greater the differentiation of the various organs the greater is the functioning of the entire system, so in the community. The more each locality, each city and region, inspired by the sense of common interest, carries on a collective activity, the greater becomes the meaning for all of the whole community, and the greater the especial task of the state, that of co-ordination. At present in England the state ineffectively endeavours to cover a vast field of activities great and small, relevant and irrelevant. It is absurd, for instance, that a Scottish burgh cannot adopt a new water-scheme without submitting it first to Westminster. The Scottish burgh knows its local needs far better than Westminster can, and the central government is impeded and distracted by such concerns from the pursuit of its particular business. In the regionally organized community the function of the state would be vastly clarified, and there would be the less danger of that most pernicious confusion, the identification of the state with community itself. How dangerous that confusion is will best appear when we turn next to the question of the co-ordination of national communities.

III. THE CO-ORDINATION OF NATIONS OR PEOPLES

The greatest advance in socialization up to the present time has been the establishment of the nation as a real community. To transcend the locality and the region, to break down the mental isolation of the smaller groups, their sense of alienation from one another, their feuds and prejudices

and their fierce spiritual pride, in such a way that they attached themselves to one another in the unity of the nation, was the work of ages. Conquest and empire could not do it. These brought domination and order over great areas, but not the sense of nationality. The great empires, from the Babylonian to the British, merely enclosed in a system of law and taxation a larger or smaller number of localized communities. It was a great task to establish the empire, it was a greater to establish the nation. It required an endless process of social education, it required the technical development of communications and of the printing press, it required the breakdown of caste and class distinctions which made the many the unprivileged servants of the few, and it required the comparative leisure from benumbing toils which modern forms of production have permitted to a large proportion of the people. England in the time of the Armada was not yet a nation. It had no conception of self-government. The unity of resistance to an invader is not enough to constitute the unity of a nation. In fact nation-making was the particular work of the nineteenth century in Europe and America, and it is still far from being completed. The sense of nationality grew stronger as the century advanced. It showed itself in the wars of liberation of Greece and Italy, in the emergence of the Balkan peoples, in the unification of Germany, in the separation of Holland and Belgium, in the decline of empire as its parts achieved self-government and 'colonies' became autonomous unities, and at the same time in those internal movements for self-government which were marked by great extensions of the political franchise and by agitations for 'home rule'. In the twentieth century the spirit of nationality spread still further. It was intensified, rather than diminished, by two world wars. It found troublesome expression in the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It gained strength in the Orient, where various countries hitherto under imperial rule asserted their right to autonomy, including Burma, India, Indo-China, and Indonesia. Even in Soviet Russia, which was founded on an intensively

anti-nationalistic ideology, the sentiment of nationality regained its vigour.

There is still, nevertheless, much confusion in the idea of nation and nationality. Nation is often confused with race, and we ought to understand quite clearly that race and nationality are entirely distinct. To begin with, the identifications of race are most hazardous and hypothetical. There are certainly no pure races in Europe and probably none, if indeed we can attach any significance to the term a 'pure' race, in the world. We may distinguish certain broad divisions of the human family according to colour, the white man or Caucasian type, the yellow man or Mongolian type (including also the red man or American Indian), and the dark-skinned negro. But even these cannot at all be regarded as species or sub-species of the genus man. The biological evidence points to their being mere variations which have developed through long exposure to different geographical and other conditions, wherein for ages they remained isolated by great physical barriers of mountains and seas. As for the minor divisions within the groups, these have first diversified from their common source, and then have mixed and remixed in the endless vicissitudes of conquest and migration. Those who foster the narrower spirit of nationality by exalting the racial purity of some particular people attributing its achievements to the peculiar virtue of the unique stock whence it sprang—as, for example, Houston Chamberlain exalted the Teuton and Taine exalted the Latin stock—manufacture a false science out of a popular prejudice. The true science of anthropology makes short work of these proud claims.

When we realize that nations are not racially distinct entities, it becomes apparent that there remains no single outward criterion of any kind to mark off nation from nation. Take language. A nation may be one though its members, like the Swiss, speak several languages; and a single language, like English or Spanish, may be common to diverse nations. Take religion. The day of the national God is past; and the God of a denationalized race (but of course not a 'pure' race) holds the at least nominal allegiance of the divided nations

of the Western world. Take culture. That pervasive spirit seeks to unite many nations, and it is, anyhow, the growing legacy of a past world to the new nations of the present, so that those who would draw around it the frontiers of nationality err no less egregiously than the prophets of race. Take physical form. Whatever index we adopt, whether the length and breadth of the skull or the slant of the jaw or the orbit of the eye-cavity or the shape of the nose, each gives a different classification and none is the clear identification mark of the members of any nation. And it appears now that even physical form is subject to the unfelt influences of environment, for in America, it would seem, according to certain investigations of the U.S. Immigration Commission, there is a tendency for the extreme European variations of head-formation to approximate in the second generation to an intermediate type, and according to Flinders Petrie the Lombards, from being long-headed, became in a few hundred years short-headed.[1]

Nationality must therefore be a subtler thing than these external signs. Yet long tradition and common customs inherited from a common past seem scarcely necessary, for the Americans, fused out of detached fragments of many full-grown nations, surely possess a nationality, and the Canadians, Australians, and other offshoots of mainly English stock feel themselves to be distinct nations. It would seem in fact, as if the first foundation of nationality was an environment within which people learn to know one another, and to recognize that they are subject to common influences and master of common opportunities, while around it there remain frontiers, not necessarily physical ones—a language, a tradition of hostility, a trade barrier, a mere difference of name, may suffice—which prevent the free extension of that sympathetic knowledge and assimilating co-operation. Common nationhood grows first out of the possession of common land, but is not constituted by the sense of possession. For the bitterest national enmities arise among those who dispute

[1] 'Short-headed' (brachycephalic) means that the width of the skull, viewed from above, is at least four-fifths of the length.

a common territory, as in the Balkans and in Ireland. It is the subtle sense of community which the present or past possession of a common land creates where no acute internal division, such as the *sense* of distinctive race or religion or of the political or social subjection of part to part, prevents the silent growth of the fact and above all the consciousness of likeness, like ways, like manners, like intonations, like dispositions, like institutions, like ambitions. Again, it appears that community is a matter of degree. A few centuries ago America, with its present inhabitants, would have made a hundred warring nations in place of one. The press, the railroad, and a popularized education have widened the range of the sense of community. Nations, like all other communities, have no eternally fixed bounds.

What then is the criterion of nationhood? It is the desire for self-government surging out of the sense of likeness and of difference. Every nation wishes to be united in one state, and historically the rise of nations has centred round the claim of self-government. Here is the true place and service of the nation, to conserve a sense of community which might otherwise be lost in smaller conflicting devotions or else in the shallow and unabiding loyalty of empire or mere cosmopolitan enlightenment, and to give free play to that sense through the co-operative activity of its proper organ, the state. For it is only in so far as men feel their community that they can wholeheartedly join in the pursuit of their common interests.

Just here, too, the danger lies. Men no sooner achieve a range of community than they seek to make it absolute. Nationality should be regarded as the inspiration and the ground of interests and activities which are not themselves nationalistic. 'Nationality is a way of being human.' If we seek to limit the interests which a nation pursues so that beyond its frontiers they cease, we mutilate those interests and destroy the very service of nationality. It is not by thinking of the exclusive interests of the nation that advance is made, except in the single case of the attainment of self-government as a basis for the free pursuit of all interests.

Nationality cannot give the *content*, but only the *ground* of social action. The welfare which a nation can achieve, through social legislation, through the provision of good education, through the development of its resources, through the encouragement of cultural ends, is not good for it alone, and is not to be secured by preoccupation with the thought of its peculiar national virtue. The obsession of nationality, like the obsession of individuality, thwarts and perverts its own object, and breeds rancours and pathological delusions. The state, which has done so much for the fulfilment of the nation, has done much also to foster this obsession. It has done so by the practice of the doctrine of unlimited sovereignty, that each is bound by no formulated obligations to the nations without. Most of all has it done so by its attitude to the barbaric institution of war.

War, like taxation, or the second chamber, is an institution of the state, just as, say, baptism is an institution of the church. It is only states that now make war, just as it is only churches that baptize. If our contention as to the place of the state in the community is sound, we must challenge the very right of the *state* to make war—meaning by war the armed conflict of nation-communities and not those more frequent raids and expeditions of exploitation which are to be condemned or defended on other grounds. For war destroys other interests than those of nationality, which as we have seen is quite limited in content. It destroys the interests of the family, it confounds religion, it uproots the economic order, it is peculiarly pernicious to culture and therefore antagonistic to all associations which promote it. Now when any one association oversteps its bounds, it is the place of the community, acting usually, but by no means necessarily, through the state, to assert the rights of other associations and ultimately, of course, the rights of the personal life. Here, therefore, the community has a clear right to curb the power of the state and to insist on its adopting means to its purposes no wider than those purposes themselves. It may be this idea which obscurely underlies the widespread belief that democracy and the institution of

war are incompatible. Note that what we are attacking is not at all the right of the state to defend against armed aggression the general interests of the community. This is clearly within its rights, since the threat of war is itself a threat against all these interests. What we are attacking is the right of the state to retain war as an *institution*, to treat war as a legitimate means of carrying out its own purposes, to regard a ministry of war as a part of its normal apparatus like, shall we say a ministry of health? By what right, we must ask, is the state entitled, in pursuance of any positive political interest, to sunder the unity of the higher interests that unite nations, and, even temporarily, to throw civilization back into that barbarism where force and dismal regimentation denude life of all its creative instincts, where an archaic code, legitimizing murder and falsehood, reigns, and where the young manhood of the nations is subjected to conditions of existence worse than those of beasts, amid conscious perils these never know? Is it not, on the contrary, the first duty of states, in their capacity as guardians of the primary law and order, to unite for the purpose of abolishing its greatest enemy, the institution of war?

If this principle held while war merely interrupted the normal life of the community, it has still greater force under the new conditions, when owing to the epoch-making discovery of a controllable process of atomic fission—not to mention new biological agencies of wholesale destruction or 'genocide'—war threatens to put an end to civilized life, if not to the very existence of mankind.

In questioning the claim of the state to make war we are also questioning its claim to absolute sovereignty. The denial of this claim is already implied in the account we have given of community and its associations. Here we must make it more explicit. If the state is really only one among other associations, it is clearly not sovereign in the old sense in which political theory assigned to it that attribute. It is at most *prima inter pares*. The other associations have as much competence to guard their special interests as the state has to guard its own. The fear-born state of Hobbes, which

regulated opinions as well as actions, the mystic state of Hegel, that conveniently enclosed 'world the spirit has made for itself', the domineering state of Austin, which gave laws to a body of subjects and itself knows no law, do not belong to reality any more. Not only internally but also externally the old doctrine of sovereignty goes too far. In the world of to-day the great interests are not bounded by state frontiers. States themselves are therefore interdependent in their functioning. How can the single state be absolute sovereign, except in a legalist's dream, when economically the state-bound communities live by trade with one another, when culturally they owe their progress to the exchange of ideas, when a constantly growing network of social relations unites their members within a greater national community? What we may call the militaristic-mercantilistic position is undermined by the facts of the case. The militarists make things too easy for themselves by falsely identifying the state with 'power' and falsely regarding 'power' as an end, whereas it is but one means, and an exceedingly limited one, for the attainment of ends. The mercantilists falsely teach that the economic gain of one state-bound community is generally achieved to the economic loss of others, as if nations were rival shopkeepers, and rather stupid shopkeepers at that, since they do not know anything of the advantage of combination over competition. The only case where the mercantilistic position has even plausibility is in respect of the seizure and exploitation of undeveloped lands, but where this leads to a state of hostility, preparation for war, and war itself between the exploiting nations, it is fairly obvious that the economic and social loss of the method of force outweighs the economic gain, and that an international regime, allowing the members of different states liberty under law to extend their economic activities in these lands, would bring to civilization as a whole the advantages, without the tragic costs, of the new resources they contain.

The world is now ripe for the recognition of the greater community beyond the state. This recognition must take the form of a real international system, adequate to and

co-extensive with the common interests which it protects and furthers. It is, as we have seen, an elementary social principle that wherever a common interest extends a corresponding association ought to exist. This principle has led to the establishment of international associations of trade, of science, of art, of capital, of labour. But justice and order are the most universal of interests, and yet their guardian, the state, with its conservative tradition of an absolute sovereignty, has withstood the necessary process of community, thus greatly impeding all other associations which have taken the wider view. It could not of course altogether resist the immediate necessities of the case, but its recognition of them, as illustrated by international arrangements for communication and transportation, domicile, immigration and extradition, trade and commerce, patent and copyright, has been of the most rudimentary character and it has spent most of its ingenuity on more or less futile 'rules' of war! Its machinery too, that of spasmodic *ad hoc* conferences and conventions, has been quite inadequate. Most obviously a federated system of states is necessary for the carrying on of the civilization of to-day, and in the lurid after-light of two World Wars some approach to it has been made by the Charter of the United Nations. While the new international structure is seriously flawed by the unregenerate sovereignty retained by the Big Five, the United Nations nevertheless contains the hopes of the future.

The world is now ripe, and never was ripe before, for an international or more precisely an inter-political system. The last hundred years have prepared the nation as the unit of a still wider community. Community extends circle beyond circle, and until the smaller circle is ready the greater cannot round itself out. In pre-nation days the only far extension of political organization necessarily took the form of empire, as it still does in respect of those peoples for whom the inner spirit of democracy, the condition of nationhood, is undeveloped. Thus it appears that the greater community does not come to destroy but to fulfil the smaller. As the city community did not replace but defined the family.

as the nation community did not replace but defined the city, so the international community can only fulfil the nation. The meaning of the wide community is found at the heart of the near one. The smaller is always the richer, the intenser, which learns to give of its overflowing life to the greater. Thus only can be avoided the dangers of the two extremes, the narrow parochialism which makes its home the world and the shallow cosmopolitanism which makes the world its home.

IV. THE CO-ORDINATION OF CLASSES

We have left to the last the consideration of an issue which, while uneasily making for certain extensions of international society, has cut sharply across the unity of the nation. As far back as we can properly trace any civilization we find distinctions of class, groupings which follow different social standards and do not freely mix with one another. Until quite recent times this stratification was relatively fixed, and was taken for granted as a normal feature of society. It was not regarded as a problem. The conditions of life and work naturally made for demarcation. The great masses of the people lived lives of incessant toil upon the land and so were quite distinct from the few who possessed leisure or knowledge or power. There was no general education. The secrets of the arts and the crafts were the treasured traditions of semi-privileged groups. Only one business required much capital, as we understand the term, and that was the business of the merchant, who thus constituted a special class. Again, war and conquest brought serfs and slaves who formed in many communities the lowest menial order. Society was a hierarchy whose topmost rank was at one time the king with his court and officials, and at another time the priesthood. In some countries classes hardened definitely into castes, as in India. There the cleavage became more rigid. Castes have no relation of sociability with one another, and they do not intermarry.

The form of the class system under feudalism has a special significance for us, since out of it has evolved the

order of modern society. The system of 'estates' which we described in Chapter II still retains shadowy traces of its former meaning, but in Western Europe and even more in America the new economic order has substituted a more flexible and less determinate class-structure. It has in turn created one great new problem. By distributing economic power, by creating the means for the dissemination of knowledge and opinion and for the wide organization of every common interest, it has destroyed the spirit of acquiescence in existing social inequalities. In any case there is not the same reverence attached to authority bestowed by capital as belonged to pre-eminence mystically attributed to birth or the favour of heaven. The glaring contrasts between luxury and poverty, between an assured social position and hazardous dependence, rest directly on the possession or lack of an external and easily transferable thing, capital. Social classes are to-day essentially economic classes. For wealth now buys estates, titles, heraldic arms, and all the paraphernalia of distinction, whereas the mere owner of these honorific possessions finds it hard to turn them into wealth. Moreover, as Veblen has graphically pointed out in his *Theory of the Leisure Class*, the chief way in which the *sense* of distinction can be gratified in a democracy is by ostentatious spending, by the exercise of the 'principle of conspicuous waste'.

It is a difficult question to determine whether wealth is in fact becoming more evenly distributed. Marx believed that an opposite process of wealth-concentration was inherent in the nature of a 'capitalistic' society. The evidence is not conclusive. Income tax statistics of the last few decades before the First World War suggested rather than proved that the proportion of the population who were moderately well-to-do was slowly increasing. There is evidence also that the real income of the working classes has increased in the more industrialized countries since the earlier part of the nineteenth century, while social legislation has provided them with an invisible income unknown in earlier times. Moreover, in recent years high income taxes and inheritance taxes have considerably reduced the effective income of the

well-to-do. One form of possession was quite certainly becoming more widely distributed, that of agricultural land, which has been subject to a great parcelling-out process as intensive cultivation has advanced. But agricultural land has grown a continually smaller portion of the wealth of the world. On the other hand there is evidence that the control of capital is becoming concentrated in fewer hands. The extension of combinations, trusts, and amalgamations has brought the control of the great capitalistic industries, iron and steel, oil, textiles, copper, coal, and many others, into the hands of a relatively few big directors, often linked up with one another and with the financial magnates of the banks, financial and insurance companies, thus vastly increasing the wealth as well as the power of a new oligarchy. Whether wealth is or is not growing more concentrated, the contrast of wealth and poverty was never more intense, and the new material splendours which an age of technical discovery has conferred upon the rich have a sombre background in the utter impoverishment which holds at least one-third of the people of Europe below the level of the simplest decency of living.

But we shall err if we suppose that the present-day class struggle is due to the psychological contrast of poverty and wealth. This has, in other forms, existed in all ages, but the class struggle did not ensue. There were uprisings against economic oppressions in the past, like the 'peasant's revolt', but they were directed against some particularly obnoxious abuse of power, and they reflected some intolerable grievance. They did not seek any fundamental change of the *status quo*. The modern issue depends on the fact that now those who own little else do own a kind of power.

Let us be clear how this has arisen. Always, since the world began, men have worked for other men as their servants or hirelings, their serfs or their slaves. The industrial revolution first changed, not the fact, but the form of dependence. It depersonalized the relation of master and servant. It made that relation depend on the fact that some possessed and others did not possess the new 'capitalistic'

machinery of production. It brought the dispossessed into new and closer association with one another. It brought them under a new, more continuous, and more exacting discipline. Thus united, they in turn acquired a new power. At first stimulated by the shocking conditions of work into which this depersonalized and socially unprotected industry fell, the workers organized. They learned the power that resided in mere passivity, the concerted withdrawal from work. The advancing division of labour put a great new weapon in their hands. The common technique of mechanical industry removed many of the barriers of skill and pride of craft which kept them apart. The new ease of communication and the integration of the nation brought them together over a whole country and led to tentative international labour movements. Capitalistic and workers' organizations countered one another in the industry, in the city, in the country, and across the boundaries of the state. Thus the field was cleared of all irrelevancies for the great struggle of economic power.

It is not surprising that these dramatic developments should have evoked the idea of a new dichotomy of society, into the owners of capital and the 'workers', in Marxian language the 'bourgeoisie' and the 'proletariat'. And it is certainly true that the critical distinction of the present industrial world is that between the class which lives by investment, a source of living greatly stabilized by the development of the joint stock and limited liability system, as well as by the vast bonded indebtedness, mostly war-created, of modern states, and the class which lives by work. This distinction, however, does not provide the simple division of society into two classes which the Marxian terms suggest. It is true that with respect to the wage-earners, proper an insignificant part of their income, probably not more than three per cent in England, is derived from capital, while there is at the other end a considerable class which lives almost entirely on its proceeds. But there are intermediate groups of very considerable importance, the so-called middle classes, the entrepreneurs and business managers,

the merchants and retailers, the professional groups, the technicians, the civil servants. These are all 'working' classes in the wide sense, but their interests are in part associated with those of the owners of capital and their incomes are often in part derived directly from capital. They form the middle classes of modern society and Marx was clearly mistaken in assuming that the inevitable operation of economic law in capitalistic society would destroy these middle classes and thereby swell the numbers of a subsistence-wage proletariat. Again, there are other interests than merely economic ones which normally prevent the decisive operation of that 'class-consciousness' on which Marx laid such stress. In fact it may be that only in an industrially undeveloped country, as in Russia, is it possible to stimulate that sharp cleavage which leads to unmitigated class war and thus to a direct and decisive economic revolution.

Nevertheless the economic class struggle (even though modified by these conditions) is to-day paramount. It may be that the issue is clearly defined only at certain points along the line, but at these points a settlement is imperative, for the whole of society is deeply involved in the waste and bitterness that mark the struggle. It is the business of social science to survey dispassionately the facts of the case, yet not to shrink from drawing any conclusions which these facts seem to warrant. It is clear to any reflective mind that no degree of harmony can be attained on the basis of the economic *status quo*. The wage-earner owns a power inherent in the very conditions of modern industry, and this power must realize itself in the altered social fact. It must be accorded responsibility and control adequate to its extent, or it spends itself in destruction instead of construction. It is not in place here to enter into a detailed examination of the conditions under which this necessary new order can be attained; but the following suggestions may indicate what the writer regards as its general nature. The wage-earner must obtain a greater security of tenure than the present wage system allows, and a first claim on any industry should be

the maintenance of its body of workers and their protection against unemployment, arbitrary dismissal, and exploitation. This in turn is not feasible—at any rate, without great economic loss—unless the worker is given an incentive to work, in the form of responsibility, representation in control, and an interest in the economic prosperity of the industry.

There is already a strong probability that the only safeguard against complete collectivism, bringing with it inevitable threats to fundamental liberties, is a greater integration of the workers into the structure of modern industry, so that they are no longer regarding themselves as merely hirelings, with no stake and little interest in the process or productivity of their labour. Many experiments, however, must be tried—and some are being tried by forward-looking managements—if such a result is to be effectively achieved.

We have spoken of the class struggle as a struggle for the redistribution of power, but if it were no more than that it would not have the great interest which it possesses. Half-hidden by the dust of the conflict there arises the ideal of a better society. The profound unrest of a society dominated by wealth and half-sunk in dependency is not ignoble. In its depths, beyond all pettier desires of gain and power, it works for the deliverance of humanity from the worst servitude, that which makes persons the slaves of things. It moves towards an order in which the greater resources of our age shall be devoted far more adequately to satisfying the greater needs of our age. Without it there cannot be fulfilled the principle that function is more than possession, and that every economic calling, industry or trade or profession, is something more worthy than an arena in which a few may snatch the prizes which all consume their energies in pursuing, that it is first a service of the whole. Until each economic field is reorganized as a co-operative function for the service of society, unrest will, and ought to, increase, both because of the narrowed ambitions of those who accept the system and because of the dissatisfactions of those who, seeking vainly an outlet for the creative spirit, are pent within it.

CHAPTER VI

THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY

I. THE MEANING OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

NO one can read history without being impressed by the changefulness of social conditions. Manners and morals, customs and codes, seem part of the eternal flux. Institutions crumble and are replaced. Empires dissolve, with all the loyalties and subjections which held them together. But the inquiring mind is never satisfied with the mere record of changes. It seeks for law even here. It seeks to find a meaning of some sort in transience and supersession. It would if possible apply to society the master-key of evolution. The surface of the ocean is never at rest, but we do not think of the ocean as evolving. That endless succession of moods leads nowhere, and its appearance at this hour may be identical with its appearance a hundred thousand years ago. Do social changes mean no more than that or is there here a law of change? If we take up any moderate compass of history, a generation or two or even a century or two, we may discover nothing but seemingly meaningless ebb and flow. But if we consider the greater drama of the movement of civilization we can scarcely avoid the idea that a development is taking place, and the thought of progress arises in the mind. Is this justifiable? That is the question we must now seek to answer. In Chapter II we described some of the stages of society. We must now endeavour to go farther and seek for a principle of evolution.

And first it is necessary to have a clear conception of what it is we seek. Evolution means literally an opening-out or unfolding, the emergence of characters at first hidden or obscured. It means more than growth. A flood or an avalanche grows but does not evolve. It means more than a passing from the simple to the complex. The germ-cell out

of which the organism evolves seems simple only because we cannot penetrate its marvellous complexity. And there are complexities which have no evolutionary quality. The complexity which a cancer adds to the organism is an example. Evolution means the realization of a nature by internal process. The block of stone which the sculptor carves into a statue does not evolve, it is moulded by an external process. Evolution is the fulfilment within an environment of an immanent nature or life. When the process is complete we understand most fully the true character of the thing. The earlier stages lead up to the later in which, as Aristotle puts it, the thing is more fully itself. We see this in the evolution of the organism. Its maturity is its fulfilment, the realization of what it seeks to be. In the case of society we know of no maturity, and therefore the conception of evolution is more difficult. But as we survey its different stages we may understand more fully what society means, and if that meaning is better fulfilled through any process of change, we may then speak of the evolution of society.

Evolution then implies a time-process, but we should be careful to avoid the error of assuming that any mere process of change is evolutionary. Society may move backward toward barbarism as well as forward toward civilization. A community, as well as an empire, may decline and fall. Communities have developed a wonderful life, in which the meaning of society has grown clear, like the life of the Greeks of the fifth century B.C., and somehow eclipse has succeeded it. There are so many instances of this kind, such as the past civilizations of Nineveh and of Babylon, of Troy and of Tyre, of Egypt and of Rome, of Carthage, of Palestine, of Peru, of Venice and of Florence, that they dispel the optimistic thought of any inevitable progress of society. Often the submergence of a civilization has been due, at least directly, to the invasion of barbarian hordes. Sometimes it seems to have resulted from the gradual onset of less favourable living conditions, as illustrated by the desiccation of Persia and Mesopotamia. Some writers believe that disease and pestilence have weakened the fibre of once great peoples,

and malaria is given as an explanation of the decline of ancient Greece. Some hold that internecine wars have exercised a baleful influence by destroying the best and fittest among ancient peoples. But sometimes we seem to trace an inner process of decay, a loss of strength and purpose, a failure of life itself. To this the name 'decadence' is attached.

Reflection on these tragedies of civilization has led some thinkers to conclude that the community resembles the individual life, in that it arises out of the unknown, grows in wisdom and stature, attains maturity, declines, and dies. It is supposed to fulfil the inevitable destiny which waits for everything that lives. But this is an application of the analogy of the organism to which we referred in Chapter I, Part v, and it seems to the present writer to be quite unsound. Communities are not tied to an ageing organism but are renewed from within. New life succeeds old life, and we perceive no reason why the new life should necessarily fail. Nor does history bear out this fatalistic idea. Peoples do not perish like individuals. They may suffer decline, but they may renew their past splendours. If ancient Rome has passed, if medieval Venice has lost its proud distinctions, Italy still lives. It is not to be wondered at that in the endless vicissitudes of social intermixture the torch of civilization should pass from centre to centre. But the peoples who now carry it forward are themselves born of the same endless vicissitudes. They as much as any others reach back beyond imaginable time. There is never sameness in social life, but there is always continuity.

We have now to ask, By what signs, in this ebb and flow of social life, can we discern the forward movement of evolution? And here we can turn for help to the study of the individual life. For as it grows from childhood to maturity there is not only a physical but also a mental or spiritual development. It is the latter which gives meaning to the former. It is only in the growth of a kind of life that we can find a sure criterion of evolution. Strictly speaking, life does not evolve, it increases, grows fuller or intenser.

Only forms evolve and their evolution means their opening-out, their differentiation, in response to the growing demands of life. The cell evolves as the life quickens, the organism evolves as the principle that animates it increases in the strength and clarity and breadth of its purpose. As the purposes of men grow, the social structure within which they are realized changes in accord with these—and that is the meaning of evolution.

We know quite clearly what the growth of purposive activity means, for we see it in every normal life that passes from infancy to manhood or womanhood. In this process we can easily distinguish the growth of social traits. The adult enters into a far wider and freer range of social relations than the child. He has a greater variety of interests. What we have named the cultural interests bulk more largely than before. He is more self-determining, an autonomous centre of rights and responsibilities. He is more conscious of himself as a personality within a world of personalities. He has at the same time a clearer perception of the personality of others, is better able to appreciate the claims they make upon him, to understand their significance, both in themselves, and in relation to himself. And so in the evolution of society. If we compare what we all regard as a lower stage of civilization, such as that of the Bushmen or Hottentots or that of the American Indians, with our own to-day, we observe the same contrasts. The circle of their communities is small. Their interests are few and circumscribed. They have no understanding of, and no spontaneous relations with, the peoples outside. They are addicted to practices, such as torture and other cruelties, which show a lack of perception of the personality of others. They are hide-bound by custom and tradition, which quite apart from their meaning they maintain with great solemnity. They have a childish belief in their own unique qualities. If they wander at all from the ancient tracks, if their traditions are broken down through contact with Europeans, they lose all self-restraint, like children that have lost their way. They cannot adjust themselves to new conditions. Their whole life lacks diversity, and the

purposes which animate it are simple and, as it were, external.

We can now translate these distinctions into a positive statement of what a higher stage of civilization means. It means that personality is liberated within society, that finding its significance within itself, it more freely relates itself to, and co-operates with, that of others, that therefore order ceases to consist in uniformity and suppression and becomes a condition of liberty, being based more on conscious common will and less on an institutional acceptance of tradition, that the sanction of conduct is more the inward sense of responsibility and the application of the necessary ways of adjusting means to ends. It means that there is a greater respect for personality, that persons are both recognized and recognize themselves as being of intrinsic value and not merely the means by which the ends of others—kings or priests or slave masters—are achieved, or else by which some impersonal and fantastic purpose, the 'glory' of the tribe or even of God, is supposed to be served. It means that caste is absent, that accidental or extrinsic differences count for less, that opportunity is widened. It means, therefore, that women are less disqualified because of sex, that the poor are less dishonoured and disfranchised because of poverty, and the alien less despised because of his origin. It means that life and health are more esteemed and guarded. It means that men are less enslaved by the primary necessities and so are enabled to pursue the wider and higher interests which reveal themselves as the former grow less insistent.

So the evolution of society will signify properly those changes of its structure which permit and further and spring from the growth of this purposive activity. In the light of what has been said we can already enumerate some of these characters. The more evolved society will have a wider range. Common life will extend farther, circle beyond circle. More numerous associations, duly co-ordinated with one another, will arise to satisfy through co-operation its clarified interests. Despotic control and arbitrary subjection will give place to an order based upon the common will. Force will become less

effective and less important. The subject will be transformed into the citizen. Custom will no longer be, in the words of an ancient historian, 'the king of men'. Diversity will increase, corresponding to the liberation of individuality. The likeness of all men will be the basis of order while their differences will be suffered to express themselves, in so far as they are not clearly anti-social, and to contribute to the whole that unique element of worth which resides in free personality, the origin of all the permanent gains of civilization.

The reader should observe that in this brief conspectus we are dealing only with one aspect of social change, which we shall speak of as evolutionary change. Society undergoes change continuously. It has an elaborate history, and that history is the record of endless vicissitudes. Institutions rise and harden and fall, power-systems grow great and then decay, economic systems undergo transformations, new technologies revolutionize the habits and even the thoughts of men. We do not think of this welter of changefulness as itself an evolutionary process. We are not studying here the processes of change—that is one of the most baffling of subjects, for a thousand conjunctures are always precipitating unanticipated and unpredictable directions in the tides of change. Hence we make no assumption whatever that the later forms of society are necessarily the more evolved. Nor do we regard social evolution as a process in which there is any predeterminate succession of social institutions, in such wise that the later types belong to a later evolutionary stage. This type of evolutionism was inherent in the sociology of Herbert Spencer, but it is contradicted both by anthropological evidence and by the record of history.

What then do we mean by social evolution, and in what sense, if any, are we justified in claiming that evolutionary processes have occurred in human society?

First let us remember that when we apply the term 'evolution' to any work of man, to any art or any science, or again to that intricate scheme of human relationships we call society, it has a different significance than when we apply it to an organism or to a species. The organism has its life

energy, its dynamic, within it. Society, like the art or the science, is a projection of forces outside the structure. Society is the response of men to their needs as interpreted, dimly or clearly, in the light of the conditions of their lives. Society changes as men seek different things or old things in new ways. Much of the change is not directly intended but is the indirect consequences of what men seek or pursue. If these indirect consequences, like, for example, some of the social concomitants of the Industrial Revolution, are not found desirable, men at length are moved to change or 'reform' them. As they gain new techniques, new controls, they reconstruct society more to their liking. But since power and ingenuity and leadership and cunning are unequally distributed the dominant groups use the new means for their own ends, not infrequently to the exploitation of other groups. The latter in turn muster what organization and what resources they can to resist domination and to put themselves on top. Thus society is for ever in a state of changefulness, moved in this direction and in that by the strivings and conflicts of individuals and groups and peoples.

The social structure is, then, the working out, through all kinds of circumstances and vicissitudes, of the answer to the problem how human beings can live together and, so far as may be, make their relationships to one another the condition of the satisfaction of their wants, the fulfilment of their lives. The answer is found through trial and error, through slow processes of indoctrination, through the half-blind struggles of group with group, but also through the deliberate reconstruction of institutions to meet changing demands. It is always imperfect and incomplete, but the more complete it is the more does society take a form that has some title to be called evolutionary. There is, for example, a greater reconciliation of unity with diversity, a greater development of specific agencies for specific ends, a greater articulation of part with part, a greater liberation of capacities, and so forth It is in this sense that we speak of the evolution of the arts and the sciences, and it is in this sense that we shall speak of the evolution of society.

Seen close up, in the record of historians who recount chiefly the abnormal and the catastrophic, most ages seem a mere confusion of narrow ambitions and stupid conflicts, a riot of tumults and follies in which the occasional noble aspiration of some greater mind is frustrate or lost. But a more comprehensive view takes in the silent process that moves beneath the tumultuous surface. Nor should we forget in how brief a space, comparatively, the only part of the process visible to our eyes has taken place. Ten thousand years ago—a mere yesterday in the history of life upon this earth—man was a neolithic savage, without settled habitations, without the use of coal and iron and bronze, without tilled fields, without writing or record of the past, living the precarious broken life of a rather cunning animal, whose glimpses of greater purpose only lit up a mental darkness peopled with monstrous forms. The whole span of our history is but a few hundreds of generations. We should remember this when we perceive, behind the 'good and great' heroes of the historians of our school books, so much childish tyranny, cruelty, shallow self-seeking, envy and spite and narrow imaginings. We should remember it when we recognize the petty greeds and selfish fears and foolish hates which beset our civilization of to-day. Over against these there stands the record of this wonderful and wonderfully swift process of evolution, witnessing to the silent growth of creative purpose. We cannot of course say that this process must continue. We can measure only in its results the coming and going of the spirit of life. But we do know already something of the road along which it travels, and—unless it weary—must continue to travel.

We know something of the external conditions which must be present if social evolution is to continue. In Chapter III we considered the general relation between society and its environment. Without fitness in the environment society cannot advance. Now we turn to the question of the particular ways in which that environment may be made a fitter soil for the evolution of society. The more purposive the life, the more it adapts itself to environmental changes. But it does so by its greater mastery of environment.

II. THE MASTERY OF THE ENVIRONMENT:

(a) THE CONTROL OF ORGANIC CONDITIONS

In its earlier forms the doctrine of organic evolution regarded man as, like every other animal, inexorably subject to the power of great natural agencies of selection, especially disease, which constantly eliminated the weaker, the less 'fit', and so rendered the survivors a healthier and more vigorous race. This theory of beneficent process had other drawbacks than the costs at which the supposed benefits were procured. It had the peculiar disadvantage of suggesting that the greater evils of life were the necessary conditions of whatever happiness or achievement mankind could snatch in the midst of them. It thus discouraged the age-old attempt of men, which a new science was at last making hopeful, to conquer disease. It was said that the abolition of disease would be a calamity. Others applied the same idea to poverty, which by making harder the struggle for existence of course increased the fitness of those who overcame. Others again found a smattering of Darwinianism (though Darwin himself gave scant encouragement to this) useful for the defence of war which by a topsy-turvy reasoning was supposed to eliminate the unfit, if not as individuals at least as peoples. And the principle of *laissez-faire* could not fail to find a strong ally in the new doctrine. Was it not from Malthus and his economic law of population that the original idea of natural selection had sprung? In fact every form of co-operative endeavour seemed to break against this principle. It proved to be nothing less than an enemy of society itself, for society means co-operation.

But the doctrine of evolution has itself evolved, and the ironical opposition between man's intelligence and his welfare is passing away. Further examination showed that fitness from the human and social standpoint could not be judged by success in survival. In some environments it may well be the best who perish. The less evolved forms of life can survive under conditions in which the higher are blotted out. What finer setting for the struggle for existence than the

arid sands of the desert or the polar snows, where only the lowliest organisms survive, and where man, if he lives at all, lives in wretched denudation of all that is worth struggling for? As geology unfolded the story of countless vanished types, it appeared that nature might unfit as well as fit her children to survive. Nor did she seem to arm them for the cosmic warfare in the simple way which the early evolutionists assumed, so that the best should win by reason of the qualities men had learned to admire. The microscopic germ might triumph over the highest of the mammals. Perversely, nature armed some of her weaker species with qualities which emphasized their weakness, but nevertheless enabled them to survive, such as prodigious fertility. On the other hand, it appeared that in the human sphere the groups which extended farthest the principle of co-operation, which relied most upon mutual aid, which displayed the most intelligence in the organized conquest of the evils of life, were those which also dominated the world. Society was vindicated by results.

We cannot pursue this theme within our limits here. We shall instead look at some of the facts which show the advance of social control over the conditions of health and life, itself a necessary part and result of the extension of society. Until quite recent times society had neither the knowledge nor the organization required for the conquest of disease. Medical 'science' was mostly quackery. Every state had its ministry of war, but none had a ministry of health. The mortality of infants was enormous. The average length of the adult life was short, as it still is among uncivilized peoples. Men were old at forty, and women had a still briefer period for the enjoyment of life. Recurring pestilence devastated the peoples, smallpox, malaria, cholera, typhus, tuberculosis, were unchecked by any preventive methods. Then science and social organization advanced together. In a generation or two, most notably after the discovery of the germ theory of the causation of most disease, the most remarkable progress has been achieved. Typhus and cholera are now scarcely known in the world of Western civilization,

though they still ravage other parts of the earth. Enteric is vastly reduced, and smallpox has been rendered almost innocuous. Malaria has been abolished in some regions where it once prevailed. The prodigal waste of child-life has been greatly reduced. Since the opening of the twentieth century the infant death-rate in Britain has been reduced from 154 per thousand to 49 (1943). In the United States it is around 50, and in New Zealand it has fallen to 35.

The general death-rate has, except for times of war, almost continually decreased, until it has approached and in some countries fallen below the annual rate of fifteen per thousand. The average expectation of life has in England, within a single generation, increased over ten years. In the United States it is now around 61½ years, whereas at the time of the Civil War it was only about 39.

Not only so, but the prospects of further improvement are seemingly unlimited. The conquest of tuberculosis has only begun, though it is already evident that concerted efforts, such as have been undertaken in Germany and elsewhere, are quite efficacious in controlling it. Sir Arthur Newsholme estimated that at least one-half of the mortality and disablement still occurring at ages below seventy can be prevented by the application of medical knowledge already in our possession. Sir E. Ray Lankester declared that 'by the unstinted application of known methods of investigation and consequent controlling action all epidemic disease could be abolished within a period as short as fifty years'. A U.S. Conservation Commission has reported that the average length of American life could be increased at least fourteen years by the utilization of the existing knowledge of hygiene. That a mass of preventable sickness and disease and incapacity still exists is suggested by the war-time experience of the nations. Even the most advanced countries have discovered that owing to disabilities of various kinds, many of which would have been preventable or remediable under proper medical care, a surprising large proportion of their youth were rendered unfit for Class A service.

If infectious disease is socially controllable, it is obvious

that contagious disease is still more amenable to control. This applies particularly to the group of contagious diseases which most insidiously undermine the health and happiness of modern communities, that is, venereal diseases. The disastrous prevalence of these is perhaps the most remarkable witness to the existing failure to extend among the people the knowledge of the causation and the prevention of disease. This is quite apart from any question of morals which here, becoming entangled with the proper problem of preventive methods, has had an arresting effect upon the necessary publicity and organization of control. Yet syphilis and its companion diseases are now absolutely and simply preventable, and in early stages are also curable. The knowledge is available, were it not that either a pernicious 'modesty' or an atavistic conception of disease as the 'penalty of sin' still hampers its application. It is a disgrace to our civilization, and most of all to those who are responsible for our 'public health', that in the ignorance of the mass of mankind this terrible disease should be suffered so to prevail.

A vast deal remains to be done in the control of disease, and above all of the conditions which breed disease. The preventive system is still in its infancy, and far the greater part of the health service of the community is still devoted to belated attempts at cure. Organized protection against infection and against the hereditary transmission of disease and of feeble-mindedness are very incomplete. The people are still scarcely half-educated in respect of personal and social hygiene, though no form of education is more important. They have not been taught how much smaller is the cost of health than of sickness. They are ready to pay for the restoration but not for the maintenance of health. This education must be brought to them. In respect of general education the community does not wait until the individual learns by bitter experience the losses of ignorance, neither should it wait until he suffers the irreparable losses of ill health.

What is, from our standpoint, most interesting in the new warfare against disease is that it is being waged with new

weapons—social weapons. There are two possible ways of combating disease and other 'ills that flesh is heir to': one is to treat those ills where and when they occur, the other is to refuse the heritage. One is the method of alleviation or of cure, the other is the method of prevention. The former is an individualistic method, which deals with particular cases in an isolated way; the other is a social method, which seeks to control environmental conditions so as to eliminate those that foster disease and to establish those which promote health. And the great successes of our age have come through the adoption of the latter method. They have not been achieved by new principles of direct therapeutics nearly so much as by new principles of control such as the insistence on cleanliness, on the purity of the water and milk supply, on segregation and quarantine, on general inoculation with serums and antitoxins, on education. The more we learn of the conditions of infection, of the relation of contagious diseases to sheer ignorance, of the crop of organic defects which arise from the neglect of the health conditions of childhood, of the dependence of the degenerative diseases of middle-age on the lack of health, intelligence and of the provision of proper facilities for exercise and recreation, of the unguarded inheritance of mental disease, the more we understand that the curative individualistic system, useful as it is, should be entirely subsidiary to the preventive socialized system. Sickness and disease are in fact the concern of the whole community. No one suffers to himself alone just as no one lives to himself alone. The hope of the future is in the recognition of this fact and in the adoption of methods appropriate at once to the fact and to the need. The new method applies, as we shall presently insist, to a much wider range of cases than those we have just been considering.

We have just referred to the remarkable fall of the death-rate, and particularly the infant death-rate. This is correlated with another phenomenon of the greatest social significance, the fall of the birth-rate. With very rare exceptions we find these two rates falling together and almost continuously in civilized countries. Trustworthy

statistics are available only for a comparatively short period, but within the nineteenth century a remarkable change took place. When Malthus wrote at the end of the eighteenth century he was inspired by the fear of over-population. To-day the alarmists talk of 'race-suicide' instead. What seems to be occurring is a new equilibrium of population which reveals in a very striking way the principle we are discussing. Where the death-rate is very high, as in Russia, Rumania, Hungary, and probably still more in certain countries for which accurate statistics are not available, the birth-rate is still higher. Thus in Hungary, for the period 1891–1900, the death-rate was 29.9 per thousand per annum, and the birth-rate 40.6; in Spain, for the period 1901–05, the death-rate was 25.8, and the birth-rate 35.3. The decline of the birth-rate cannot be understood apart from the decline in the death-rate. In Denmark, for the period 1901–05, the birth-rate was 29.0, but the death-rate was only 14.8. In the United Kingdom for the same period the birth-rate had fallen to 27.7, but the death-rate was down to 15.6. It has become a commonplace of the annual reports of the registrars-general to say that the figures for both birth- and death-rates were the lowest yet recorded. In 1914 the rates for the United Kingdom were respectively 23.9 and 14.4. In England before the Second World War the birth-rate had fallen to a fraction above 14 and the death-rate was below 12. It should be added that the fall of the birth-rate, by raising the average age of the population as a whole, itself sets a limit to the fall of the death-rate, reckoned as so many per annum for every thousand people. The social significance of these figures can scarcely be exaggerated.

It is quite clear in the first place that the decline of the birth-rate is due to voluntary and not to 'natural' causes. It is greatest in the countries and for the classes whose economic prosperity is greatest. The higher standard of living puts what Malthus called the 'preventive' checks into action. There is more celibacy, later marriage, and fewer children per marriage. On the other hand, a low standard of living seems to induce a high birth-rate. The successors of

Malthus, like Thornton in his work *On Population*, perceived this and reversed his order of causality, pointing out that 'misery breeds population'. But false conclusions are often drawn from this fact. If a lower death-rate accompanies the lower birth-rate, the result may be, not a diminished population—population, as Malthus saw, did not increase rapidly under conditions of high fertility—but a new equilibrium of population. The danger point comes not when the birth-rate falls but when the balance of births and deaths becomes unfavourable. This has happened in France, where, however, the death-rate did not decrease so low as in other low-birth-rate countries. It will happen also in a number of industrialized countries if the present rates continue. The age distribution will change in response to these rates, which means that the proportion of women in the child-bearing period will grow still smaller. There is here a danger signal, especially since it is the groups best able to provide for their offspring who fall short of reproducing their numbers. At the same time we should remember that the projection into the future of present statistical indices has always been precarious and has generally led to mistaken predictions. What is clear is that the new equilibrium of births and deaths, that characteristic of industrial civilization, has, like all human advances, its attendant risks and requires of men a new sense of responsibility.

The new equilibrium confutes not the fact, but the older theory of selection. Since there is no longer a 'surplus' of births, there is no longer much room for the operation of the cruder methods of selection by death, by disease, and destitution. It would then seem as if, under the influence largely of economic conditions, mankind were advancing from a stage in which the equilibrium of population was determined by a selective death-rate to a stage in which it is determined by a selective birth-rate. It is therefore necessary to insist more and more on this new method of selection, and to embody its necessity in the principles of social education. It is necessary to assure, what is quite within the power of man, that our successors shall be 'well-born', and

that the waste of life and health shall cease. The new equilibrium means that the control of life passes from outer nature to the intelligence of man. It means also, if we understand at all the social significance of a high birth-rate and a high death-rate, an immense economy, an immense liberation of humanity.

III. THE MASTERY OF THE ENVIRONMENT:

(*b*) THE CONTROL OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Our study of society ought to be teaching us this among other lessons, that every kind of social fact is linked up with every other. We have been discussing the social control of health conditions, but the discussion would be quite one-sided unless we saw the significance of economic conditions in the attainment of this (as of every other) goal. The relation between poverty and sickness has been amply demonstrated. There is evidence to show that from twenty-five to forty per cent of the applications for poor relief are due to sickness. Experience accumulated through the operation of the British National Health Insurance Act shows that extreme poverty and excessive sickness go together. There is more ill health and a higher mortality among the wage-earning classes than among the well-to-do. Those who are near or below the poverty line spend so little on health—on good living and housing conditions, on rest and recreation, on medical examination, dental care, and so on—that the community must spend much more and with much less return upon their lack of health. The reports of a number of health insurance commissions in certain American states (Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut) indicate that twenty per cent of workers are laid off from sickness more than seven days every year. The effect of evil economic conditions is visible in a hundred ways. An investigation made by Mr. Arthur Greenwood into the height and weight of children in the city of Glasgow showed that the growth of the children 'of every age varies according to economic status with mathematical certainty'. Nearly all the diseases

of early and of middle life take their heaviest toll from the class of industrial workers, while in the case of certain diseases their incidence is most clearly connected with the conditions of particular industries. Marble and stone cutters are six times as liable to tuberculosis as bankers and brokers. What a fine field is here offered for the ingenuity of the natural selectionists!

Economic conditions are all pervading. We must not, of course, assume that poverty in itself is responsible for the organic and spiritual evils which are associated with it. It is rather poverty, along with its concomitants and its own *causes*, the lack of education, the lack of skill, the lack of control, the lack of privacy, the insecurity, the nervous strain, the bad housing, and all the rest. Poverty apart from these might conceivably deserve the encomiums which simple-minded enthusiasts have bestowed on it, but poverty in the modern world cannot be dissociated from these conditions. There is a vicious social circle or chain of causes of which poverty is an essential link, just as there is a beneficent social circle of which economic comfort is an essential link. Poverty, inefficiency, insecurity, ignorance, intemperance, and disease form one circle just as economic comfort, health, education and efficiency form another. Either circle may be broken at any point, but the important thing socially is that the essential point at which to break the vicious circle is the economic. This is gradually becoming realized in our Western civilization. Economic foundations are being laid such as, after all, no past civilization possessed. The principle of a minimum economic standard of reasonable living is being worked out in legislation and industrial bargaining. It is gradually becoming established that no class of workers, whether men or women, shall receive less for a day's work than will assure to them and to their dependants an adequate subsistence, that none shall be exposed to unnecessary hazards of accident and poisoning and overstrain and disease, that none shall suffer the compulsory demoralization of the willing but workless, and that all shall have some degree of leisure and some facility for recreation

and some sense of opportunity. The menace of destitution, that dismal fear which has no redeeming quality of elation or adventure, is being met by collective action, and the social principle of insurance is being introduced where prevention does not avail. Much remains undone and much is very incomplete, but when we look back to the early decades of last century, all unconsciously refuting by their waste of life and health the economic individualism they proclaimed, we must see how great an advance has already been accomplished.

On this another word must be said, before we take final leave of the doctrine of fitness by struggle. The doctrine is true. Mr. Arnold Toynbee in his *Study of History* attributes the rise of the greater civilizations to the 'challenge of hard conditions'. Struggle is always the answer to some challenge, but 'hard conditions' of themselves may stimulate no great enterprise. Whatever the conditions there must be the perception of opportunity—and the responsiveness to it, and these qualities may be present under more favourable as well as under less favourable conditions. Only by struggle is strength and quality evoked—but the kind of strength corresponds to the kind of enemy, and the quality of the victor is the quality of the warfare. There are as many forms of struggle as there are ways of living. To live is to struggle; to will, to work, to think, even to play. Where the advocates of the 'free' struggle err is in identifying the greater conflict with the lesser. They lack discrimination. The energies of men are not in the first instance the result of battle and the competitive struggle; instead these are merely particular and in our present world increasingly wasteful manifestations of these energies. The destructive forms of struggle block the way of the constructive, the anti-social of the social. The higher struggle is not that of each against each, or of group against group. The higher struggle is the creative struggle. It does not involve any necessary clash of wills, for it is a struggle not so much *against* something as *towards* something. Its method is not the infliction of loss but the positive achievement of a good. It offers an infinitely

wider field for the activities of men than the cramped battle-ground where losses are exchanged and a momentary sense of fulfilment is precariously achieved, in the exultation of taking from another what he would take from you.

The lower and the higher forms of struggle cannot dwell together in society; the one drives out the other. In the absence of intelligent social control the lower drive out the higher. This applies in the competitive sphere. There is, as Mr. Webb has put it, a sort of 'Gresham's law' to be seen in operation here. Just as, where the two meet as currency, bad money drives out good money from circulation, so the more ruthless and unscrupulous methods of competition drive out the fairer. The 'sweating' employer compels his more honourable competitor to follow his example. The adulterating manufacturer gains an advantage which may mean ruin to honest men. The loud advertiser of nostrums draws the custom of the crowd. Thus the fitness which survives is a bad fitness. The dominance of the cunning and the predatory corresponds to the subjection of the *socially* unfitted. In this sense, 'a hundred years ago the "fittest" to survive were sturdy Virginian slaves; sixty years ago they were the maimed, distorted, and diseased factory hands who paraded before Lord Ashley in Oldham and Blackburn; a generation ago they were the "lower class brutalized" of the great apostle of culture—what they will be a generation hence depends essentially on the legal and social limitations which we to-day set to the "ape and tiger" of the "natural" man.'[1]

For the presence of intelligent social control works just the opposite effects. Then the higher drives out the lower. It is the adulterator, the sweater, the slave-driver who are eliminated. The conditions and the kinds of fitness are changed. Success depends on the ability to contribute to a co-operative service. Competition does not disappear, but it takes another form. It becomes a motive *within* the co-operative system, and not an enemy of it. The common interest is broader and it binds those who compete, no longer

[1] Sidney Webb, in *Problems of Modern Industry*, c. v.

for survival, but it may be for distinction or pre-eminence or the subtler rewards of success. The breadth of the common interest is an essential criterion of social advance. 'To trace the growth of community from the dim origins of "Cyclopean" family community, through primitive clan and tribe and horde, through isolated or semi-isolated communistic village, through warring city community and badly integrated empire, through feudal confusion on to the close-knit social life of modern Western states, is to follow the process, indirect, indeterminate, broken, yet victorious, by which human life has been reclaimed from the waste as the principle of co-operation has more and more become active within it.'[1]

The method of co-operative activity succeeds over the methods of mere warfare or unmitigated competition just because it is in the widest sense more economical, and therefore gives to those who extend it furthest a great advantage, even in the field of warfare and of competition, over the others. If the significance of this truth is realized it will be clear that, quite strictly, the war of destruction and the competitive struggle for existence nourish their own antidote until it at last expels them. They impose conditions which constantly narrow their own range. The group which co-operates most intelligently, and therefore most extensively, wins out. Offence and defence call for greater solidarities and new alliances. The greater they grow, the greater is the social area from which war is extruded, until it requires at last only one step to pass from a world divided against itself to a world made one. The simple logic of the process is concealed and thwarted by the inherited complexities of every historical situation. Nevertheless it works. It works more obviously though not more necessarily in the less traditionalized economic world. The logical end of industrial competition is combination and monopoly, and it is no abstract logic but one endowed with remarkably persuasive powers which impels men to that goal. Official reports on trusts that have been published in Britain and in the United

[1] *Community*, p. 353.

States acknowledge that they permeate nearly every industry and threaten to control the whole economic life of the country. This in turn is, of course, as is obvious from the very apprehensions which it raises, only a stage on the road. It is as it were the new alliance of offence and defence which stimulates the other side to a new alliance of defence and offence. But the co-operative method has clearly triumphed again. It is needless to show how in the field of labour, of the arts and the professions, of technique and of science, the same principle is revealed.

One result is a new social problem. The co-operative method produces a surplus, as compared with less economical methods, of both material and immaterial resources. The latter, the great gifts of knowledge and art and understanding, may be distributed to the multitude through education, and the more complete the distribution the more there is for all. But what of the former, the enhanced capital goods of civilization? Here we touch again, from another side, the storm-centre of modern society. Our question is just this. How should the economic surplus be controlled and distributed in order to provide the best condition for the evolution of society, or, in other words, in order to serve best the members of society? We do not at all raise the other question: How should the surplus be distributed in order that each shall receive his deserts, the share of it he has justly by his own efforts earned? The latter question is quite unanswerable, in fact it is almost meaningless. For there is no possible means, where many contribute diversely within an inherited social order to the making of a joint product, of deciding in terms of desert the contribution of each. The question is antediluvian, the relic of a falsely individualistic outlook, reflecting the naïve pride of the 'self-made' man. It is important that men should find some reward for their efforts, but it is impossible to measure at once so grossly and so meticulously their efforts or their rewards. And even were it possible, it would be undesirable if it interfered with the solution of the greater problem, for here as elsewhere the welfare of society is the final consideration.

When the statesman of ancient Greece, Pericles, found himself in control of much treasure no longer required for its original purpose of protection against the Persian, he had several alternatives open to him. He might (if the Athenians permitted him) have distributed it among the cities from which it came. He might have divided it among his own citizens in reward for their services as guardians and promoters of the successful league. Actually he expended it on the creation of the noblest monuments of Athenian culture, on temples that crowned a little hill with imperishable fame, on sculptured forms which under the names of gods and goddesses embodied first to the Athenians and then to every later age an ideal of manhood and womanhood. Pericles had unusual good fortune in finding such genius at his hand, and there are few who would not now justify the alternative he chose. What concerns us here is that modern society has similar but less simple alternatives opened up to it by the growth of the economic surplus due to intelligent co-operation. Except in time of war the store of wealth possessed by modern nations which have reached the industrial stage increases year by year. This new wealth is, for reasons we cannot here consider, as readily turned into alternative channels as the mere treasure commanded by Pericles. Some of it is translated into new agencies of production. Unless this were done there would be no enhancement of the surplus, but of course the ulterior object is the increase of consumable goods. These may be luxuries which use up in their preparation large stores of productive power, and are therefore available only for a relatively few, or they may be the commodities and services required for the maintenance of an acceptable standard of living by a larger number of the population, or again they may consist in the leisure and educational service and other equipment needed in the pursuit of cultural interests. These alternatives are not at every point distinct, and the last of them does not seriously conflict with the other two, though it takes different forms according to the mode in which wealth is distributed. The form of culture fostered by Pericles happened to be

unusually expensive. There is, however, a real conflict between the first and the second. Luxury and poverty go together. The more unequal the distribution of wealth the more productive energy is devoted to luxury for the few and the less to comfort for the many.

Viewed from a purely economic standpoint this means that wealth is not rendering its full service to society. No economic principle is more certain than the 'law of diminishing utility', which asserts that each equal unit of wealth has less utility, is less capable of satisfying the desires to which wealth is a means, the greater the stock of it possessed by the individual. A pound has more utility to the poor man than to the wealthy man. If we assume that their respective interests as consumers are of equal social significance, it would follow that any redistribution of wealth which, without checking the productive stream, rendered less unequal the shares of poor and rich would be socially advantageous. We have, however, made here an important assumption which we must next examine. If it is confirmed, we shall have found the principle we seek as to the general method in which the economic surplus should be controlled so as to contribute most to the evolution of society.

Meantime it is obvious that the economic surplus is an essential condition of civilization. Apart from this the great majority could never hope for liberation from the struggle for mere existence, with its sordid and incessant and benumbing necessities, while the few who emerged precariously above the struggle must enjoy only a dubious and menaced liberation. Apart from this there could be no great advance of knowledge and refinement, no great stimulation of the higher hopes and endeavours. The necessity of living would for ever destroy the power of living, and men would remain nearer to the level of the animal. It is, therefore, most important that the surplus should increase, but it is no less important, in view of the alternatives which it opens, that it should be wisely controlled. Some degree of control is already undertaken by the state, chiefly in the form of

taxation. But the growth of the surplus calls for a far greater control, and not by the state alone, but by the state acting together with the greater associations of production, if its immense social potentialities are to be fulfilled.

IV. THE CONDITIONS OF EVOLUTION: THE LIBERATION OF POWERS

We left unanswered at the close of the last section a question whose consideration must now bring us to the heart of the central problem of social *policy*. We made the assumption that the interests of poor and of rich, of the many and of the few, were equally significant socially. By this we meant that a community which was governed by considerations of social welfare would not, quite apart from any question of the redistribution of power, sacrifice the more urgent needs of the poor to the less urgent needs of the rich, would not increase the leisure of the few if it meant the greater enslavement of the many, or provide for the former a more refined life *at the cost of* a lowered standard for the latter. On the contrary, it would strive to mitigate all the *external* conditions of inequality. It would make a first lien on the resources of the community the establishment of a minimum standard of reasonable living for all who are born into it, and therewith the equalization of opportunity for all its members. It would not undertake the impossible and foolish task of 'rendering equal things to equals and unequals alike'. It would recognize that there always must be the few and the many, the leaders and the led, the superior and the inferior; but it would recognize also that adventitious and external conditions of authority and influence and advantage prevent the emergence of intrinsic merits and diminish or pervert their service of the whole. It would recognize that the true task and enterprise of personality is not the unequal struggle against the 'invidious bar' of birth or of fortune, but the inward struggle to fulfil itself. It would recognize that factitious superiority breeds false ideals on the one hand and wasteful rebellion on the other, that, in a word, it sets up a wrong social

standard by making personality, which is the one final value, subordinate to its mere accoutrements.

There is a contrary argument which is more often implied than stated. In its extremer form it belongs to the age of slavery. Aristotle expressed it when he spoke of the slave as a 'living tool', and said that some men were destined by nature to that service. In a modified form it is the claim that birth or fortune bestowed superior rights, and that, if this requires justification at all, it is to be found in the fact that birth and breeding go together, that a leisured class raised above the sordid struggle to live, is an essential to civilization, that it is the repository of the inherited traditions of a people, the patron of the fine arts, the incentive to advancement, the guardian of loyalties. It is claimed that without a superior class, definitely and permanently distinguished, society would become a swirl of mediocrities, out of which would emerge as leaders only those who most successfully and therefore most basefully appealed to the passions of the mob and who most blatantly gratified their undiscerning tastes.

The history of past aristocracies scarcely bears out this argument. There have been times, notably in ancient Athens, when a fortunately endowed leisured class have contributed splendid gifts to civilization—yet it was in that very age of Athens that the democratic claim, narrowed though it was by the institution of slavery, first became imperative. At other times the socially privileged class have at best merely decided, as patrons and customers, the direction which the spirit of invention and the genius of art should take. The born leaders of men arise within no class. Where opportunity widens, so does the field in which the flower of genius may bloom. The inheritance of quality is far too uncertain to be made the ground of the distinction of classes, even if we could assume quality as the differentia of class at any one moment. The offspring of 'golden' parents, as Plato put it, may be 'silvern', and from apparently commonplace parents may spring the child of genius. Besides, any rigid distinction of classes tends to bind society to its

past traditions, and prevent free development. Perhaps worst of all, the effort to maintain distinctions not rooted in intrinsic quality leads to a double perversion. The dominant class grow narrow and hard in their inevitable undervaluation of the broader human qualities which do not depend upon the special training of the caste, while the subject class grow servile or bitter according to the degree in which they realize this subjection. Thus it is characteristic of extrinsic autocracies to regard work as degrading, to cultivate superficial distinctions, to worship power, to spend in wasteful display the resources of the community. Even where the sense of superiority has some justification it is full of danger. Thus white peoples who live among less advanced races seem often to lose something of their humanity, seem to grow reactionary, and rarely, if ever, do they carry forward the banners of civilization.

It may be worth while to quote the strongest and the noblest expression of the view which we are combating, as expressed by Nietzsche in *Beyond Good and Evil.* 'Good,' he exclaims, 'is not longer good when one's neighbour takes it into his mouth. And how could there be a common good? The expression contradicts itself, that which can be common is always of small value. In the end things must be as they are and always have been—the great things remain for the great, the abysses for the profound, the delicacies and thrills for the refined, and, to sum up shortly, everything rare for the rare.' And again, 'The general welfare is no ideal, no goal, no notion that can be at all grasped, but is only a nostrum—what is fair to one *may not* be at all fair to another, the requirement of one morality for all is really a detriment to higher men, in short, there is a *distinction of rank* between man and man and consequently between morality and morality.' What is true in this indictment does not at all contradict the principle we have been setting out. It is true that there is a distinction of rank between man and man. It is true that adults may read with advantage books unsuited to young girls, and gain strength from food which would poison infants. It is true that many can live by traditions

which greater minds and hearts cannot endure, outworn creeds, the idols of the tribe, the complacencies of national pride, mass opinions. But all this has nothing to do with the denial of the general welfare as an ideal or a possibility. Is there no general welfare for the family because the children must have milk and the parents stronger meat? What an absurd idea of general welfare it would be that requires the infants to eat meat or the adults to subsist on milk! Such uniformity is the principle of the tyrant, of the mob, of the uneducated, of all bureaucrats, against which true democracy becomes a bulwark, a protest, a form of order. Nor again is the common to be confounded with the vulgar. There is another community, that of the universal, of the immanent virtue, the pervading nature whose quintessence is the only rarity we need prize.

It is the merest truism that some must rule and that the rule of the best is the best. But how shall we find our best, our aristocracy, save through equal chances? Who shall select the 'aristocrat', who shall recognize and suffer him, unless a society educated in the freedom of opportunity? This gives at least the possibility that the best will emerge. Without it the undeserving *must* be the masters of men, and that means servitude and enforcement, the coarseness, the brutality, the parasitism of the master-slave relation. The lower the people, the lesser are their gods and also their heroes. The higher the democracy, the higher is the aristocracy which it will bear.

So we are led again to the conclusion that the fundamental condition of social development is the equalization of opportunity. All titles to superiority of right or power not based on intrinsic quality are socially harmful. The only final claim resides in personality, and it is only in the degree that communities are undeveloped that they suffer authority to attach to other considerations. Thus among some peoples age is the source of authority, just as in certain semi-atrophied public services (such as the English army used to be) it is seniority that counts most for promotion. But this too is an extrinsic quality, for men do not necessarily become more

capable by becoming older. Another barrier to opportunity which the awakening sense of personality overthrows is that of sex. The exclusion of women from education, from office, from citizenship has depended not on the free selection by men and women of the respective spheres of their distinctive qualities—as it works out, for example, to some extent in certain forms of industrial work, where men and women, though free to choose, rarely compete with one another—but on an arbitrary rule. The resulting subjection of women, who by the decree of nature must educate the first youth of the race, irresistibly attract its early manhood, and create and maintain the life of the home, has been hurtful not only to themselves, but also to the whole community of men and women. Caste and sex disability go together. Their failure to emancipate women accounted for some of the most insidiously dangerous features of the society of ancient Greece and of Rome. Exclusion from the free life of community meant absorption in drudgery for the most, and in pettiness, vanity, and intrigue for the others. The few who attained a certain liberation, like the Greek *hetaera*, did so at a price. Sex perversion in the absence of any reasonable companionship between men and women, became almost a normal feature of the times. In the Middle Ages a certain ideal of womanhood emerged, but for lack of the quality in women which comes from wider opportunity of service and free activity, it took the false form of a glamorous chivalry, at best the shadow and forerunner of a true ideal. One of the greatest advances of our own time, even as compared with the Victorian age, is the new opportunity it has opened up to women.

Mountains do not spring abruptly from the plains. The general level of a community determines in some way the relative height of its greatest achievements. No Socrates could have arisen among the Scythians, no Dante among the Huns, no Newton in savage Africa. No people achieves greatness through its leaders unless it has some of the quality of greatness in itself. Most peoples reject at the first, or even crucify, their prophets, but at the last they

learn to honour them for what they are, their own children in whom their own character is most greatly revealed. The aristocracy of a people is truer and finer according to the quality of its democracy.

The positive side of the argument must now be insisted upon. Equalization of opportunity means more than the removal of arbitrary barriers: it means the free and thorough provision of the completest education the community can possibly bestow on all its members.

This belongs to the essence of the democratic ideal. An uneducated democracy is impossible, for among an uneducated, uncritical people the form of democracy is merely a cloak for a more vulgar and unscrupulous tyranny, that of the demagogue who panders to the passions and trades on the stupidities of the multitude. An uncritical democracy is a contradiction in terms, but criticism must of course be informed, or else it will substitute caprice and instability for self-government. An autocracy is possible only where men are politically and socially uneducated, a democracy is possible only where education prevails. And this education must be many-sided. It must open wide the gateways of knowledge, and, in proportion to revealed capacity, offer the opportunity to practise it, the exercise of technique and of management. It must seek to make the culture of the age its common possession, so that none, for the mere want of opportunity, shall be debarred from the greater world of intrinsic interests. Finally, it must give to all the knowledge of the society in which they live and which has been prepared for them as their greatest heritage. We do not know the limits of the receptivity of social man, but we do know that they stretch beyond what has yet been revealed.

In our own age education has a new mission. Education alone can counter propagandism, and modern conditions have created agencies of propaganda on a scale never known before. Associations of all kinds seek to influence public opinion. The new means of communication and expression, the platform, the moving picture, and above all the ubiquitous press, have achieved an enormous power of appeal. This is

a result of the democratization of elementary education. Its manifest perils can be met only by a more thorough and, so to speak, a more realistic education. The dangers of a little knowledge must be removed by deeper draughts at the same spring. Only so can the critical spirit be developed which will detect the prejudice of interested appeals, discern the bias of specially selected information and shake off the hypnotism which constant reiteration produces. To-day no people can be free unless it is also intelligently critical.

How far this liberation can be achieved we cannot predict. But there is one consoling thought for those who are most afraid of the prejudices of public opinion in the age of its power. The history of public opinion may bring some comfort. Beguiled and deluded as it often is, at length it tears the bandage from its eyes. Easily captivated, it nearly always struggles free from its captivity. Ready to worship false gods, it discovers in the end their feet of clay. Eager to applaud the spectacular and the meretricious, yet its eternal heroes are all worthy. It cries 'Barabbas' for an hour, but it repents for ages. At the last it assigns their true place to the great, and extinguishes the petty prominence of the small. At the last it pierces the pretensions of selfish aims, and metes out the justice which it always loves. Thus it may justify its exceeding power. For it can do more than external force ever could. It pulls down the mighty from their seats and exalts those of low degree. In its anger it destroys the old order of the world, but in its patience it builds the world anew. So by its aid

> The pale pathetic peoples still plod on,
> Through hoodwinkings, to light.

CHAPTER VII

THE GREAT LAW OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

I. SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

MANY books on society obscure its nature by drawing false distinctions between 'society' and 'the individual'. They speak, for example, as if there were some kind of opposition between the two. We find this idea in such otherwise unlike thinkers as Herbert Spencer, Benjamin Kidd, and the Hegelian school of Bernard Bosanquet. Spencer speaks as if the development of society were hostile to individuality—he finds, for instance, that there is an opposition between 'perpetuation', the carrying on through the family of the life of the race, and 'individuation', the achievement of the full powers of the member of the race. Kidd speaks as if the great principle of society were the sacrifice of the present to the future. Bosanquet speaks as if the end or purpose of society were something other and bigger than the end or purpose of its members, as if its value consisted in something else than *their* value. But in truth society is only its members, or if we use society in the stricter sense in which we have defined it, it is simply the structure of relationships which its members build. The views we have referred to are worse than misleading. They not only prevent us from understanding the true nature and value of society, they suggest false ideals which have dangerous consequences. They suggest that the welfare of society can be attained apart from the welfare of its members, in fact through the sacrifice of its members. Now there are times and occasions when some individuals can nobly sacrifice themselves for the good of others; in fact every individual finds it at times his duty to choose the good of others before his own. But it is absurd to suppose that *the* individual, i.e., all individuals, can be sacrificed for the welfare of society. There is no meaning in the words that *the*

individual can wither and the race grow more and more. The 'race' grows only in its individuals. Society exists only in its members. If we pursue any social ideal which means anything else than the good of social individuals we are pursuing a figment.

If this false idea were confined to the philosophers it would matter less. But it is the support of various reactionary policies. Upon it rests the conception of some mystic and independent sovereignty possessed by the state—not of course by its members, for it is obvious that *they* are all bound up in interdependence with others as far as their social relationships extend. There is no mystery in the state, or in the community of which it is merely an organ, save the mystery of the life that moves and works in its members. On this idea too was based the doctrine of Rousseau that the people as sovereign cannot err, though as individuals they are all most fallible. From it sprang the notion that a divine right existed in authority, other than the right conferred by the will of those whose service alone justifies its existence. By it is justified still the pursuit of some impersonal goal, such as the 'glory' or 'honour' of the nation abstracted out of all relation to the welfare of the nation.

These conceptions are dispelled when we understand the simple fact that the good of society is only the good of its individuals, and that there can be no possible opposition between the two. Individuals are all social individuals. Social relations do not exist outside, but only within, the beings thus related. They are not external things, like the couplings which join railway carriages. The relation of father to son, for example, does not lie as it were in some intermediate area *between* them. It consists in the quality of fatherhood on the one side and the quality of sonship on the other, stimulating the sense of obligation and affection in each. The individual is the only real unit of society, and the worth of society is just the personality which individuals realize.

What makes error so easy is the ambiguity of our terms. Let us take the antithetical pairs, 'individual' and 'social',

'individuality' and 'sociality', 'individualization' and 'socialization', 'individualism' and 'socialism'. We will seek to attach definite meanings to these terms, excusing the tedium of the process by its necessity, for otherwise we cannot set out the fundamental law which is the object of this chapter.

Sometimes the term 'individual' is used in the sense of 'particular' or 'private', as when people distinguish between the 'individual' and the 'social' interest. But it is better to say 'particular' and 'general' in such a case, for what is meant is the distinction between the interest of some and the interest of the whole, not the impossible distinction between the interest of society and that of *the* individual. When we have clear terms, such as 'particular' and 'general' or 'private' and 'common', it is a pity to confuse the issue by using instead the terms 'individual' and 'social'. 'Social' is simply the adjective corresponding to 'society', and 'individual' the adjective expressive of the unit of society, when it is thought of distributively and not collectively.

By 'socialization' we shall mean the process by which social beings establish wider and profounder relationships with one another, in which they become more bound up with and more dependent on one another, in which they develop the sense of their obligation to and responsibility for others, in which they grow more perceptive of the personality of themselves and of others and build up the complex structure of nearer and wider associations. Sociality is then the quality corresponding to this process, the quality in virtue of which men find their fulfilment within society. It is not to be identified with sociability, which is merely the capacity to 'mix well', to enter readily and comfortably into the more superficial relations with one's fellows. Some writers have denied, like Hobbes, that man is a 'social animal', but they have merely meant that he is not sociable, and whether this is true or false it is of relatively little importance compared with the fundamental fact that man is from first to last a social being, the most socialized of all the animals.

Individualization on the other hand is the process in which

men become more autonomous or self-determining, in which they advance beyond mere imitativeness or acceptance of standards which come to them with only an outer sanction, in which they become less bound by tradition and custom in the regulation of their lives, less submissive to authority and dictation in matters of thought and opinion, recognizing that each is a unique focus of being and can achieve the ends of his life only as these grow clear in his own consciousness and become the objects of his own will. Individualization is the fulfilment of the command 'Know thyself', and individuality the active sense of selfhood. It is the sense of the inner responsibility for conduct which alone can make man free. It is not selfishness or self-centredness or eccentricity. It is simply being oneself, and individuality is great or small according to the strength and breadth of intrinsic purpose. A society in which uniformity reigns, in which custom is regarded as sacrosanct and authority rests upon acquiescence, not on active establishment, is a society of inferiors, of beings not socially adult, who in their present state can never achieve anything great.

It might seem that here we have an opposition between sociality and individuality, since the latter chafes under the social restrictions of custom and usage and certain forms of authority. What we propose to show, is that on the contrary, *sociality and individuality advance together*, and that herein we have the first clue to the understanding of social evolution. Sociality and individuality are the two aspects of the one reality, which is personality. Personality is the final value, the only thing in the world worth having in itself. We do not, of course, mean that every kind of personality is good in itself, rather than nothing but personality can be good in itself. A society is best ordered when it best promotes the personality of its members. A community is great in the greatness of the persons who compose it. And in the attainment of this end not only individuality, but also sociality, is most fully developed. But before we seek to amplify and illustrate this law we may complete our series of definitions.

Sociality and individuality are qualities, socialization and individualization are processes, socialism and individualism are theories. The qualities and processes in question are complementary, not opposed like the theories. It is therefore important to point out that we are not here at all concerned with the various theories that pass under the names of individualism and socialism. These are terms to which much confusion attaches, owing to the various significations which they possess, but in every case they are theories of what *ought* to be, not of what actually is, whereas our law relates facts and not ideals. Socialism sometimes means the view that collective control or ownership of wealth or property *should* be extended, individualism the view that it should be narrowed. In a stricter sense socialism is the theory that the apparatus of production, with its attendant system of exchange and distribution, should be owned and controlled collectively, either by the state or by other associations directly responsible to the community, such as the guild; while individualism is the theory which advocates *laissez-faire* in these and other matters. But the terms have also various looser usages, and in the heat of the conflict of interests they often become perverted into meaningless forms of abuse and condemnation.

II. THE MAKING OF PERSONALITY

We may now speak of individuality and sociality as the two great factors of personality. They are woven eternally together in the making of personality, and the one has no meaning apart from the other. Just as there can be no freedom without order, just as there can be no right without duty or power without moral responsibility, so there can be no individuality without sociality. We spoke as if individualization and socialization were two processes—they are really the same process seen from different sides. Where individuality is most advanced, there social relations are most intimate and most extensive. The great man is not one who is most independent of his society, he is the man who is most profoundly sustained by it. It may reject him,

but only because it does not know itself; and, in rejecting him it rejects what is best within itself. On the other hand, the individuality that cuts itself loose from social relations cuts the chords of its own life. It grows sterile and frustrate and in time descends to the mere negation of insanity. The strong individuality can resist the follies and prejudices of the social environment, but only because its roots strike so deep within society that it scarcely bends before the gusts that play upon its surface.

It is easy to see, alike in the life-history of the individual and in that of any community, how the development of individuality means also the evolution, in the sense already defined, of society. The social relations of the child are few and simple and external. His relationships are made for him, they are almost accidental. He is more self-contained, more self-centred, but less self-determining. The greater and subtler changes of social institutions affect him little. The boy, when he wakens to his membership of a social circle, family, or school. displays as a rule a simple loyalty and strong pride towards it; but it is of a competitive and comparative character. His family is better than other families. His school is the best of all schools, and he fiercely wants it to win in all contests with others. It is not its inner significance but its standing which concerns him. His pride and devotion are evoked by the bigger individuality which he finds in it, but it is bigger, not greater, because he has not yet found his own individuality. It is but the new circumference of his self-centredness, the diffusion of an uncritical egoism. Others share the social advantage he possesses, and the recognition of this community modifies his egoism. But they share it because they share just his own qualities. They belong to his type. For divergence from this type he has no sympathy or understanding. He has little comprehension of the personality of others, and is therefore unable to live the life of a community. His comradeships are transient, his associations the affairs of a day. His likes and dislikes are unstable. He is ruled by conventions and customs in everything, save where he breaks

away in mere petulance. He clings to his own conventions with the solemnity of the savage, a solemnity great in proportion to their insignificance. Lacking the profounder sense of self-determination, of individuality, he moves about in a world not realized, and which therefore suffers him to erect those rigid uniformities of observance which give him the sense without the substance of society. It is merely the promise of society which only the autonomous adult being can at length attain.

Were there space, similar characteristics in the life of primitive communities could be abundantly illustrated. Here we must be content with a brief generalized description, referring the reader for illustration to such works as Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution*, Westermarck's *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, and W. I. Thomas's *Primitive Behaviour*. One of the most characteristic forms of early society is that which invented the totem, the symbol of the social type. Each individual is one with the totem, his personality is the same as its—whether it be named crow or kangeroo or wolf or any other object of nature, animate or inanimate—and therefore is identical with that of every other member of the group. The vague sense of personality is attached to an outward shape, and is utterly undifferentiated save by the hard and fast line which distinguishes totem-group from totem-group. This curious form of society, though widespread, is not found in the early history of the western peoples, but it suggests, in its cruder way, certain of the characteristics of all undeveloped communities. They are ruled by simple uniformities, embodied in custom, sanctified by tradition, symbolized by the blazon of shield or flag. They cling fiercely to the type, the shadowy projection in community of their own uncritical but exclusive sense of personality. Divergence from the folkways is abhorrent to the communal sense. There is a simple narrow predetermined way of thought and life prepared for all. The needs of the developed personality, the deliberate choice between alternatives made possible by a liberal and complex environment, the pursuit of values as they are discerned by

the reflective mind, conscious both of freedom and of responsibility—these are not yet known. There is one religion which all accept, one series of ceremonial observances from childhood to old age, which all must keep, one code of moral prescriptions which does not suffer the individual to apply his moral sense to the claims of each particular and changing situation that confronts him. These rigid determinations are essential to the primitive life, which cannot depart from them without grave danger of being lost, which, having little inward guidance, requires the mass control of the group conscience in everything. An analogue may be found in the conditions of the military life with its barbaric simplification of existence, with its definite limited code of 'honour', and its clear-cut cadres of uniformity, with its abandonment of privacy, with its insistence on obedience as the cardinal virtue. There is a code, an external rule, for everything, and the business of life consists of the fulfilment of the code. In the primitive world, what we regard as the most intimately personal things, such as the selection of a partner in marriage, are determined by considerations into which the personality of the parties most concerned does not enter. 'Custom is the king of men.'

Nor does this mean that society is more developed. We must not think that primitive communities are more socialized because they are more subject to the simple common rule. Their sociality is shallow as their individuality is weak. The child is not more socialized because it is more imitative and receptive. The man is more socialized who understands his own relation to society and achieves it with effort and trial and often with conflict. Society gives less to the primitive man even when it seems to demand more. It gives less because it has less to give. A modern society is an imperfect harmony, but a primitive society is an imperfect unison. J. S. Mill in his *Essay on Liberty*, referring to those abrogations of the demands of personality which he regarded as most prejudicial to social development, declared that 'society had definitely got the better of the individual.' But this is a misleading form of expression. In so far as it represses

individuality, society represses itself. Finally, it is the lack of individuality in the members of society which accounts for its repressiveness. As individuality increases, as interests grow refined and diversified, society gains in fullness and significance. A primitive society is to the more advanced society of to-day as a unicellular organism to the wonderfully adapted structure of the mammal.

We can carry the argument further back, beyond human society altogether. We saw at the beginning that, wherever there is life, there is society, but it is least where life is least. The chart of evolution shows the growth of individuality as we pass from the lower to the higher. In the lowest, even physical demarcation between individuals is incomplete, in vegetative life, in protozoan colonies, in polyps and other relatively simple organisms. As life increases, there is more marked individuation, first physical, then psychical. The individual displays more initiative, more power of choice, more subtlety of discrimination. At the same time he becomes more social. Among the higher animals the family evolves, becoming a permanent, purposive form of society, in place of the mere glimpse of sociality revealed in the perpetuation of lower life. The higher animal is at the first less adapted and more adaptable. It has a period of helplessness in which it is shaped within a society, and the period is longer the more advanced the stage of life. As we advance still further the family differentiates into the clearer manifold associations of community, corresponding to the clearer purposes that awaken within each life. In the highest life this activity becomes definitely creative, and the highest satisfaction of life, the goal to which all the inchoate instincts of all living things dimly tend, is pure creation. Life is creation, and man, the highest animal, transforms the face of nature into the expression of his creative thought, embodies his intelligence in mechanism, and fashions in art and literature new worlds that mirror back to him his personality. Life is at the last creation, which is the fullest expression of personality, so that the first name man gives to God is that of the Creator.

We can now express our law in a new form. Personality is the synthesis of sociality and individuality, and as it grows the forms of society evolve. They take more specific characters, opening out into manifold associations within community just as the organs of an evolving body are differentiated within the unity of its life.

III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE GREAT ASSOCIATIONS

We spoke of the family as the first form of society, but it was not the family as we to-day understand it. It was a rude undifferentiated community of which the conscious bond was the sense of kinship. There was no family as a particular organization within the community, there was no state, there was no church, there were no economic associations. The head of the family or the clan, the paterfamilias or patriarch, was also the lawgiver and often the priest, the 'defender of the faith'. These offices were not yet distinct. The place and the kinds of authority were indeterminate. Custom was law and law was custom. Custom and morality were one. This we can see clearly in the history of language. Our term 'morals' comes from the Latin *mores*, 'folkways'; 'ethics', from the Greek expression of the same idea. The significance of morality lay therefore only in the ways of the group, not in the freer consciousness of right and wrong centred in the heart of the individual. What is permissible for the conscience of the person coincides with what is enjoined by the standards of the group and by the precepts of religion. This might be illustrated further by the Hebrew term *mishpat*, the Latin *ius* and *fas*, the Teutonic *recht*. In Homeric Greek the term *themis* suggests divine sanction and at the same time signifies the 'doom' or decree which the patriarch or lawgiver proclaims to his folk. In fact, the ruler is rather the revealer than the maker of law, for its real source is the tradition inherited and as it were sanctified, which is taken to be the eternal and unique possession of the group.

The ferment of individuality dissolved this primitive coherence of all the aspects of life. Much of the process is hidden from our eyes, and even the historical aspects of it

we cannot here survey. A few glimpses must suffice. Throughout the history of civilization there have been recurrent periods of restless transition, disturbing at the time to the majority, but revealing through all their perplexities the impulse towards a society more adequate for the needs of awakening personality. The Israelites ceased to be satisfied with the divinely commissioned patriarchal 'judge', and sacrilegiously asked for a king. And throughout their later history, as it may be fitfully read in the Old Testament prophets, there is an evident conflict between the adherents of the older order wherein the religious and the political laws were one and the innovators who broke away from the tradition of identity. In the history of ancient Greece the figure of the sophist appears, denying that the social code is identical with the law of nature, denying in a word the unconditioned necessity of obedience to the rule of custom. Socrates, who at the last is condemned to death for 'impiety', follows the same road. In every civilization there arise these disturbers of the ancient ways, putting asunder the things that the God of tradition had joined. Often behind the disturbance there lay the vision of a greater integration which later ages realized.

Let us look more closely at the greater distinctions which emerged out of these ferments. First let us observe how the family broke out of its original fusion with the community to become a distinct association. Primitive groups everywhere feel that the basis of the community is the blood-bond. They are brethren, sprung from one ancestry. Their pride and their affection, their right and their duty, are rooted in the sense of kinship. The first condition of permanent society is the protection of the young life, and this natural instinct develops into the wider protection with which the tribe or the clan enfolds its members. The first sin against one's fellows is the denial that each is his brother's keeper. To be outside the kin, to be in the Anglo-Saxon term a 'kin-shattered' man, is to be outside the law. The kin prescribes on the nearest male relatives the particular duties of maintenance and of revenge. How strong and far-reaching the

kin-bond was, appears from such survivals as the Hebrew levirate, the Hindu niyoga, and the Athenian law, according to which the brother was bound to maintain his deceased brother's wife and children. The family hearth was the focus of social life. Above it stood on guard the household gods. The undying hearth fire of Vesta symbolized the great principle and source of the continuity of the race. Here was the primal mystery, the recognition of which opened all the springs of society.

But the self-containedness of the kin-group is never complete. The marriage-instinct leads men outside the narrow circle. They sought wives abroad, by raid or rape. They brought home captive women who found a place in the house and bore them children. When they conquered the territory of their neighbours they made property of their women. Even the fierce exclusiveness of the Hebrews could not sustain the command to spare neither woman nor child. The slower friendly contacts of trade and travel established new relationships. Sometimes we find the significant institution of adoption, whereby the alien is fictitiously invested with the character of the kin. As the tribe grew, by natural increase or by conquest, the sense of blood-relationship expanded. It became, in Aristotle's expression, 'watery', and had to be strengthened by the sense of other relationships. The tribe became the race, whose more diversified interests, whose distinctions of class and rank, of the well-born and the base-born, modified the 'consciousness of kind', so that it remained effective only in such simple predicaments as that of war. The growing division of labour broke the economic self-sufficiency of the family group. The elevation of political authority withdrew from the paterfamilias much of his ancient family jurisdiction, such as the 'power of life and death', which the head of the Roman household once possessed. The state became the avenger of family wrongs and the restorer of family rights, abrogating such institutions as the feud and the vendetta. And the household gods paled into mere idols as the church arose and the conception of deity became more profound and

universal, turning the family altar into, at most, a seat of common worship.

The process illustrated the great law. By losing its self-sufficiency the family found its true character and significance. It ceased to be the cluster of relations bound by the sense of kin. It became delimited from the kin. By losing the coerciveness invested in the paterfamilias, it made a new relationship possible between the sexes. The woman ceased to be a kind of property and became a personality. The inferior position of women in the more primitive family, even among so advanced a people as the Greeks, had impoverished the life of sex and degraded feelings capable of the greatest expansion and perfection. Only in equality could these subtler emotions flower. Here as elsewhere, deep and intimate relations are not possible between superiors and inferiors, but only between equals, equally free, equally self-determining. As the family lost function after function it found its own. It became an association, the primary association within which husband and wife became father and mother, bound by a simple tie, animated by a clarified emotion which begins in the love of the sexes and develops into the affection, intimacy, and devotion of the circle of parents and children. Only in this unitary family can these emotions find free expression, and as the community grows the family takes this unitary form. What it loses in extent it may more than regain in quality. The wider community brings greater gifts to the members of the family, in education, in economic goods, in protection, in all the provision of life. In its sociality it provides the conditions of a fuller individuality, which shapes the family to that clearer and limited function which it can best fulfil.

Let us next observe the similar process which created the church. The first gods were probably an uneasy extension of tribal property, the forces of nature represented as vague persons propitiated and controlled by the magic and virtue of the tribe, or else the incarnation of the qualities of human action which most impressed the primitive mind. In either

case they belonged to the tribe. Each had its own, and to leave the tribe was to leave the dwelling-place of its gods. 'Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God,' cried the woman of Moab when she followed the woman of Israel. Dagon belonged to the Philistines as Jehovah to the Israelites or Athena to the Athenians or Ra to the Egyptians or Finn to the Kelts. The awakening ideals of the tribe creates gods of beauty, like Apollo or Balder, and of conflict, like Tiauw and Ares and Mars, and of sovereignty, like Zeus and Jupiter, and of the imperious attraction of sex, like Aphrodite, Astarte, Venus, and of motherhood like Isis and Demeter and later of the virgin mother Mary, and of a hundred other qualities, admirable or terrible or grotesque. As the gods multiplied, special cults and priesthoods were instituted and there arose gods of particular classes, of artificers, of soldiers, of rulers, of women, even of slaves. Men began to choose out from among the gods those who most appealed to their particular imaginations and situations. There arose conflicts within the community between the votaries of rival gods, as between the followers of Baal and of Jehovah. The identity of the tribe with all its gods was broken, and the inevitable appeal to the heart of the individual had begun. On the other hand, as communication grew, the gods of one people were identified with the gods of others. Zeus was Jupiter, Poseidon was Neptune, and Venus was Astarte. The supreme god of one people was likened to the supreme god of neighbouring peoples. Their gods ceased to wage war against one another, particularly as they became enclosed within a common empire. They tended to coalesce instead, and the sense of a more universal deity, ruler of heaven and earth, god of barbarian, Scythian, bond and free, gave to religion at once a supra-social and a more essential character.

So the idea and the form of the church universal arose. The lesser gods dwindled away or they became satellites of the supreme deity, his ministers and angels. There were now no new gods, but only new attributes of the one god, and new prophets and saints who revealed him. And now

the conflict took another form. There arose a great issue between the state and the church with their competing claims to universal jurisdiction, but that we will consider presently. The inner conflict concerned the source of religious interpretation. The church, now assuming definite forms as a special association within community, claimed to be the religious conscience of men. It formulated elaborate creeds, to which all were bound to subscribe on pain of excommunication. But the individuality of man could not thus be chained, perhaps above all in matters at once so full of doubt and yet expressing so intimately the reaction of the mind to the very fact of the universe. The one church became many churches, and no coercion of fire and sword, no proclamation of divinely delegated authority, no denunciation of an eternity of punishment for all 'heretics and schismatics' who wandered from its fold, could any longer save its unity.

But again the result was the purification of religion. Religion is most intense and most personal—and unless it is personal it is not religion—where it creates not one but many churches. The church is then saved from absorption in the secular life of the community. It finds a mission of its own. It is more readily saved from that ossification which is the nearest and deadliest foe of the conservatism which seems to belong by a necessity of its nature to the religious mind. It is forced to vindicate and interpret its own mysteries so they shall not grow into meaningless and stultifying symbols. And above all, while it gains freedom for itself, it loses that power of coercion, moral as well as physical, which perverts religion so easily into an external sanction, in place of being the clear expression of the deep emotional response of the human mind to its discovery of purpose and of unity in the universe. Those who share that sense can then freely unite in the association of a church, and the church can then become a true vessel of religious life. Here, too, individuality joins with sociality in the creation of the great organs of community.

Only under exceptional conditions, as in Tibet, in certain dynasties of ancient Egypt, in the temporal sovereignty of medieval Papacy, has the church been actually *identified*

with the whole community, and only under primitive conditions is the kin-group co-extensive with society, but even to-day there exists a tendency to identify community with the state. We pointed out this tendency when seeking to define our terms in an earlier chapter. We have now to show how in fact the state has evolved within community towards its distinctive place as an association. The process is still much less complete than in the case of the other associations we have been considering. The activity of the state seems in fact, certainly in time of war, to know no limits. Yet a comparison of past and present reveals a clear evolution. As the other associations find their place, so does the state come to find its limits.

The first stage was the distinction of custom and political law. In the primitive life, custom, upheld and enforced by the community, was confused with law, or more strictly, neither of these yet appeared in its evolved significance. Custom had not the semi-voluntary character it now possesses. The body of social usages was not distinguished from the code with its rigid prescriptions. All of it was at first 'unwritten law', until parts of it were given definition by the law-maker and made the special charge of the evolving organ of government. In place of the patriarch came the king, in place of the elders of the people came his council. Besides the court of public opinion there arose the political tribunal, the judge and the officers of justice. Gradually the right to use force, to decide conflicting claims to property, to uphold and define contracts, to make war or punish wrongs, was removed from the family group and concentrated in the political authority. Custom grew less onerous and less uniform as law selected for prescription and enforcement special portions of the hitherto unwritten code. Within the code itself distinctions arose. Part of it became criminal law, which the state enforced of its own accord and the breach of which became that specifically anti-social act, a crime, against which it sought to protect the community by punishment and segregation, by deterrence and (so far as its wisdom extended) by reformation and training. Part of it

became the civil code, which regulated and upheld contracts and other relationships freely entered into, so that the person or association could pursue his or its interests with assurance. In these distinctions was contained the principle which sets its true limits to the state.

But this was only the beginning. Because all within its borders were members of the state, because to it alone belonged coercive power and the enactment of laws which applied to all its members, it became an age-long task, still far from ended, to fix its bounds from within. If we look back to the states of ancient Greece and Rome we see that they never achieved this delimitation. Language again furnishes us with a clue. The Hellene could not make the distinction between state and community which is now familiar to us, because his one term *polis* meant either or both. The 'city' was the 'state'. The 'political' was the 'social', as in Aristotle's famous expression that man is a 'political animal'. Likewise for the Roman the common concern (the *res publica*) was just the *civitas*, the state, and citizenship summed up all social attributes. The facts obscurely and, of course, imperfectly (for the process of evolution was nevertheless at work) corresponded. The city state (or the state city) was the guardian of morals as well as of law, of religion as well as of social order. Citizenship was in theory a 'partnership in every virtue', the recognition of a common culture, a common faith, the common possession of art and discipline as well as of friends and foes. It was an ideal which could be nobly expressed, as in the funeral oration of Pericles, but it contained a defect which proved utterly disintegrating. It narrowed the circle of community, and prevented that great co-ordination and more extensive citizenship needed alike for liberty and for security. At the same time, it made individuality a quality of the city rather than of the individual, and so led to coercion and to internal strife. The incessant divisions within the Greek cities as well as between them, which finally paralysed their life, and left them a prey to the empires without, revealed the dangerous side of their ideal. The place of liberty was not

yet found, and thus, particularly for a people so spiritually endowed as the Hellenes, the basis of order was insecure. The opposite danger overtook their great successors the Romans. They achieved a firm foundation of order, but only as the impulse of individuality weakened within the greater state they built, weakened until its whole life seemed to grow empty, until at last it too could neither control nor assimilate nor resist the more vigorous forces outside its gates. In both cases citizenship stood for too much, for everything. The state, seeking to be the community, dominated the community. Caesarism might seem the opposite extreme from Greek particularism, but alike they reveal, by their effects in character and on the social structure, the essential interdependence of individuality and sociality.

It is significant, too, that the protests made against the all-inclusive state, as voiced by the Stoic and the Epicurean and the early Christian, offered no alternative save the denial of citizenship altogether or else the affirmation, which came to nearly the same thing, of the 'citizenship of the world'. There were as yet no developed associations besides the state, which could protect against its encroachments the life of men. In our world to-day these perils of Greece and Rome have lost much of their power, because within community there is securely organized a great system of associations which can freely pursue unlike or conflicting ends and within which every threatened interest can nearly always find some degree of support and protection.

As contrasted with the state, these other associations may be named voluntary. To prevent or to compel—functions which bulked so largely in the activity of the state—is equally foreign to their nature. (This much must be said for the act of the French Revolution in suppressing by the law of 14 June, 1791, other associations than the state that these associations had become monopolies or privileges, themselves coercive, since until the state was truly demarcated the other associations also passed their bounds.) The demarcation of the state as the one compulsive power helped to establish this principle, within the family, for instance, in

the relation of husband and wife, within the guild, in respect of the relation of master and apprentice, within the church, in the abolition of a wholly stultifying religious coercion, within the community at large, in the reduction of the constraint of custom and suppression of the liberty of opinion. In turn, the habit of free association reacted upon the state, giving emphasis to the relation between citizen and citizen as distinct from that between ruler and subject. As we have already pointed out, relations between equals admit of a greater profundity and strength than relations between superiors and inferiors.

The Middle Ages, that time of new beginnings, saw the first formation of associations recognized as being distinct from and in some respects independent of the state. Then in particular was witnessed the spectacle of a church rising to universality while an empire dissolved. Surely these were two distinct forms of social structure. But men always fear at first to recognize or accept differences. They think that to admit plurality is to destroy the unity of the world, and the temptations of power reinforce their fears. State and church fought for alternative absolutisms. The church, grown strong with the fervour of a religion which seemed to give meaning to men's lives in the breakdown of ancient loyalties, claimed the 'temporal' as well as the 'spiritual' sword. In the end, after a period of triumph, this theocratic claim was defeated, but not before a new interpretation of society was awakened in the minds of reflective observers. The church had one function and the state another. Each was a *persona*, a corporation, each had a sphere. Both were necessary for the satisfaction of human needs, therefore there was a place for both, to be found by consideration of their respective natures and functions. Not so has it been found in historic fact, but as the last resort of a world weary with the stupidities of vain persecutions and monstrous 'wars of religion'. Western nations have advanced at last beyond these follies, and beyond such impossible compromises as the Peace of Augsburg, which made the religion of a community depend upon the religion of its prince. But we may

remember that it is not yet a century since the profession of a particular religion disqualified from English citizenship, and that still the phenomenon of a form of religion 'by law established' creates needless disharmony in the social life of England.

The process initiated by the insurgence of *the* church, and carried forward by the effective protests of such churches as suffered through the association of the state with *one* church, has now reached a further stage. The question of church and state is practically settled. But the solution of that problem is merely the distinction of the 'sacred' and the 'secular'. If it left all of the latter sphere, all the myriad diverse interests which make up the life of community, as the proper and sole concern of the state, it did not yet discern the true limits of political action. Another association, or rather set of associations, pursuing an interest definitely social and 'secular', next came forward as the main determinant of social evolution. Even in medieval times, the pre-eminently economic guild had divided authority, in the confusions of jurisdictions characteristic of the age, with the municipality. But that issue was never fought out, for the range of the guilds was too narrow and in course of time they hardened into obsolescence. When the greater industry arose the real conflict began. As the barriers between industries gave way before the new realizations of common economic interests, a great motive was provided for vastly widened economic associations. The organization of capital on the one hand and of labour on the other, and the growing consciousness of power and of opposition, broke down the principle that other associations are the mere creatures of the state. Here were associations which secretly or openly directed the policy of the state, which made the control of the state the issue of their warfare, which possessed forms and sources of power subtler, more pervasive, more continuous than the mere right of coercion with which the state was endowed. Property is always social power, and most of all in the fluid form of concentrated capital. Work has become social power, since the division of labour makes it

possible for organized groups to withhold it at will. Property and work have become power available not only in the economic sphere but over the whole area of social interests. And the later developed power of labour has dramatically revealed what the silent efficiency of capital has concealed from the view of the unobservant. 'Direct action' itself is only the cruder display of a control which in surer ways belongs of necessity and in some degree to every economic organization of the modern world.

In the case of the church it was the divisions within it, between its opposing creeds and sects, which stimulated its demarcation from the state. Similarly the divisions of the economic order have worked to distinguish it from the political. But the church had a common interest which could only be attained as it found its distinction from the state, and so again economic associations must find by demarcation their true place and service. This is still most imperfectly realized in the communities of the present. We have already expressed the conviction that the cleavage between capital and labour must in the course of social evolution be bridged by the establishment of new forms of industrial co-operation, making each industry an effective and within limits an autonomous unity. Should that be achieved, much of the activity which now engrosses the state would pass over to the industry. By internal agreement each industry would decide conditions and terms of work which now are partially embodied in such legislation as the Factory Acts, and federations of industries would necessarily arise for concerted determination of common principles. This would give a new function to the state as it removed an old one. The state would stand out more clearly as the co-ordinator, the guardian of the general, the diffused, interest which is only the more vital as the special interests discern their solidarity.

These demarcations reveal once more the operation of this first law of evolution. The state has always fulfilled a great service, but its vast exercise of authority and of force has, for lack of the definition of its proper sphere, entailed heavy costs for the community. It has too often been an

instrument of repression, upholding the interests of the dominant few, thrusting its uniformity into the intimate concerns of the spirit, destroying enterprise for the sake of centralizing power, claiming in the name of its majesty an absolute independence within and without, which could only be maintained, precariously and barbarously, by the false exaltation of force. While it claimed this liberty, it destroyed liberty. While it asserted this independence it fostered servitude. While it insisted in its oneness with community, it arrested the march of community. Only as the other associations, more responsive to the nearer human needs, have grown strong and great, has the state begun to learn that self-discipline which perfects it to the service of men. In the multiplicity of associations the greater mission of the state is revealed. It remains indeed the guardian of law and order, but of a greater law and order, a law which reconciles instead of merely repressing and is therefore more complex and more flexible, an order which it assures and does not merely create and is therefore more rich, more varied, deep and strong. In a word, the state thus grows moralized. It is no longer might, the blind worship of the boy and the barbarian, the nurse of egotisms and enmities. It no longer translates into the ideal of the community the anti-social qualities of domination, ruthlessness, and greed which it must discourage, in spite of the contradiction, in the relationships of its members. In fact, in thus limiting itself under the urgency of the impulses of individuality, it serves the more the qualities of sociality.

We must not of course assume that the process thus outlined is nearly complete. It may be only begun, though we can never predict the continuance of any process of evolution. Our civilization is still subject to the spirit of intolerance, the tendency to suppress differences, other than those clear manifestations of an anti-social attitude which are properly called crimes, by mere force. The time of war raises this spirit, inevitably, to a higher intensity. At such a time it is a sort of necessity involved in the more barbaric order which war entails, but the easy reaction to it, the readiness—in

many cases the unconcealed joy—with which the necessity is accepted, reveals clearly its accord with persistent elements in the spirit of our communities. Dominant majorities are as ready to trust to coercion as dominant minorities, even though in the latter case there is the particular prompting of the law of self-preservation. It is in the might-theory and the might-policy of the state that this spirit has found its strong support. Above all, its claim of absolute sovereignty, fostering the lust of power and the vain-glory of national egoism, with its attendant fear and peril and competition in the amassing of force, has broken the common interests of all communities. The state has thus remained narrow and incomplete—consider how one whole field of political activity that concerned with the interrelationships of states and their common protection and co-ordination of the great interests that belong to a civilization, has thereby been limited to a few paltry conventions and insecure alliances—because its service of personality in its double aspect has also been so narrow and incomplete.

The associations of the economic order are likewise strengthened by demarcation for their service of the community. The truth of the matter was expressed in a passage of Plato's *Republic*. The 'art of payment', he points out, is distinct from the other arts. Medicine, for example, is the art of healing. It is not the art of receiving pay because a doctor takes fees when he is engaged in his specific art of healing. All the arts and crafts are primarily concerned with the giving of service. It is in so doing that their perfection lies. 'The truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends them which is the art of pay.'[1] Society is distracted because not merely is the 'art of payment' confused with the arts of production but instead of being an 'art' it is a scramble to which the business of production is inevitably subordinated with grave waste and perversion of energy. Once more, should the industry, the trade, the service of producing, form itself into an integral association, instead of at least

[1] *Republic*, I, 3, 4, 6.

two, sometimes several, factions which battle against one another while they produce together—should the industry, for example, attain the unity of intention which characterizes any other type of association, academy, or church, or club, or scientific society—it would perform vastly better its function within community. In the absence of this demarcation our society is needlessly obsessed by the narrower economic interest, whose uncontrolled and distracted course draws from their true orbits the political, cultural, and all other interests. Here we have a negative illustration of the thesis of this section, that in the demarcation of associations and consequent integration of community, personality, the synthesis of individuality and sociality is achieved.

IV. CONCLUSION

Individuality is not at war with society, but only with its tyrannies. Sociality is no spirit of uniformity, but the infinitely various responsiveness of the individual, self-determined by his sense of obligation and responsibility as well as of his liberty and creativeness. We make for ourselves false problems when we regard these two as by nature conflicting, even when we regard them as by nature divergent. They are as closely bound as the obverse and reverse of a die. They cannot exist, without one another, and they cannot increase apart from one another.

So much should be clear from what has preceded. We can therefore, without danger of misunderstanding, point out the real issue that remains, the actual problem which meets the individual, every individual, in his social relationships. Although essentially every individual lives in and through society there remains a problem of conflicting aims. It is not that individuality and sociality are at variance, it is that individualities clash with one another. Within every association there is thus a conflict of wills. The fact of association implies common will, the common will to pursue the interest for which the association stands. But to agree upon the general end is not to agree upon the means, the policy. Here there is—there must be—difference. In the

determination of policy there is always a majority and a minority for practically every issue that is raised. The minority must, for the sake of the common good realized through the association, accept and carry out the decision of the majority, and this is the established rule of all associations. To do so is part of the sociality of the civilized man. Only so can the interest which belongs to each as well as to all be fulfilled. In quite rare cases the policy of the majority may seem to the minority to be destructive of the general end. Then, in the case of the voluntary associations, the minority must simply secede, and if it is large enough, it may form a new association. This is a well-known phenomenon, in the case of churches, academies, economic unions, and so on. In the case of the state, because of its compulsiveness, it is different. Here the individual must simply choose what seems to him the greater loyalty. Whether he obeys, or disobeys (and takes the consequences), he cannot, if he acts upon that principle, be condemned. For his disobedience depends upon the same sense of obligation which alone justifies enforcement of the law. He disobeys in the name of the greater good, not of his own alone. The passive resister, the pacifist in time of war, the 'protestant' who refuses to recant at the bidding of authority, cannot for a moment be placed in the same category as the criminal, the individual who deliberately or carelessly seeks his own ends at the cost of society. The majority is as much entitled to think the former misguided, even to coerce them where they believe their principles endanger the common welfare, as these in turn are entitled to resist. There is no solution here. The sense of right alone must guide each of the conflicting parties. Whatever the consequences, each side is right to choose what seems to it the greater value, the greater loyalty. Majority gives power, but the conscience of the many has no prerogative over the conscience of the few. There is not one loyalty, but many, and they all spring alike from the heart of the individual, who alone must find for himself a way of reconciliation. If he is true to his own self he cannot be false to any man.

Nevertheless, the growth of the inner sense, the discovery within of the abiding sense of obligation and of good, instead of magnifying this conflict, diminishes it. It does so in two ways. For as men reverence the inner sense of value in themselves, they come to reverence it in others. They learn to be more chary of mere enforcement. They advance beyond the primitive hatred of mere difference, which is bound up with a more shallow external initiative sociality. They appreciate more the profounder common nature which all men share, and which is revealed and fulfilled in endless variety. The sense of personality brings respect for personality, that sympathy and open-mindedness which makes community so much more rich and full of meaning. They learn the futility of coercion in spiritual things, the inefficacy of force. So they limit its use as far as possible. Force, as we have seen, has a much narrower range in advanced than in primitive societies. On the other hand the conflict is minimized by those demarcations of function and of association which mark the advance of society. The number, distinctiveness, and variety of associations in the modern world furnish a refuge for endangered interests, a support within the social structure for every conception of common good, a constant check to the masterfulness of any one dogma, tradition, or policy which, were it not thus limited, might overrule community. Thus the process of evolution which we have described furnishes a progressive though never complete solution of the conflicts which arise within it.

We must insist that it is never complete. Otherwise the process, too, would be complete, and evolution would end in stagnation. The insurgence of individuality prevents this fatal conclusion. So even in what must remain of conflict society is being served. Conflict becomes less wasteful, less brutal, less violent, more fruitful, in the more developed community. But it never ceases. Even in its disharmonies, individuality builds up society. The individual is the unit of society, but finally he is something more. He is not summed up in his social relations. He is more than a citizen, member of a family, of a trade, of a church, of a club,

of a nation. The pattern of life which he weaves contains more threads than these. He is a self, a person. He is both creature and creator. He is the arbiter of values, and as he chooses he creates.

Only here can we find the meaning of that much-disputed term, 'liberty'. It means nothing more and nothing less than the exercise of personality, a thing to be loved and to be feared, because while it brings dangers it is the only thing in the world which is worth while in itself. Kant feared it when he proclaimed his 'categorical imperative', the law of unconditioned duty proper to its nature, but he understood it when he said that personality should always be treated as an end and never as a mere means. Liberty is the condition of our being ourselves, in which we pursue whatever fulfilment our nature urges us to seek. It too is never, can never be, complete. But what makes it possible is the unity of individuality and sociality, and what makes it real is the process of growth within that unity. Therefore it is more than the liberty of an association, of the state, for example. 'Self-government' is but the beginning of liberty. It removes an external obstacle, the domination of interests outside the association over those which it exists to pursue. But the achievement of liberty comes from within. Association implies organization, and organization means the common rule, the common policy, which contains more or less of constraint according to its quality.

The only function of any association is to serve personality. As we have seen, it can never be a perfect instrument. This is not simply because organization involves some degree of constraint. After all, some degree of constraint is a necessary discipline. If constraint were reduced to the minimum demanded by the purposes of association it would, for socially educated beings, remain a valuable form of discipline. They would accept it as necessary and thereby attain that greater thing, self-discipline, without which liberty itself is vain. But this reconciliation implies a perfected individuality and sociality, and it is constantly broken by the temptations of power which beset the leaders of every association, as well

as by the imperfect sympathies and undisciplined ambitions of its members. Organization creates also another obstacle to the achievement of its true purpose. The institutions which it sets up grow hard and fixed, so that they cannot readily respond to changing conditions and needs. Men accept them merely because they are old. Their permanence is interpreted as itself a value. Tradition makes them venerable, and education attributes to them the achievements of the community. They seem to exist in their own right. They create 'vested interests'. Officialism grows within them and zealously guards them against change. They dominate the mind, so that it ceases to ask what service they render. This is peculiarly true where a definite religious sanction attaches to the institution, as universally in primitive communities. But, all communities offer illustrations of this tendency. Consider, for example, the anomalies of our parliamentary system, such as the absurdity of our antiquated methods of election. Or consider again the uncritical veneration which attaches to the American Constitution. If men realized that their institutions were only mechanisms to serve them, they would not regard it as profanity to improve them continually as they improve the physical mechanisms which serve their needs. Their institutions would no longer impose upon them the worst form of slavery, a willing slavery.

Institutions require to be subjected to constant free criticisms in the light of the service they can or might render. If they have ceased to be of service, if they stand in the way of institutions which can render better service, no plea of sanctity should protect them. Then the command must be: Cut them down, why cumber they the ground? If they served the past by their life they must serve the future by their death. This is the ruthless law alike of the organic and of the social world. Nothing is saved but by service. For if an institution does not serve, it is dead, and it is only its fossil remains, the shell of what once lived, that we vainly cherish. This is not loyalty, but its perversion, for we can be loyal only to what has worth. The living past

lives within us, and we are true to it when we are most true to ourselves. The old lives peacefully in the new when we do not hold either in violent detachment. The new is the living monument of the old, its last and greatest work. Imperceptibly it is built up in the great process of life. The old is reborn in the new, and those who love it most must seek it where it lives. Then as men discover new worlds of thought, they think, more rightly than Columbus, that they are rediscovering by a new route old worlds.

This free attitude towards institutions is a condition of liberation. It makes it easier to seek and to follow ideals. It removes needless fears, restrictions, and tyrannies. Setting personality above all other considerations, above property in things and even in traditions, it reveals the consentience of sociality with individuality. Society appears in its true nature, as the co-operative production and enjoyment of things worth while. And their worth is found only in the free conscience, the sense of values, of every member of it, seeking that truth and that beauty which offers whatever degree of happiness, whatever permanence of good, human life, in the great stream which bears it along through change, is qualified to attain.

APPENDIX

NOTES FOR FURTHER READING

THE object of these notes is to guide the reader to works which will enable him to carry his studies further along the lines suggested by the text. The list of books is selected solely with this end in view out of the vast literature dealing with social questions, theoretical and practical. It is not to be regarded as constituting a bibliography of the subject or even as containing the most important contributions to it. As this book has been written for the general reader, nearly all the works referred to are in English.

GENERAL WORKS

An acute and suggestive approach to the study of society is contained in Graham Wallas, *The Great Society* (Macmillan, 1914). Among other earlier works mention should be made of G. D. H. Cole, *Social Theory* (Methuen, 1920). Of the many more recent books dealing with the subject we suggest Morris Ginsberg, *Studies in Sociology* (Methuen, 1932); Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (Harcourt Brace, 1940); Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Oxford University Press, 1946); and R. M. MacIver and Charles Page, *Society: A Textbook of Sociology* (Rinehart and Co., N.Y., 1949). The reader will find that the author's *Community* (Macmillan, various editions) deals from the same standpoint with many of the topics treated in the present text.

CHAPTER I

The social significance of the division of labour was first given convincing though one-sided expression in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (Everyman Edition is convenient). Of modern sociological studies a particularly interesting work is Durkheim's *Division du Travail Social* (Paris, 2nd ed., 1902). On the subject of the relation of the state to other associations, see Cole's *Social Theory* and Laski's *Authority in the Modern State* (Yale University Press, 1919).

The topics of this chapter are treated in *Community*, Book I and Book II, cc. III and IV.

CHAPTER II

The nature of the village community is discussed from different viewpoints in Gomme's *Village Community* (Contemporary Science Series, London, 1890), Seebohm's *English Village Community* (Longmans, London, 6th ed., 1890), Maine's *Village Communities in the East and West* (London, 1876), and Mavor's *Economic History of Russia*, Book V, cc. I and II (Dent, London, 1914). For early society see Alexander Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization* (New York, 1922). For the ancient city community see Zimmern's *Greek Commonwealth* (Oxford University Press,

2nd ed., 1915), Will Durant, *The Life of Greece* (New York, 1939), De Coulanges' *Cité Antique* (Hachette, Paris, 11th ed., 1885), and George H. Sabine, *History of Political Theory*, cc. I, II (New York, 1937). The structure of medieval society may be studied in Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire* (Macmillan, London, rev. ed., 1902), Lipson's *Introduction to the Economic History of England*, Vol. I (Black, London, 1915) and the *Cambridge Medieval History*. For the guilds see Unwin's *The Gilds and Companies of London* (Methuen, London, 1908). On the industrial revolution see Toynbee's *Industrial Revolution* (2nd ed., Longmans, London, 1912). L. C. A. Knowles, *The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain* (London, 1926), J. Hobson, *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism* (London, 1926), J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Rise of Modern History* (London, 1927), and Bücher's *Industrial Evolution* (tr. Wickett, Holt, N.Y., 1912). A graphic picture of the various stages is given in Wells's *Outline of History* (Cassell, London, 1920).

CHAPTER III

On the physical environment see in particular Ratzel's *History of Mankind* (3 vols., tr. Butler, Macmillan, London, 1896), Miss Semple's *Influences of Geographic Environment* (Holt, N.Y., 1911), Franklin Thomas's *The Environmental Basis of Society* (New York, 1925) and Huntington's *Civilization and Climate* (Yale University Press, 1915). On the city environment there is much literature, from which we may select Geddes's *Cities in Evolution* (Williams and Norgate, London, 1915), E. W. Burgess (ed.), *The Urban Community* (University of Chicago Press, 1926), Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (New York, 1934), and Sir Hubert Smith's *The New Survey of London Life and Labour* (London, 9 vols., 1930–5). On the economic environment, in addition to works listed below, reference may be made to the acute analyses by Veblen in a series of writings, such as *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (Macmillan, N.Y., 1899) and *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* (Macmillan, N.Y., 1915). For the last section there is no better book than Wallas's *The Great Society* already cited.

Community, Book III, cc. I and VII, deals with this subject.

CHAPTER IV

The literature treating of the subject of this chapter is still meagre. A short analysis is given in Cole, *Social Theory*. The subject is dealt with in the author's *Community*, Bk. II, cc. II, III, and more fully in *Society: A textbook of Sociology*, c. XIII.

CHAPTER V

On the relation between the state and other associations, see Cole, op cit., and Laski's *Problem of Sovereignty* (Yale University Press, 1917), and his *Authority in the Modern State*, and R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York, 1947), c. XII. The relation of church and state is discussed in Figgs's *Churches in the Modern State* (2nd ed., Longmans, London, 1914). The principle of decentralization or 'federalism' is

advocated by a number of French writers, for example Paul Boncour in *La Fédéralisme Economique.* On nationality and internationalism see Zimmern's *Nationality and Government* (Chatto & Windus, London, 1918), Angell's *Foundations of International Polity* (Heinemann, London, 1914), Delisle Burns's *Political Ideals* (Oxford University Press, 1915), and A. C. Ewing, *The Individual, the State and World Government* (London, 1946). The problem of the economic order found its most incisive statement in the *Communist Manifesto* by Marx and Engels. On the subject of economic 'reconstruction' see, e.g. Tawney's *Sickness of an Acquisitive Society* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1920), and William H. Beveridge, *Full Employment in a Free Society* (London, 1945).

CHAPTER VI

The further study of social evolution involves not so much the reading of 'textbooks' on the subject as of the broader histories of man and society such as, to select from a multitude of works, Westermarck's *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* (Macmillan, London, 1906), Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution* (Chapman, London, 1906), and histories of civilization such as that of Seignobos (Fisher Unwin, London, 1909). For an introduction to this study Marvin's little book *The Living Past* (Oxford University Press, 1913) is admirable. On the subject of Section II, see Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* (Macmillan, London, 1901), Henderson's *Fitness of the Environment* (Macmillan, N.Y., 1913), Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid* (Heinemann, London, 1910). On the effect of war on society see Nicolai's *Biology of War* (Century Co., N.Y., 1918). A fine series of studies on the psychology of war and peace is contained in Gardner Murphy (ed.), *Human Nature and Enduring Peace* (Boston, 1945). On the control of disease see Arthur Newsholme, *Evolution of Preventive Medicine* (Baltimore, 1927), and Bernhard J. Stern, *Society and Medical Progress* (Princeton University Press, 1941). For Section III reference may be made to the works of Mr. and Mrs. Webb, particularly *Problems of Modern Industry* (Longmans, 1902 ed.), Cole's *Self-Government in Industry* (Bell, London, 1918), Russell's *Roads to Freedom* (Allen, London, 1918), M. H. Dobb, *Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress* (London, 1925), and Stuart Chase, *The Economy of Abundance* (New York, 1934). The whole subject of the chapter is treated in *Community*, Book III.

CHAPTER VII

The subject of this chapter is treated in *Community*, Book III, cc. III–V. A good account of the evolution of the state in the community may be found in Jenks's *The State and the Nation* (Dent, London, 1919).

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